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This thesis aims to analyse the relationship between games (be 
they board games, video games or sports) and the concept of fun.  More 
specifically the attempt is to build on Bernard Suits’ well-known 
definition of game-playing (‘the voluntary attempt to overcome 
unnecessary obstacles’) by citing a reason that there might be an 
attempt to overcome those obstacles, namely for the purpose of fun.   
In order to prosecute this idea, a technical use of ‘fun’ will be 
needed (i.e. capital-F ‘Fun’) in an attempt at more precision than a folk 
understanding would allow.  The new concept of ‘Fun’ will be 
stipulated as the intersection between the psychological state of flow, 
and the experience of fun (as understood in the folk sense as a form of 
pleasure pursued for its own sake).  The hope is that using this version 
of fun, as a lens for games, will have downstream benefits for other 
approaches, such as viewing games as an activity to be valued, an idea 







What do Monopoly, tennis, poker, a video game like 
The Last of Us (2013) and a children’s game of Cops and 
Robbers all have in common?  In some sense the answer is 
obvious; they are of course all games.  But why should this 
be?  These examples are certainly dissimilar from each other 
in a variety of ways but the fact we call them all games, so 
the argument goes, means that perhaps there is some 
feature that links them all.  Alternatively, we might be 
despairing of an answer to their commonality and follow 
Wittgenstein’s line of thinking that there are, in fact, no 
essential features of games, only overlapping ‘family 
resemblances’ (see Wittgenstein, 1968[1953], §65-71).   
Wittgenstein’s family resemblances idea suggests that 
categories in general, and the concept of games in particular, 
might work something like a family with members who 
share no one common trait (be they physical or 
psychological) but instead have some features in common 
with a few members, who in turn have different features in 
common with others.  This popular analogy for the way 
 
 8 
games might lack one defining common characteristic came 
into question in the second half of the twentieth century, 
however, after games theorist Bernard Suits offered a 
definition of game-playing as ‘the voluntary attempt to 
overcome unnecessary obstacles’ (Suits, 1978, p. 43).   
It can be claimed that Suits gave us the first, and 
perhaps best, reason to believe the door may be open to an 
essentialist conception of games after all.  Suits himself 
cited Wittgenstein’s scepticism regarding an essentialist 
definition of games when he came to write his introduction 
to The Grasshopper (Suits, 1978, pp. i-ix) subsequently 
positioning himself as the architect of an explicitly 
essentialist definition of ‘game-playing’.  Although Suits 
assumes some words can be defined, he accepts that others 
may not, taking seriously Wittgenstein’s advice to search for 
the commonalities of games rather than relying on 
assumptions.  This agnosticism about definability, of course, 
backs Suits’ claim that he has not set out ‘some kind of anti-
anti-definitional manifesto’ (1978, p. x) in The Grasshopper, 
and that his project is instead more relevant for the local 
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case of games rather than making broader comment 
regarding definitions. 
This dissertation is primarily an attempt to add to 
Bernard Suits’ definition of game-playing.  As remarkable as 
the Suits definition is, the key claim made here will be that 
it might be improved upon if it were to make mention of 
‘fun’.  Suits sees an open-ended definition of game-playing as 
a benefit, and thus able to encompass different reasons for 
playing games (such as for status or prizemoney) (Suits, 
1978, pp. 142-153).  I suggest that we needn’t lose anything 
by narrowing Suits’ understanding of game-playing to being 
‘an activity that provokes fun’ seeing as this needn’t rule out 
playing games for money and status in addition to fun. 
Moreover, giving a reason, such as fun, for why one should 
want to ‘overcome unnecessary obstacles’, it will be argued, 
can avoid the original definition’s apparent circularity 
whereupon a game’s rules are accepted in order for that very 
game to exist.   
A definition that includes fun may also give some hint 
as to why games may be valued in the first place.  Such a 
view of the value of games and game-playing would 
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necessarily be a variation on Suits’ view that games ought to 
be prized for being the sole activity to be performed in an 
ideal utopia (Suits, 1978, p. 171).  Much of what Suits writes 
will still be endorsed however (including his views on the 
value of games) seeing as the attempt here will be an 
extension of The Grasshopper rather than a radical 
overhauling of the ideas in it.  The inclusion of ‘fun’ as a 
reason behind Suits’ conception of game-playing (and the 
purpose of utopian activities) is suggested here, in no small 
part, due to the intuitive link we often feel between games 
and fun.  Indeed, doesn’t it just seem correct that fun and 
games are linked?   
For their protagonists, projects in philosophy are often 
seen as intrinsically worthwhile, yet it is always useful to 
justify them even when their value seems obvious.  This 
particular dissertation seems to be one such project, it 
striking the author that the goal – to articulate the 
relationship between fun and games – should be obviously 
valuable as knowledge for its own sake.  Perhaps the most 
important justification for such a project, however, is that 
studies into games and fun – topics that humans are 
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spending an increasing amount of time thinking and writing 
about as demonstrated by the rise of the fields of ‘games 
studies’ and ‘funology’ – are hampered by a lack of clear 
understanding of what precisely we are talking about when 
we use these terms.   
Indeed, it can be questioned whether investigations 
into fun and games can ever make any real progress without 
a definitive way of determining exactly which things are fun, 
which things are games, and further, what the relationship 
is between the two.  This current project is then surely 
valuable for those who wish to be precise when using the 
terms ‘game’ and ‘fun’.  This includes, but is not limited to, 
governments drafting legislation and making funding 
decisions; sports bodies distinguishing between sports, 
games and non-games; as well as journalists, students and 
theorists when writing about games and fun. 
The attempt here will be to address two distinct, but 
related, gaps in current knowledge.  The first goal will be an 
articulation of the precise link between fun and games, a 
connection that appears real (as evidenced by a strong 
correlation between the words’ use, such as in the phrase 
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‘fun and games’1) but is seemingly not well understood.  In 
order to prosecute this apparent link, we will need to fill a 
second gap in knowledge, and that is the lack of a clear 
theory of fun.  As we will come to find out in the coming 
chapters, fun is claimed to be a basic need for humans 
(Monk, Hassenzahl, Blythe, & Reed, 2002, p. 924), however 
those reading the literature on fun can be forgiven for being 
unclear on the concept’s exact nature.  This is due, in part, 
to the startlingly few theories of fun itself.  Indeed, fun, as a 
distinct topic of study (as opposed to the study of play, 
games and leisure) is surprisingly uncommon.  
This neglect of fun has perhaps only started to change 
in recent years with studies into HCI (or Human-Computer 
Interaction).  In particular, the attempt to produce computer 
programs and online content that is more pleasurable to use 
has lead in recent times to the field known as ‘funology’ (see 
Blythe, Overbeeke, Monk, & Wright, 2003).  Funology has 
resulted in a renewed interest in articulating more precisely 
the differences between play, enjoyment, pleasure, leisure 
                                               
1 ‘Fun and games’ meaning ‘exciting, amusing, or enjoyable activity; goings-
on, carryings-on’ ("Oxford English Dictionary," 2019)) 
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and fun.  Even so, these terms are often used 
interchangeably, even within that field, so it will be part of 
my aim to tease out a clearer understanding of ‘fun’. 
In contrast to fun, one doesn’t have to turn far to see 
those with a keen interest in games.  Games are big 
business, and ubiquitous, despite there still being some lack 
of clarity on exactly what it is to be a game.  Presumably we 
want ‘game’, as a concept, to cover everything from 
association football and basketball through to tabletop 
gaming and video games.  If, as it seems, this is a unified 
category, games would necessarily be responsible for 
generating a huge amount of money for the various 
stakeholders involved, highlighting a level of interest in 
games that is often underestimated.  Even taking video 
games in isolation it is thought that at the time of writing 
the global industry could be worth over US$138 billion a 
year (Ell, 2018).  If we were to include sports such as 
association football in our understanding of games then the 
size of total annual spending on games would also include 
sponsorship, player payments and ticket sales, leading to an 
even more astronomical figure. 
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Serious writings on games have, like fun however, 
until recent times seen less academic scrutiny than might be 
imagined considering such levels of community interest, it 
taking until the middle of the twentieth century before 
Huizinga and Caillois tackled the topic in a rigorous fashion 
(Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, & Tosca, 2013).  There has been 
a flurry of writings on games, though, in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries, not least due to the rise of 
video games and their ever-increasing complexity.  In 
particular, the field known as ‘games studies’ is now 
considered a fully-fledged field of study, with its analysis 
illuminating topics related to both games’ gameplay and 
their narratives.  (As we will see, the dichotomy between the 
two, sometimes seen as a debate between ‘narratology vs. 
ludology’ has, in contemporary writing, been largely seen as 
overstated (see Aarseth, 2001; Frasca, 2003)). 
Recently there have also been parallel strides in 
analytic philosophy to come to terms with how to see games.  
A new journal (The Journal of the Philosophy of Games, 
2018, hosted online by the University of Oslo, Norway) and a 
recent workshop (Inaugural Workshop on the Philosophy of 
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Games, Salt Lake City, 2016) for instance, hope to carve out 
the field of ‘the philosophy of games’.  The idea in this sub-
discipline is to weave together different philosophical 
approaches in order to come to a useful way of thinking 
about games.  Importantly, the philosophy of games usually 
works to a broader conception of games than games studies, 
the latter specifically taking video games to be paradigm 
cases.   
Nguyen (2017) makes the observation that the 
philosophy of games typically attempts analysing games 
with one of two methods; as artefacts (as with games-as-art 
and games-as-text approaches) or as an activity (taking its 
cues from the philosophy of sport).  The explicit hope of 
philosophers of games such as Nguyen, though, is that it 
might be possible to marry the two approaches together in a 
transdisciplinary way that can be used for a variety of 
games, game types and aspects of the game-playing 
experience (Nguyen, 2017, p. 15). 
This weaving together of game-as-artefact and game-
as-activity approaches will inform this current dissertation’s 
rather modest claim (and only slight modification to Bernard 
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Suits): that rules of games are accepted just to make 
possible activities that provoke Fun.  The technical term 
‘Fun’ used here (with a capital-F) will need a full explication, 
but for the moment we can say it will be stipulated to 
describe a version of the psychological state known as ‘flow’ 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) (a concept similar to the folk 
notion of ‘being in the zone’).  More specifically ‘Fun’ will 
cover a subset of flow that is provoked by activities pursued 
purely for their own sake.  In effect, this modification of 
Suits amounts to suggesting that Fun is an essential 
property of games, thus perhaps giving us a way of judging a 
good game and indicating why we would want to play them 
in the first place.  
 Although the following analysis includes discussion of 
‘fun’ (in the folk sense) as a way of arriving at Fun (in a 
technical sense), our project is intended to be descriptive of 
how words are used rather than being prescriptive of how 
they should be used.  Having said that, the use of ‘fun’ in the 
literature appears not to be uniform, so it will be the goal to 
be stipulative in some sense: i.e. in how we are using the 
word and how that differs from other uses in the literature.  
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This necessarily means the goal here is not to attempt an 
overarching survey of how the word ‘fun’ is used in all 
contexts but instead intended to be a somewhat idealised 
abstraction; an attempt to appeal to intuition to find some 
useful tendencies that speakers have when discussing the 
topic.  We can call the attempt in this thesis, then, one of an 
‘explicative definition’, a definition which ‘aims to respect 
some central uses of a term but is stipulative on others.  The 
explication may be offered as an absolute improvement of an 
existing, imperfect concept.’ (Gupta, 2015)  This method of 
definition is thus in contrast to making claims regarding 
inerrant examples of word use from all speakers or 
occasions, which would be needlessly narrow in focus.  So too 
– with the claim that game-playing provokes Fun – it will be 
a necessarily more idealised view of things rather than a set 
of hard and fast rules about the psychological states 
provoked by all examples of game-playing.  It is perhaps 
better to think of the claims in the thesis arising from a ‘best 
case scenario’ about a ‘perfect’ game.  Such a view might be 
then useful for one wanting to design – or modify the rules 
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of – a game, since it would presumably be their aim to create 
the best game possible. 
To argue the case that our technical term ‘Fun’ is 
essential to games (once again in an ideal sense), I will need 
to introduce two specific concepts in turn; games and Fun. 
This scene-setting will be followed by a synthesis of the two 
concepts, after which we shall turn, finally, to an analysis of 
some potential objections.   
The first concept to introduce is that of games in 
general, and in Chapter 1 I will survey the current 
literature on the topic and show why a new lens for games 
might be useful.  We will closely track a recent overview of 
the state of the philosophy of games from Nguyen for this 
purpose (Nguyen, 2017), with the added observation that 
‘fun’ appears noticeably absent from the literature. 
The next concept to be explicated is ‘Fun’, this term 
capitalised due to the technical use introduced in this thesis.  
In Chapter 2, I will show that fun, as it stands, is a concept 
that is not agreed upon, being seen as perhaps too vague, 
and certainly too broad, to be useful.  We need then, this 
related term ‘Fun’, a new word coined so that we can 
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stipulate our precise meaning and be clear in our claims.  
We will also introduce Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) work on 
flow which will be not only vital to explicating the more 
precise use of ‘Fun’ that we will be using in this chapter, but 
also vital more broadly for the later claims to be made in 
this dissertation. 
  Next, the synthesis of the two topics will be discussed 
in Chapter 3. Here, I will argue that the well-known and 
respected definition of ‘game-playing’ from Bernard Suits 
(Suits, 1978) should be endorsed with a slight amendment, 
namely, that it can potentially include the concept of ‘Fun’.  
As it stands the Suits definition in its more detailed form is: 
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing 
about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by 
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because 
they make possible such activity. (Suits, 1978, p. 43) 
   
The change proposed to Suits’ conditions for game-
playing is that instead of the rules of games being accepted 
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just to make possible an activity, that the rules are accepted 
just to make possible an activity that provokes Fun.  In 
other words, the original Suits definition may be correct as 
far as it goes, but more can be said in its articulation.  
Further, this alteration to the definition will have impact on 
some other approaches to games, which will also be 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
Finally, Chapter 4 will be reserved for objections, 
borderline cases and case studies.  Does, for instance, game-
playing provoke Fun in every case?   
Now that we have a sketch for the four chapters I will 
foreshadow the arguments in each, so that the reader has a 
roadmap for the journey we will be embarking on: the 
journey of articulating the link between fun and games.   
Chapter 1 can be seen as a review of the literature on 
games.  We know that much has been written about games 
since the topic was taken up in earnest in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  We will aim to limit the review of the 
game literature, however, to what can be considered 
relevant for the aforementioned area of the philosophy of 
games, a branch of analytic philosophy.  We can trace this 
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movement to three seminal writers; Roger Caillois, Bernard 
Suits and Johan Huizinga.   
We will touch on all three in Chapter 1, from Huizinga, 
who is known for his idea of the ‘magic circle’ (Huizinga, 
2003[1938]) – the notion that a game creates a distinct 
metaphorical space apart from the outside world – to Roger 
Caillois (1961[1958]) who followed Huizinga by offering four 
categories of games which are still used today: Agôn, Alea, 
Mimicry and Ilinx (1961[1958], pp. 11-23).  As we will see 
though, Caillois was sceptical that there was any one 
feature that picked out games from non-games.  It was 
Bernard Suits (1978) who was the most famous advocate of 
such a project, ignoring Wittgensteinian claims that games 
may have no essential features (Wittgenstein, 1968[1953], 
§65), and proposing that games may be defined as ‘the 
voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’ 
(Suits, 1978, p. 43). 
 Later in Chapter 1, we will see how Suits helped 
inspire the idea of ‘formalism’, which, in a games context, is 
a broad term relating to rule-based accounts of games.  For 
Suits this meant that the ‘unnecessary obstacles’ in games 
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might be specified by rules, and then, that these rules might 
be somehow constitutive of the games themselves.  It is 
notable that the most talked about definitions of games still 
make mention of ‘rules’ (e.g. see Avedon & Sutton-Smith 
(1979), Abt (1987), Juul (2003), Crawford (1982), Salen & 
Zimmerman (2003)) and we will also discuss these (and 
other definitions) in Chapter 1.  We can note, though, that 
none of these definitions makes any mention of ‘fun’, even 
when fun is seemingly an intuitive part of what it is to be a 
game.  My hope for this project is that we may be able to say 
that, yes, perhaps rules are a constitutive part of games (as 
per Suits, 1978, p. 43) but so could the reasons for those 
rules.  Such reasons, I claim, may include something like fun 
(or, indeed, ‘Fun’, our technical concept.) 
The latter sections of Chapter 1 will discuss the main 
methods of looking at games used in the philosophy of 
games.  Games under the philosophy of games banner, as I 
will illustrate, and after Nguyen (2017), can be variously 
seen as ‘magic circles’, as artworks, as texts to be analysed 
or as sport-like activities.  Few would claim that either art-
like or text-like properties are essential features of games, 
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however.  This is evident when analysing examples such as 
tennis or golf which appear not to have an art or narrative 
purpose except in the broadest possible sense.  For instance, 
although one could read beauty, social commentary or 
artistic virtues into almost any game, calling all games art 
seems to leave the term ‘art’ devoid of meaning.  So too do 
there seem to be games, such as many sports, that have no 
literal author-written narratives to tell, as a video game 
with written characters might.  This shows us that games-
as-art and game-as-text approaches, although they may be 
enlightening for some examples of games, appear limited 
when attempting an analysis of all games.  Another reason 
that these methods will only see limited coverage in this 
thesis is that both game-as-art and game-as-text approaches 
appear to have little to say about what does seem essential 
to games, and that is rules and the overcoming of obstacles 
(as per Suits (1978)). 
A promising method, instead, and born of the 
philosophy of sport, is to see game-playing as an activity.  By 
activity we mean a focus on the playing of the game – the 
whys and hows of participating – rather than a focus on a 
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game as a ‘thing’, or artefact, that we might want to value in 
and of itself.  This approach could help us answer questions 
of why we would want to play games, and indeed how we 
should play games.  By way of example, how should we 
proceed if there were to be a player at a squash tournament 
with the incorrect equipment?  Do the game’s essential 
features give us any suggestion as to whether we should 
lend the player a racquet?  Philosophers of sport (such as 
Butcher and Schneider (1998) and Simon (2000)) have been 
known to pose these types of questions regarding ‘values’ 
when thinking about games, something our addendum to 
the Suits definition may also help us to do. 
The specific examples relating to squash will be shown 
to have been raised when discussing so-called ‘broad 
internalism’, the idea that there might be something about a 
game that dictates the way we ought to play it (for example 
if it were to be good for the game if everyone played it in 
that particular way) (Butcher & Schneider, 1998; Simon, 
2000).  I will later argue, that if we were to accept a version 
of broad internalism from Simon (2000), that an essential 
feature of a game could then tell us the value of playing 
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games and also help inform what ought to be the values of 
the players who play them.  Assume, for instance, that a so 
called ‘lusory attitude’ (i.e. an attitude of accepting rules just 
to make possible a certain activity) was an essential 
property of a game.  According to Simon’s broad internalism 
it follows that we ought to lend a racquet to a racquet-less 
player so that we are able to have a ‘lusory attitude’ (and 
thus accept the rules just to make possible the activity).   
The claim will be that we might be able to add to this 
the idea that the ‘lusory attitude’ is held for the reason for 
having Fun.  If true, we ought then to lend a racquet-less 
player a racquet not only so that we can accept rules just to 
make possible an activity, but that we do this in order that 
we can have Fun.  This is a normative claim about doing 
something so that we can have Fun, as opposed to the 
alternative of, perhaps, forgoing Fun should the racquet-less 
player not have the correct equipment to play.  In a similar 
way, Simon’s version of ‘interpretive’ broad internalism also 
seems to give us another normative result regarding the 
tinkering of the rules of games.  One could argue that when 
changing the rules of the game we ought to do so not only to 
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make possible the activity, but in order for the game to 
provoke more Fun. 
 To make the case that Fun is an essential part of 
games (and thus contributes to the value of games as 
suggested above) we need to first know what fun is, the topic 
of Chapter 2.  In the limited literature on fun, the writers 
who do touch upon the topic speak of fun being conceptually 
distinct from happiness or pleasure, even if a variety of 
pleasure (Fincham, 2016, p. 200).  Describing the difference 
between fun and happiness (or the difference between fun 
and pleasure, or fun and enjoyment) is less agreed on, 
although some candidates for fun-making (as opposed to 
simply pleasure-making) have been how social the 
experience is (Fincham, 2016, p. 200), how active the 
experience is (Dix, 2004) or how intense the experience is, in 
particular if it is ‘distracting’ or ‘absorbing’ (Blythe & 
Hassenzahl, 2004).  This last point, a distinction between 
distraction and absorption, is supposed to appeal to our 
intuitions that so-called ‘high’ art such as opera, poetry and 
classical music is not properly described as fun, but is 
instead often ‘absorbing’, in a way pop music or Hollywood 
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films are sometimes thought not to be (although claims, 
such as these, from Blythe and Hassenzahl obviously admit 
of exceptions).  
As we will see in Chapter 2, these more semantic 
debates have coincided with the rise of ‘funology’, a small 
field dedicated to making information technology more 
enjoyable to use.  It can be claimed that video game design, 
which overlaps with ‘funology’, has led to the most writings 
on the overarching principles of fun.  Part of my argument, 
however, is that video game accounts of fun are lacking for 
being too video game-centric rather than taking a broader 
view of fun.  We will see, for example, how Sorenson and 
Pasquier (2010, p. 258) prefer to speak purely of fun from 
video games rather than fun qua fun, and even then that fun 
is being used in their writings in a vague way.  Others 
working in games hope to narrow fun down into narrow 
taxonomies of things that provoke fun, doubting that the 
term ‘fun’ is precise enough to use in analytic statements 
(see, for example, Hunicke, LeBlanc, & Zubek, 2004); more 
evidence regarding the vagueness of ‘fun’ in the literature.   
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In Chapter 2, we will point to three key uses of ‘fun’ in 
the limited literature on the topic.  The first, from Martha 
Wolfenstein, is a historical analysis of fun changing after the 
second world war (Wolfenstein, 1951).  The second is the 
only major book dedicated to fun as a distinct topic, Ben 
Fincham’s The Sociology of Fun (Fincham, 2016), and 
finally, we will discuss a treatment of fun by Blythe and 
Hassenzahl (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004).  Using these 
writings, as well as Csikszentmihalyi’s work on the topic of 
flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990]), I aim to illustrate with 
diagrams how each conception of fun talks to each other.  
The diagrams are intended as an aid to clarity, in particular 
highlighting the type of activities that tend to be described 
with each term.   
Flow, a close cousin of fun (see Privette, 1983), has 
garnered much interest after Csikszentmihalyi’s work in 
positive psychology since the 1970s.  Flow can be seen as 
similar to the folk concept of ‘being in the zone’ (Nakamura 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), a state often arising from the 
balance between achievement and skill.  Relating to peak 
performance, Csikszentmihalyi found that flow states were 
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reported by athletes, musicians and painters (among others) 
at times when lost in their work or play.  It will be claimed 
in Chapter 2 that there is some very important overlap here 
between flow and fun. 
In talk of fun we will at times point to what we call the 
‘folk’ use of the word from everyday English speakers.  
Although vague, and with fuzzy boundaries, it will be 
claimed that this fun is the variety of pleasure that is found 
in ‘autotelic’ activities, or in other words, pleasure pursued 
for its own sake.  This goes some way to explain why some 
pleasures that have instrumental ends, such as eating and 
drinking, although potentially enjoyable, may be seen as odd 
to describe as ‘fun’ with a folk use of the term.  It must be 
admitted though, that determining what counts as ‘for its 
own sake’ and, by association, what counts as ‘instrumental’ 
is difficult and is apparently without a useful test. 
For these reasons in Chapter 2, I will aim to introduce 
my own idiosyncratic use of ‘fun’ by stipulating a technical 
version of the term, which we will dub ‘Fun’.  Despairing at 
fully determining any underlying (or exact) principles of fun 
it will be important to be clear on precisely what we mean by 
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the word.  I will show that flow, in particular, is related to 
fun, but that seemingly not all flow-states can be said to be 
fun (such as when one is ‘in the zone’ while working, work 
being an instrumental activity rather than for its own sake) 
and not all things that are said to be fun always put one in 
flow-states (such as going on holiday, which although is done 
for its own sake doesn’t ‘merge action and awareness’ as flow 
states do – at least not during the entire duration of the 
activity).   
The solution, for our purposes, will be to propose Fun 
as the intersection of fun and flow.  (Capital-F) Fun is 
therefore a state of flow, but flow connected with an activity 
that is pursued for its own sake (i.e. fun).  It excludes flow 
states that are not connected to autotelic activities (such as 
from reading for instrumental ends or from working) as well 
as excluding things we do consider autotelic, but which do 
not often provoke flow (such as watching entertainment 
television or going on holiday, seeing as although they may 
be ‘fun’ and pursued ‘for their own sake’, they don’t appear 
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to ‘merge action and awareness’ as flow does2).  Using this 
concept of Fun, we can move forward with the key claims in 
the dissertation. 
In Chapter 3 we can attempt to synthesise existing 
approaches to games with the new concept of Fun as coined 
in Chapter 2.  I will show that perhaps the most promising 
way to do this is to endorse the Bernard Suits definition of 
game-playing in its totality.  Keeping the Suits definition, 
we might benefit from making a small addition to one of the 
conditions, that of the ‘lusory attitude’.  As it stands Suits 
claims that, the rules of games are accepted in order to 
make possible the activity of game-playing itself, which he 
called the ‘lusory attitude’.  It seems we might be able to 
avoid obvious circularity if we were to alter the lusory 
attitude condition to being where the rules are accepted just 
to make possible an activity that provokes Fun.  This results 
in a reason for the rules to exist apart from simply to accept 
                                               
2 There is much debate on which activities reliably produce flow and which 
are unlikely to do so.  Although Csikszentmihalyi (1990) originally cites 
watching television as rarely producing flow, for example, we will see in the 
coming chapters that this example is not without controversy (see Brooker, 
2005 for further discussion). 
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them, while still maintaining the idea the game-playing 
couldn’t exist without the rules. 
By using Fun as part of a definition of ‘game’ this, as 
will be shown, may have an impact on several other ways of 
approaching games as well.  I aim, later in Chapter 3, to 
show how we can use the concept of a ‘magic circle’ in a 
psychological sense to refer to the phenomenological 
distinction between game-playing and non-game-playing.  
Given our amendment to Suits, the claim will be that 
experiencing Fun and its flow states fits nicely in an 
analogue with being ‘inside’ the magic circle. 
The way of viewing games as activities, as per the 
philosophy of sport, may also alter if we were to embrace the 
amendments to Suits proposed here.  As we’ve already seen, 
much of the philosophy of sport raises questions on the value 
of games, and if we are correct about our changes to Suits 
then this seemingly gives us a ready-made answer to our 
value problem.  It seems we would be able to say that games’ 
unique place in society and culture is due, at least partly, to 
the Fun provoked.  Questions as to what makes a good game 
can be determined along ‘interpretive broad internalist’ lines 
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(as mentioned earlier in the introduction) suggesting that 
good games are Fun games.  Further, this can also suggest 
where and when we should change the rules of a game (i.e. 
to make the game more Fun).  It even gives us answers as to 
questions of sportsmanship, for instance our earlier example 
of whether we should lend equipment to a player (namely 
that we should, in order to foster Fun). 
In the final section of Chapter 3 we will look at the 
business of games.  As per our hypothesis of what makes a 
good game being, in part, due to Fun, we will take a brief 
look at what makes a game profitable.  In particular we will 
analyse the recent rise of in-game transactions and whether 
they are a good metric of Fun.  It will be argued that while 
many in-game transactions do not lead to Fun, that they are 
still contingent on Fun, for it is claimed that people will be 
less likely to spend money on games that do not provoke 
Fun.  
In Chapter 4 we will take a deeper look at our theory 
of Fun and the amended Suits definition with some problem 
cases.  First up, the case of Snakes and Ladders, which can 
be argued not to provoke flow seeing as it does not build and 
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increase skill but is instead a game of chance.  The question 
thus becomes whether Snakes and Ladders can be 
considered a game, on our expanded definition of it.  We 
know that flow is an essential part of our concept of Fun, so 
to preserve our theory we will need to investigate whether 
building and increasing skill is, in fact, an essential part of 
flow.  
  Next in the chapter will be a claim that there may be 
a class of games that do not necessarily provoke Fun for 
reasons not of a lack of a flow state, but because of a lack of 
fun.  These games are referred to as ‘serious games’ (those 
being ‘games that train, educate and inform’) (Michael & 
Chen, 2005, see also Flanagan, 2009).  In order to preserve 
the main thesis of this project it will be necessary to argue 
that these so-called serious games are games in name only.  
It is, in fact, the idea that we need a special category for 
‘serious games’ that illustrates they are outliers when it 
comes to games – such outliers that they may not be games 
at all. 
The first case study of a serious game will be the video 
game Dear Esther (2012).  In the game the player is asked 
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to wander slowly around a deserted Hebridean island while 
hearing letters read to an unseen character named Esther.  
The puzzle of Esther’s untimely death is then, piece by piece, 
revealed during the explorations (Kelly, 2012).  With very 
little in tasks for the player to complete, the game relies 
largely on a slow narrative.  It is not hard to see why many 
reviewers questioned the ‘game-ness’ of the game.  Online 
articles with titles like ‘When A Game Is Not a Game’ 
(Fletcher, 2012) and ‘Dear Esther: You’re Not A Real Game 
At All’ (‘bitmob’, 2012) abound.  As well as investigating 
whether Dear Esther can be said to provoke flow, we will 
investigate whether Dear Esther has instrumental ends or 
not, and thus can be considered fun to play (and thus, in 
turn, ‘Fun’ to play). 
I will argue in Chapter 4 that Dear Esther and other 
so-called games with potentially instrumental ends may not 
provoke Fun, and thus may not fit the definition of ‘game’ 
offered here.  Other serious games which might cause 
problems for our amended definition are educational games 
for young children, as well as simulations that help train 
people for work, for example, pilots and those in the armed 
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forces, seeing as they seem to have more instrumental, 
rather than autotelic ends. 
It will be shown that the key to the updated Suits 
definition relies on whether we understand serious games to 
be literally games in the sense of being a subset of games, or 
whether they are game-like and technically misnomers; i.e. 
not games at all.  I will personally argue that these games 
are not games at all and, further, that both the original 
Suits definition and the updated definition should thus 
exclude them.   
The above argument will be illustrated with reference 
to Microsoft Flight Simulator X (2006) (or FSX), as well as 
Microsoft Flight Simulator 2 (1984).  The claim will be that 
because FSX contains optional missions to complete that it 
can be seen as ‘making possible an activity that provokes 
Fun’ and is thus is a true game; a simulation game.  It will 
be claimed that the earlier Microsoft Flight Simulator 2, 
however, which doesn’t have a mission option and only 
simulates aeroplane flight, is perhaps lacking what is known 
as a prelusory goal (the specific goal formed at the outset of 
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the game) and is not a game under either the original or 
updated Suits.  
Finally, in this dissertation will come a brief 
Conclusion.  The aim will have been to illustrate the 
relationship between games and fun, and although fun itself 
will have remained a little elusive, I trust that our coinage 
of ‘Fun’ will have been a useful stand-in.  I will have aimed 
to show that Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow cannot, for 
instance, quite do the job that Fun can.   
By the end of the dissertation I hope to have 
illuminated the idea that Fun may be an essential part of 
games and may even be able to bridge the gap between 
game-as-artefact and game-as-activity approaches.  We will 
be able to see, at once, that games may indeed be artefacts 
consisting of rules but that the rules specifically facilitate 
Fun, and thus Fun may be an important way to judge games 
as artefacts.  Simultaneously, the phenomenal experience of 
Fun implicit in the definition comes from the activity of 
playing the game, and this feeling is, like the rules of the 
game, also one of a game’s essential constitutive 
components.  Using our philosophy of sport insight, this 
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view of games as an activity (as well as also an artefact) may 
even be able to guide us in the playing, and improvement, of 









I will aim now to introduce the first key concept, that of 
games, by noting, as I have in the introduction, that games 
have a much richer tradition in academic scholarship than 
that of the vanishingly small literature on fun, the second 
key concept in this dissertation.  For this reason, I will need 
to delimit my discussion on games to the growing field of the 
philosophy of games, an area that, as mentioned, has seen a 
recent workshop held in Salt Lake City in 2016, a new 
journal published online from 2018 (The Journal of the 
Philosophy of Games), and a Philosophy Compass article 
reviewing the various positions held by those in the field, 
from 2017 (Nguyen, 2017).  These recent developments 
perhaps mean the field is becoming somewhat more defined 
as a discipline although we can trace the field’s origins to 
much earlier than these points of reference.  
At the time of writing, the philosophy of games has 
rather porous boundaries, with the topic not having struck 
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out on its own but rather known for weaving together 
strands from other disciplines.  This can be seen as a feature 
rather than a bug however, and it is in this spirit that I will 
align myself with the field, taking my cues from the recent 
key foundational text ‘Philosophy of Games’ by C. Thi 
Nguyen (Nguyen, 2017).  Whether the future of the 
philosophy of games sees more of a unification of ideas from 
different areas of study or whether one of the strands takes 
pre-eminence is, at this point, unknown.  For now, however, 
there seems little point in ignoring the different lenses that 
are variously used for philosophical approaches to games. 
 Nguyen himself restricts his overview in ‘Philosophy of 
Games’ to philosophical treatments that have at least one 
foot in the analytic tradition, which I think is useful for the 
scope of my thesis.  Various continental writers have had 
much to say on play and games too (see for example Deleuze 
& Guattari, 2008[1980], pp. 351-352; Gadamer, 2013[1960], 
p.106-134; Heidegger, 1994[1984], p.146; and for an 
overview see also Ryall, Russell, & MacLean, 2013), but this 
has little to do with determining what is essential to games 
in the manner we are interested in.  There is, too, the large 
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field known as ‘game studies’, often seen as having links to 
critical and literary theory, that, following Nguyen, we will 
not ignore, but rather acknowledge is too large a field to 
delve into extensively.  This is especially true when, as it 
seems, large swathes of it are orthogonal to our present 
discussions. 
One reason we can talk about a distinct field called the 
philosophy of games at all is the fact that there are some key 
historical texts that have gone on to inspire nearly all 
analytic philosophers who have touched the topic of games 
since.  Nguyen points to three unignorable voices in the 
philosophy of games’ foundation; Huizinga (2003[1938]), 
Caillois (1961[1958]) and Suits (1978), each of whom we will 
discuss in turn. 
 
Foundations 
 Johan Huizinga was responsible for originating the 
concept of the ‘magic circle’, the idea that a game creates a 
metaphorical space that is distinct from the rest of the world 
(2003[1938]).  We will discuss this particular idea in its 
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more contemporary iteration a little later, seeing as it still 
resonates with many writers today.  For the moment though 
we can say that, for Huizinga, what goes on in the magic 
circle when one plays a game is separate from life outside 
the circle, with the game having its own internal reality.  
Disputes, for instance, that make sense when one is playing 
a game are, according to this idea, set aside or forgotten the 
moment we finish playing.  This magic circle perspective is 
an important marker historically because, before Huizinga, 
games were studied largely in terms of their utility for the 
rest of society (such as education, skill development and, 
occasionally, catharsis) rather than as valuable in and of 
themselves (Nguyen, 2017, pp. 2-3). 
Roger Caillois (1961[1958]) is important for following 
Huizinga in also offering a way of looking at games as being 
contained in their own reality but was largely suspicious of 
there being a unified idea of games.  Although Caillois does 
tell us that games have some essential features, such as 
being played voluntarily, of having uncertain outcomes, of 
being unproductive and being ‘make believe’ (Caillois, 
1961[1958], pp. 1-11) he thought of games as belonging to 
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highly distinct categories.  For Caillois, games could either 
belong to the category of Agôn (games which rely on 
competition), Alea (games which rely on chance), Mimicry 
(games which rely on pretending to be someone or 
something) or Ilinx (games which rely on a physical thrill).  
Caillois also writes about the differences of games on a 
spectrum of Ludus on one end and Paidia on the other, or 
playfulness and rule-based restriction respectively (Caillois, 
1961[1958], pp. 11-23).  
The Caillois system is certainly one way of categorising 
games, and has indeed been widely used in the study of 
games, including in a video game context (Egenfeldt-Nielsen 
et al., 2013).  This does not mean the system is without its 
critics however.  Jesper Juul (2005), for example, writes that 
the distinction between the four categories is ‘hard to justify’ 
and that the difference between Ludus and Paidia, in 
particular, comes from the mistaken belief that rules are 
simply limitations.  By this I take him to mean that we can 
be extremely playful even if there are tight rules.  Further, 
one could argue that it is the restriction of rules that makes 
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play possible in the first place, making the distinction 
between Ludus and Paidia, perhaps, unhelpful.  
Although Huizinga and Caillois wrote about the 
necessary qualities of games, it is doubtful they intended 
their writings to advance an all-encompassing essential 
definition of ‘game’.  The fascination with essential, or ‘real’, 
definitions of the word ‘game’, particularly boiled down to a 
pithy passage, has its own tradition and can be traced back 
at least as a far as Wittgenstein.  In his Philosophical 
Investigations (1968[1953], §65) rather than proposing his 
own definition of games, Wittgenstein articulated doubts 
about the possibility of ever arriving at a necessary and 
sufficient understanding of the concept.  His tactic was 
asking us to ‘look and see’ if there was anything in common 
with all games rather than just assuming that there was.  
His point was a broader one, arguing against the 
essentialism of concepts generally and not just of games, but 
his argument had particular significance for those who were 
actually in the business of writing about games themselves. 
It was in reference to games that Wittgenstein 
introduced an alternative way of thinking about concepts.  
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According to him, at least some concepts might have 
overlapping features rather than one essential feature that 
binds them together.  He mentions various games and their 
dissimilarities, wondering if they might work a little like a 
family.  Some members might share one facial feature in 
common, and other might share a feature of temperament, 
and so on in various overlapping ways, but without there 
being one attribute that all members of that family share.  If 
this could be true of families, the same might be true of 
games (Wittgenstein, 1968[1953], §65-71). 
It took perhaps until Bernard Suits and his book The 
Grasshopper (1978) for someone to actually take 
Wittgenstein at his word and re-investigate the 
commonalities of games.  For this project, Suits made sure 
to keep his definition of game to what he saw as the real 
meaning of ‘game’, accepting that there were often 
metaphorical and figurative uses of the word that we need to 
ignore when defining terms.  The Olympic Games, to use 
just one Wittgensteinian example can thus be seen, if we 
take Suits’ point, to be games in name only (Suits, 2005, p. 
167).   
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The Suits definition, in its succinct form, is of game-
playing as ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles’ (1978, p. 43) and is very influential in the 
philosophy of sport and games.  Indeed, Kretchmar (2008) 
calls the Suits definition the ‘gold standard’ in definitions of 
game, with some writers appearing to adopt Suits as an 
almost default position (see for example Hurka and 
Tasioulas (2006) and Kagen (2009)).  Recall, in the longer 
form of the definition that Suits tells us: 
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing 
about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by 
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because 
they make possible such activity. (Suits, 1978, p. 34) 
 
An important point that needs to be noted at the outset 
is that most writers on the ontology of games are attempting 
to describe a game, whereas Suits is technically defining 
‘game-playing’.  One of the disadvantages of defining ‘game-
playing’ is that it can leave the definition too broad.  For 
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example, those defining ‘game’, rather than ‘game-playing’ 
as Suits has done, can largely negate criticisms like those of 
McBride (1979) who argues that competitive running, 
competitive fishing and ice-skating all appear to meet Suits’ 
definition of ‘game-playing’.  
Suits’ reply is to accept that competitive running, 
competitive fishing and ice-skating may, in fact, be game-
playing.  Suits admits that every-day language use and his 
definition come apart at times and is seemingly unapologetic 
about it.  For Suits, although analysis about the way we 
usually speak is helpful to a point, once we draw a 
meaningful distinction between games and non-games it 
might be that we can use the definition to find that things 
are games that we would not usually call games.  This is 
where, potentially, Suits might be seen at his weakest, but a 
delineation between game and non-game needs to be made 
at some point.  We will, in this thesis, largely follow where 
Suits has drawn his line for games, admitting that it may 
remain a slightly counter-intuitive line for everyday uses of 
the word ‘game’. 
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There are also further objections to Suits’ definition, 
however.  Particularly relevant are the accusations that the 
definition is too narrow, an objection also articulated by 
McBride (1979).  McBride cites the simple act of the 
imitation of the orbits of the Sun, Earth and Moon (or SEM, 
which Wittgenstein himself apparently once engaged in) as 
an example of a game ‘par excellence’.  The game, based on a 
recollection of Wittgenstein by Norman Malcomb, is outlined 
thusly: 
 
Once after supper, Wittgenstein, my wife and I went for a walk 
on Midsummer Common. We talked about the movements of the 
bodies of the solar system. It occurred to Wittgenstein that the 
three of us should represent the movements of the sun, earth 
and moon, relative to one another. My wife was the sun and 
maintained a steady pace across the meadow; I was the earth 
and circled her at a trot. Wittgenstein took the most strenuous 
part of all, the moon, and ran around me while I circled my wife. 
Wittgenstein entered into this game with great enthusiasm and 
seriousness, shouting instructions at us as he ran. He became 
quite breathless and dizzy with exhaustion (cited in McBride, 




McBride makes the point that if we were using Suits’ 
definition it would result in SEM not qualifying as a game, 
when it does indeed appear to be a clear example of one.  For 
McBride, it seems that the one ‘rule’ of the game (to 
represent the sun, earth and moon) does not seem to place a 
restriction on the goal, a restriction being a necessary factor 
in a Suitsian game.  As McBride wants to say, the ‘specific 
state of affairs’ that the game is intended to bring about (or 
‘prelusory goal’ to use Suits’ own terminology), and the ‘rule’ 
seem to be one and the same, suggesting to him that SEM 
has no constitutive rules (being the rules that dictate the 
less efficient way of doing things rather than the more 
efficient) and only a prelusory goal.  We will talk more about 
the possibility of rule-less games later, but for the moment 
we can say that if we are able to find examples of rule-less 
games, it then spells a very serious problem for Suits, and 
essentialist versions of Suits-inspired accounts. 
 Suits reply is two-fold, having an each way bet 
regarding whether SEM is a game or not (seemingly not 
trusting either Frank McBride or Norman Malcomb to be 
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the arbiters).  He makes the plausible suggestion that not 
impeding the Sun, Earth, or Moon might be a (hidden) rule 
of SEM and thus giving SEM the restriction required to be a 
game.  If we doubt this though, Suits wants to tell us that 
we can’t automatically assume SEM even is a game just as 
we can’t automatically assume foot-racing is not a game 
(Suits, 1981). 
Despite these McBride-style of objections, both Suits’ 
definition, and, more broadly, his approach of seeing games 
as sets of rules have proved very influential.  The idea of 
seeing games as set of rules, in particular, is an approach we 
may describe as ‘formalism’, an umbrella term that 
describes those theories that see the essence, or constitutive 
elements of games to be something like their rule-sets 
(Nguyen, 2017, p. 9).  Following Suits, rule-based accounts 
of games have an important, perhaps even dominant, level 
of support.  Therefore, in the following section we will touch 
on several rule-based definitions that have been proposed as 





One definition of games inspired by Suits and other 
formalist accounts, is from Clark C. Abt where he suggests 
of games: 
 
Reduced to its formal essence, a game is an activity among two 
or more independent decision-makers seeking to achieve their 
objectives in some limiting context. A more conventional 
definition would say that a game is a context with rules among 
adversaries trying to win objectives. (Abt, 1987) 
 
The Abt account faces the problem of describing games as 
necessarily adversarial.  While no doubt this is true of some 
games, indeed many games, surely not all games should be 
seen in these terms.  Card-games such as Patience and 
Solitaire that are played by one person would certainly be 
strange if described as an adversarial game unless in the 
broadest sense.  Similarly, the narrowing of Suits’ talk of a 
specific state of affairs of games (i.e. the prelusory goal) to be 
specifically about winning or losing doesn’t seem correct.  In 
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addition, video games would be strange if their programs 
were to be referred to as ‘independent decision-makers’ and 
stranger still if the programs themselves were described as 
having objectives.  This leaves this particular definition with 
seemingly little improvement over Bernard Suits’ 
Grasshopper definition. 
 Turning to writers who attempt to be inclusive of video 
games, Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman (2003) were struck 
by Chris Crawford’s (1982) contribution of a list of four 
‘primary qualities’ of games.  These are representation (i.e. a 
subset of reality that represents things extrinsic to the 
game), interaction (i.e. the provoking of cause and effect), 
conflict (i.e. the overcoming of obstacles) and safety (i.e. lack 
of harm despite the conflict).  Crawford’s further observation 
that games can be described as a ‘system’ (i.e. ‘a collection of 
parts which interact with each other, often in complex ways’) 
(Crawford, 1982, cited in Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, p. 77) 
is perhaps his most profound contribution, and this point 
was picked up by Salen and Zimmerman as well as Juul 
(2003).  Their more recent definitions (and definitions which 
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were specifically written to be inclusive of video games) both 
date from 2003.   
Firstly, from Salen and Zimmerman: 
 
A game is a system in which players engage in an artificial 
conflict, defined by rules, that results in a quantifiable outcome. 
(Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, p. 80) 
 
Which we can compare to the somewhat similar Juul 
definition: 
 
A game is a rule based formal system with a variable and 
quantifiable outcome, where different outcomes are assigned 
different values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the 
outcome, the player feels attached to the outcome and the 
consequences of the outcome are optional and negotiable. (Juul, 
2003) 
 
One notable outlier in the definition of games is the 
only definition appearing in the broader literature that 
omits the condition of rules, and thus is unique for not being 
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explicitly influenced by rule-based formalism.  This 
definition, from Greg Costikyan, proposes: 
 
A game is a form of art in which participants, termed players, 
make decisions in order to manage resources through game 
tokens in the pursuit of a goal. (Costikyan, cited in Salen & 
Zimmerman, 2003, Chapter 7, p.8) 
   
Salen and Zimmerman call the reference to art 
‘provocative’ (Chapter 7, p. 8) and it is unclear what 
Costikyan really means by ‘art’ or how this point adds to the 
definition.  Certainly, as part of an essential definition a 
reference to art is problematic unless a precise definition of 
the term can be articulated.  This is perhaps the major 
problem for this account but not the sole one, seeing as the 
condition of ‘managing resources’ also seems obscure, and 
perhaps inadequate in describing examples such as Snakes 
and Ladders. 
  Once we take Costikyan to be an outlier, we may say 
that, since Suits, the most notable definitions: Salen and 
Zimmerman (2003), Juul (2003) as well as the Avendon and 
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Sutton-Smith (1979), are so similar that it shows that the 
literature is almost at consensus at a definition of game, at 
least for those advocates of a formalist account.   
Although any view that uses ‘rules’ or ‘rule-based 
systems’ as a necessary condition of games would be 
troubled if there existed games with no rules, the response is 
usually to broaden the conception of rules, which does 
appear to be a legitimate move.  This is motivated by the 
worry that if we can find just one game without rules then 
this fact scuttles not just the accounts mentioned, but all 
potential Suits-style formalist approaches.  We have already 
talked about Wittgenstein’s SEM game, but children’s dress 
up games or a game of ‘House’ or ‘School’ also can be argued 
to stretch the proposed conditions of ‘rules’ or ‘unnecessary 
obstacles’ too far under a suitably narrow conception of rules 
(for example if rules required formal consequences such as 
‘missing a turn’).  A more controversial position is the 
contention that video games, too, might be rule-less.  Mia 
Consalvo, and other formalists debate this, claiming the 
computer code gives rise to the rules for a video game: ‘The 
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rules of a videogame are contained within the game itself, in 
the game code’ (Consalvo, 2009a, p. 85). 
Noted philosopher of law Neil McCormack, has a 
useful description of rules as ‘hypothetical propositions, 
stipulating that if certain circumstances ... obtain, then 
certain consequences are to (or ‘must’ or ‘ought to’) follow or 
be implemented.’ (MacCormick, 1994, p. x)  This still leaves 
broader or narrower interpretation for what qualifies as a 
‘certain consequence’.  One corollary may be that all games 
with winners and losers, at least potentially, have rules, 
seeing as winning and losing seems unambiguously a 
‘certain consequence’.    
But, do all games have rules?  ‘House’ and other 
similar games involve play where children assume roles, 
such as pretending to be mothers, fathers and children.  In 
this type of imaginative play there needn’t be winners or 
losers, but the structure appears to still make the activity a 
game.  Dress-up games are a variation on the idea, and 
sometimes the two merge (imagine a child putting on her 
mother’s high-heel shoes in attempt to play the role of a 
businesswoman).   
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I think we can afford to be sceptical about citing a lack 
of rules in these types of games however.  Instead, a 
charitable reading of formalism sees dress up games and the 
like as potentially having rules of a more social kind.  If a 
child is annoyed at their father for dressing up in a silly way 
in a dress-up game, for instance, this may be because the 
father is breaking the rules of the game in some sense (thus 
implying that there are rules to children’s play of this kind).  
Further, a consequence of a certain miming action where a 
child moves their hands in a particular way, for instance, 
might be that it counts as ironing a shirt in a game of 
‘House’ for instance.  Although not a formal consequence 
such as ‘losing a turn’, it does appear possible then that 
these games have rules of some description. 
Video games almost always have a win/loss mechanic 
thus being one indicator that they, too, are not examples of 
rule-less games.  Even video games that lack win/loss 
mechanics still appear to bring about a ‘specific state of 
affairs’ (as per Suits) suggesting they are true games.  One 
could plausibly debate whether computer code could be seen 
as a ‘hypothetical proposition’ as per McCormack’s definition 
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but ‘certain consequences’ certainly follow when the code is 
implemented, thus once again a charitable reading of 
formalism can see computer code containing rules on that 
score.  It appears then, to me at least, that video games are 
at least a plausible case regarding games with rules.   
When we look at video games, dress up games, ‘House’ 
as well as ‘School’ it appears likely that they could all have 
rules of some variety or other.  Indeed, ‘rules’ should 
perhaps be seen as a stand-in for some sort of limitation or 
constraint on how play should be organised, whether or not 
they take the form of an explicit instruction.  It is then easy 
to see the popularity of games-as-rules approaches, seeing as 
they potentially cover all examples of games (as long as 
‘rules’ is read broadly enough). 
 We know, however, that being a set of rules can’t be all 
there is to games.  Portions of legislation such as the ‘road 
rules’ are also a set of rules; thus, we know there must be 
something over and above simply being a set of rules that 
makes games special.  What could it be, besides simply 
being rules, that determines games’ unique place in society?   
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We will come to Bernard Suits’ insights on the lusory 
attitude of rule-following in Chapter 3, where he suggests 
that games’ rules are special for making possible the very 
activity of the game.  For the moment though we can note 
that games as rule-sets is an idea found (although not 
without exception) in each of the four major ways that the 
philosophy of games approaches games: as ‘magic circles’, as 
art, as text, or as sport.  We will turn first to Huizinga and 
his concept of ‘magic circles’.   
 
Games as Magic Circles 
Recall Huizinga and his idea of the ‘magic circle’: 
magic circles being the things that somehow mark the 
boundary between game-life and normal-life.  Implicit in 
this is ideas of formalism, as per Bernard Suits: that it is 
somehow rules that, at least in part, draw the dividing line 
between game and non-game.  The precise nature of that 
divide is open to interpretation: the idea has been used as 
something of a blank canvas to talk about a variety of 
aspects of game-playing, from the divide between the mind-
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set of playing and non-playing, to the social contract implicit 
in playing games versus not-playing games. 
The magic circle concept has certainly seen its fair 
share of criticism. It can be argued that having a distinct 
reality is too broad to pick out games uniquely, as there are 
a great many concepts that have their own distinct, internal 
realities outside games.  In fact, almost every facet of life 
(from home life to work to school) can be said to have its own 
traditions and meanings that are only relevant in its own 
context or ‘circle’ (Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al., 2013).  It is 
ironic, under this line of thinking, that the magic circle 
supposedly marks a distinction from reality but playing a 
game appears not to be particularly distinct for creating that 
distinction.   
Another critique is the question of how distinct games 
actually are as ‘magic circles.’  Mia Consalvo, for instance, 
writes; ‘… we cannot say that games are magic circles, 
where the ordinary rules of life do not apply.  Of course they 
apply…’ (Consalvo, 2009b, p. 411).   By this Consalvo means 
things like the laws of physics and social norms are not 
suspended when games are played (at least not all social 
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norms).  Games then seem not to be completely distinct from 
the rest of our lives.  We will, however, see opposition 
against this line of thinking in Chapter 3 from Eric 
Zimmerman (2012) who claims that this style of argument – 
that game-playing is distinct from reality in every respect – 
is a straw-man version of the idea that literally no-one 
would endorse. 
Huizinga’s magic circle idea has been taken up in a 
slightly different way by Castronova (2004), who sees the 
magic circle idea in normative terms.  For Castronova we 
ought to keep the world of games separate from the rest of 
culture otherwise everyday culture will contaminate, and 
ultimately dominate the game.  Castronova suggests this 
will spell the end of the game as, in his words, ‘the game will 
be over, the fantasy will be punctured, the illusion will be 
ended for good’ (Castronova, 2004, p. 196).  We can take this 
not to mean that literally that no one will play games any 
more but rather, games would have lost their ‘unique appeal’ 
(Egenfeldt-Nielsen et al., 2013). 
 One argument against hard-line magic circle 
approaches is true for formalist approaches more generally: 
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if the playing of the game goes on inside the rules then what 
of those people playing outside of the rules, or cheating?  
According to critics, those taking the magic circle as a 
descriptive account of games (as opposed to the normative 
reading as seen by Castronova) seemingly have to admit 
that those operating outside the rule-set, and presumably 
magic circle, are not playing the game – resulting in the 
counter-intuitive idea that cheaters are not players.   
The example Consalvo gives of operating outside the 
rules is when players use a small program, or mod, called a 
‘glider’ while playing the video game World of Warcraft 
(2004) (Consalvo, 2009b, pp. 412-413).  The glider automates 
some of the mundane actions that a player must perform to 
progress to later levels, and in the gaming community this is 
understandably considered cheating or playing outside the 
rules, and thus, it appears, outside the magic circle.  
Consalvo reasons that magic circle approaches can’t 
accommodate this fact, seeing as this ‘gliding’ activity 
happens outside the rule-set that defines the circle but 
surely still impacts on what occurs ‘inside’ the magic circle 
despite the supposed distinction.  Further, while gliding 
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players are not playing the game by the rules it would seem 
odd to claim they are not playing at all, a position that some 
critics, like Consalvo (2009b, pp. 412-413), argue that magic 
theorists are obliged to maintain.  Similarly, there are 
countless examples of things going on ‘in-game’ that have 
impacts outside the magic circle, the winning of prize money 
for in-game achievements being one example, but also the 
selling of a character (known as an avatar) for real-world 
money as also described by Consalvo (2009b, p. 412). 
Many of these objections can be countered with a less 
‘hard-line’ version of magic circle theory, however.  
Zimmerman (2012), for instance, tells us that the hard-line 
magic circle theorist is a caricature, or ‘straw-man’ position.  
As such, Zimmerman suggests that a magic circle theorist 
need not have it that game-life is completely distinct from 
real life, a claim we will hear more about later.   
While magic circle approaches don’t appear to work 
well as essential accounts, or definitions, they do seem to 
say something about how the playing of games appears, at 
least for some, artificial in the sense of not being for any 
ends other than the playing itself.  We can see, here, that 
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magic circle approaches often work with formalist 
approaches that cite rules of games as existing for no other 
ends than to make possible an activity.  This kind of claim, 
as we will see in more detail in Chapter 3, is of the variety 
that Bernard Suits would seem to endorse.   
We will return in Chapter 3 to magic circles with a 
slightly different bent.  We will see how magic circles since 
Salen and Zimmerman (2003) have been something of a 
blank canvas on which to project.  One way of seeing magic 
circles is as a dichotomy not between social contracts 
between players, nor reality and imagination, but between 
the particular psychological state between playing and not-
playing, also known as the ‘psychological bubble’ (Stenros, 
2014).  This will be shown to have relevance to our second 
key concept, Fun, as to be discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Games as Texts 
After magic circles, games as texts can be seen as the 
second method with which to view games.  The utility of 
methods that see games as narrative texts has been a 
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central debate in the transdisciplinary field of ‘game 
studies’.  As mentioned earlier, this field of study, which is 
distinct, but related to, analytic-style philosophy of games, 
has a large body of literature surrounding it that is only 
tangentially related to our concerns, so we will only sketch 
the points relevant to the philosophy of games here.  It is 
important to note that the paradigm cases of games in game 
studies are video games, even though we know not all 
examples of games run on a computer.  Debates on whether 
the appropriate methodology for studying games is as a text 
or to concentrate on their game-play mechanics is sometimes 
known as the ‘ludology versus narratology’ debate in game 
studies, one that dominated the field for some years but is 
seemingly now dormant.   
We can perhaps trace this ludology/narratology 
controversy to Janet Murray’s analysis of the video game 
Tetris and it its block-stacking gameplay as a comment on 
late-capitalism (Murray, 2017[1997]), a then-novel way of 
reading a game as a political text.  This approach appeared 
to worry those who felt this method was too closely aligned 
with narratology, as seen in areas such as literary studies, 
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and thus setting a dangerous precedent for further studies of 
games.  In recent years, however, it is more common to see 
articles attempting to roll back this type of debate or frame 
the ludology/narratology dichotomy as overstated.  It is 
reasonably common instead for those in games studies to 
acknowledge that games have unique gameplay mechanics 
as well as having (at least sometimes) narrative elements, 
and that these can live in harmony (see for example the 
aptly titled ‘Ludologists love stories, too: notes from a debate 
that never took place’ (Frasca, 2003)).  Even supposed 
polemics (for example, ‘Computer Game Studies, Year One’ 
(Aarseth, 2001)) which had apparently been read by some as 
a call to arms against narratology, with careful inspection 
make it clear that they endorse reading narratives as a 
potentially valid method of analysing games. 
It is ludology that explicitly views the rule-set of a 
game as relevant to its analysis (Nguyen, 2017, p. 4) but 
increasingly common are methods that attempt to 
incorporate the view that the rules shape narrative as well 
as game-play.  For example, parallel to games studies, are 
ideas such as that taken up by Robson and Meskin who 
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suggest that, at least some, games may be ‘self-involving 
interactive fictions’ (or SIIFs) (Robson & Meskin, 2016).3   
The claim is that SIIFs ‘differ from standard examples 
of interactive fictions by being, in some important sense, 
about those who consume them’ (p. 165).  Robson and 
Meskin claim their view of SIIFs is compatible with 
Walton’s view of fictional works such that there is a 
distinction between truth in the ‘work world’ (the world 
where the work is set) and truth in the ‘game world’ (the 
world of the audience observing the work) (Walton, 1990, pp. 
58-61).  This method draws a reasonably direct line from 
traditional narratives to SIIFs with the added controversial 
claim that what happens to the consumer of the narrative 
(according to the rules of the game or text) is fictionally true, 
of the real-life consumer.  Defeating a ‘boss’ in a game then 
is, according to this view, fictionally true of the avatar but 
also of a living person, one reason that SIIFs are claimed to 
be the philosophically interesting category. 
                                               
3 It is important to note that Robson and Meskin intend their argument to be 
read as broader than simply referring to (some) video game fictions and can 
include things such as Choose Your Own Adventure books. 
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Purely game-as-text approaches without any reference 
to rules, however, are (and generally speaking) not as 
common in the philosophy of games.  While many video 
games can have narratives, and, of course, almost anything 
can be read as a text, focussing purely on narratives doesn’t 
necessarily analyse what we are assuming to be an essential 
part of games: and that is rules and the overcoming of 
obstacles.  One, of course, could argue that this is a flaw of 
rule-based formalism rather than a flaw of narratology, but 
it is striking that narratives seem inessential to games, but 
rules and obstacles do not.   
The limitations of game-as-text approaches for our 
project of finding essential properties of games is, of course, 
not to downplay the work done by narratologists and others 
in games studies.  There is some truly worthwhile and 
exceedingly valuable analysis going on in treating games as 
metaphor or ideological representation.  Views of games-as-
texts will be given somewhat limited space in this thesis, 
however, seeing as the attempt will be to come to a more 
essentialist view.  By this I mean that the aim here is to 
promote an approach that is more inclusive of all games, by 
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highlighting what is essential to games in the manner that 
games’ rules seem to be. 
 
Games as Art 
Another way of looking at games, both their value and 
ontology, is as artworks.  As can be anticipated however, 
just as narrative is not essential to games, neither is a 
game’s status as an artwork.  This doesn’t suggest that a 
games-as-art method is moribund, just that it is not a 
uniform fit, and, perhaps, limiting.  Like narratology, 
interpreting games as artworks is best seen as being able to 
encompass (some) video games.   
As Lopes tells us, we should agree that some artworks 
are run on a computer even if we don’t agree on the 
boundaries of which things are art (Lopes, 2009, p. 10).  This 
category of ‘computer art’ is then, according to Lopes, 
assumed to overlap with computer games at least some of 
the time.  Several writers (see Smuts (2005), Rough (2017) 
and Tavinor (2009)) importantly delve into the question of 
whether video games can be art, with varying contentions.  
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Unfortunately, this debate is hugely hampered by the long-
standing disagreement on what art is, and it appears, in 
fact, non-obvious that video games can overlap with 
computer art at all.   
One benefit, however, of seeing, at least some, games 
as artworks is that there is already scaffolding to see how 
art is related to authorial intent or can do other things such 
as comment politically.  The best examples of provocative 
authorial intent in computer art are from the genre known 
as ‘serious games’.  Serious games, as per the title of Michael 
and Chen’s (2005) book, are seen to be games that ‘educate, 
train and inform’ as opposed to being purely for 
entertainment.  (This, as I will discuss in detail later in 
Chapter 4, may preclude them from even being games and 
instead, place them in the misnomer category, but for the 
moment we need to make mention of them).  Included in this 
category of serious games, according to Michael and Chen, 
are ‘art games’, part of their appeal deriving from the fact 
that they make striking political or social comment.  
Notable games sometimes dubbed as ‘art games’ 
include Gone Home (2013), Dear Esther (2012), and Flower 
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(2009).  These games eschew pure entertainment through a 
lack of goals, and, often, a lack of a win/loss mechanic.  The 
game September 12th: A Toy World (2003), for example, uses 
a lack of winning mechanic (which is to say the game is 
impossible to win) to illustrate the concept that combatting 
terrorism breeds more terrorism (Flanagan, 2009, pp. 239-
240).  Importantly for my claims later in this dissertation, 
there already exist those who, like Brian Crecente (2014), 
raise doubts that art games such as September 12th and 
Gone Home are games proper, because they appear not to 
have the requisite purpose of being fun or are not 
traditionally entertaining.  
Art games are sometimes seen as distinct from 
interactive art found in galleries, such as the works Jeff 
Koons Must Die!!! (2011), PING! Augmented Pixel (2011) 
and Receipt Racer (2011), (Petraitis, 2012), although this 
can blur.  There are perhaps difficult cases, in the sense of 
being hard to determine whether they really fall into the 
category of ‘games’, ‘interactive art’ or ‘art games’.  
At any rate, while it seems that, for many, at least 
some games can be art, a conception of, say, chess or Snakes 
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and Ladders as an artwork appears to stretch the conception 
of art too far to be useful.  It seems then, the fact that not all 
games are artworks – and perhaps even none – vastly limits 
this lens on games, at least in an essentialist context. 
 
Games as Activities 
A completely different tack is to think of games as an 
activity, as is more common in the philosophy of sport.  As 
Nguyen writes: ‘to paint with a broad brush, literary 
theorists and philosophers of art typically focus on games as 
designed artefacts, while philosophy of sport investigates 
game-playing as an activity’ (Nguyen, 2017, p. 10).  In 
particular, seeing game-playing as an activity is useful for 
looking at the value of playing games, rather than being 
simply focused on ontology, or the what-it-is to be a game.  
We should, perhaps, be sympathetic to approaches which 
have something to say about why we ought to care about 
playing games and the manner we ought to play them, over 
and above simply looking at games as a collection of rules or 
as an artefact to study.  Perhaps the unification of these 
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methods is the real goal however.  If a simple principle 
guiding the value of games as activities could be stated that 
also had something to do with what was essential to games 
as an artefact, then this is surely the holy grail of the 
philosophy of games: the marrying of the game-as-artefact 
and game-as-activity approaches. 
In the philosophy of sport, opposition to finding the 
values for game-players strictly in the rules of a game (a 
method that can be seen as broadly formalist) sees Robert L. 
Simon describe an alternative view called ‘conventionalism’ 
(Simon, 2000).  Simon gives the example of strategic or 
‘professional’ fouling in basketball (a popular example in the 
philosophy of sport) to illustrate this approach.  To foul in 
basketball is to break a rule, with a penalty accruing against 
the fouling team.  In the late stages of matches this is often 
done for strategic reasons, seeing as the penalty is not so 
severe that it is harmful to the goal of winning the game, 
and indeed can give the fouling team an advantage.  
Formalist approaches appear to dictate that strategic 
fouling is non-normative, or even cheating, as it is clearly 
against the rules.  Few basketballers, or basketball fans, see 
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professional fouls as cheating, or in any way to be frowned 
upon however.  It instead seems that the players of the 
game, in some sense, are following the convention that 
strategic fouling is just part of the basketball game, and 
thus a valid tactic.  Conventions of play outside the rules 
then may, perhaps, tell us how we ought to behave over and 
above what is strictly in the rules. 
As students of David Hume’s famous ‘is-ought’ gap 
may note, however, it may seem odd that the conventions 
surrounding how games are played then tell us how the 
game ought to be played.  These types of normative 
questions are common in the philosophy of sport: both 
questions about sportsmanship when the rules do not 
explicitly guide the way we should play, but also questions 
about which values ought to guide those who oversee the 
adjusting of the written rules of the game.  With our 
strategic fouling example, we can ask ourselves, for 
instance, whether we ought to change the rules of basketball 
to outlaw fouls deemed clearly strategic in the final minutes 
of the game.  Conventionalist approaches don’t appear to be 
able help us with the issue, simply describing the ‘is’ of the 
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situation, rather than the ‘ought’, and thus severely limiting 
them as approaches to sport and games. 
Simon instead agitates not for formalism, nor 
conventionalism, but for a third method of locating the value 
in games.  He describes this view as ‘broad internalism’. 
Simon is here referring to sport rather than strictly games 
when he tells us that sports have what Butcher and 
Schneider (1998) call ‘interests’ that are intrinsic to the 
game itself.  If a sport can be said to have an interest, so the 
argument goes, then our actions should be guided by 
following them.  As Butcher and Schneider suggest ‘…if one 
honours or esteems one's sport not only will one exhibit fair 
play, but one will have a coherent conceptual framework 
for arbitrating between competing claims regarding the 
fairness, or otherwise, of actions’ (1998, p. 9).  This fairness 
of actions, it is argued, is then clearly the value that should 
guide both the playing and rule-tinkering of sports, and by 
extension the game.  But what can we say are the interests 
of the sport or game?  Butcher and Schneider refer to 
‘respect for the game’ (Butcher & Schneider, 1998, p. 1) and, 
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for them, this takes the form of a Kantian-style imperative 
in determining the ‘interests’: 
 
The idea of the interests of the game provides a means of 
judging one's own actions in relation to the sport. We approach 
any activity with mixed motivations and interests. Taking the 
interests of the game seriously means that we ask ourselves 
whether or not some action we are contemplating would be good 
for the game concerned, if everyone did it. (Butcher & 
Schneider, 1998, p. 11) 
 
This simple principle of the interest of the game can govern 
cases like the squash player who, perhaps through no fault 
of their own, is left without equipment to play a tournament, 
a case described very similarly by both Butcher and 
Schneider (1998) and Simon (2000).  Should an opponent, if 
it doesn’t inconvenience them, offer to lend the player a 
racquet in such a scenario?  Officially, formalism, which is to 
say a view informed purely by the rules, has nothing to say 
on this matter.  Something like our broad internalist 
account however can help us here.  Surely, in the ‘interest’ of 
the game (or in respect for the game) there is normative 
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weight to the case for lending the racquet-less player some 
equipment, a seemingly common-sense and perhaps even 
elegant result for broad internalist accounts. 
 An extension of the ‘interest of the game’ idea is a 
more explicitly, as Simon (2000) describes it, ‘interpretive’ 
version of broad internalism. The idea here is that the 
interest of the sport (or game) is found somewhere in the 
very nature, or essence, of the sport.  For example, if sport 
is, by its nature, a test of skill, and thus what is good for a 
test of skill is for everybody to reach their potential and play 
fairly, then this might be the interest of the game.  J.S. 
Russell (1999) appeals to a version like this when he looks 
for a principle in guiding judgements when rules are unclear 
in his chosen sport of baseball.  He suggests several 
principles that may govern judgements of umpires, explicitly 
making the parallels with law and jurisprudence, citing 
Dworkin and his views on legal principles (Russell, 1999, pp. 
33-35).  He concludes that one principle may be that ‘rules 
should be interpreted in such a manner that the excellences 
embodied in achieving the lusory goal of the game are not 
undermined but are maintained and fostered’ (Russell, 1999, 
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p. 35).  As the ‘lusory goal’ can be seen to be essentially 
constitutive of baseball, then we have a sound, internal, 
reason to value excellence in achieving it, rather than 
simply appealing to the elusive notion of ‘respect for the 
game’. 
 The benefit of this second type, or extension, of broad 
internalism is that it gives a justification for what the 
interests of the game are (i.e. to be found in its essence) 
rather than appealing to something as apparently 
unmotivated as ‘respect for the game’.  Secondly, it helps us 
tie our account of games back to games as artefacts of a 
certain type; if we can determine the essential quality of 
games (perhaps, in part, following Suits, that they are 
played with a certain ‘lusory attitude’) we have information 
about what games are, as well as why we ought to, and how 
we ought to, play them.   
If we are inclined to take essentialism seriously, in the 
sense that finding something essential to games might guide 
the way for how to look at them, then perhaps the most 
promising perspective for games is something like a 
philosophy of sport approach in conjunction with Bernard 
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Suits-style formalism.  Suits, in particular, seems to cover 
all games with his definition and leave aside all non-games 
as long as we take ‘rules’ to be broad enough to encompass 
games like children’s dress-ups.   
Yet with Suits there still seems something lacking.  
Firstly, a set of rules seems ill-equipped in telling us why we 
should value game-playing outside of the utopia-setting that 
Suits imagines, or where and why we should adjust their 
rules.  Also, the Suits definition explicitly depends on 
suggesting that rules are accepted simply so that game-
playing can exist, which, without a claim about why we play 
games, seems circular.  Perhaps then an addendum to Suits 
might be useful? 
In the later chapters of the thesis I’m going to suggest 
that fun (or perhaps ‘Fun’, a concept to be stipulated in 
Chapter 2) might be incorporated in the ‘lusory attitude’ (or 
the attitude one has when accepting the rules of the games) 
that Suits is proposing as a condition for game-playing.  Fun 
would then be essential to games and, if we follow 
interpretive broad internalism, thus inform the value of 
playing games.  
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We will more fully explore the value of playing games 
later, but for now we can see our previous examples seems to 
show us that whether to introduce rules against strategic 
fouling in basketball, for instance, might be determined, if 
we follow a fun/formalist account, along the principle of 
whether it makes the game a more fun game.  So too, ought 
we lend our opponent a racquet at a squash tournament not 
only so that it will make the game possible, but for reasons 
of making a specific instance of fun possible.  Another 
benefit, of course, of a lusory attitude including something 
like ‘fun’ is that there is seemingly a strong intuitive link 
between fun and games that feels satisfying if we were able 
to include it in our definition. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, the rise of sophisticated video games 
has given added difficulties for philosophers of games to 
grapple with in an already complex area.  Following 
Nguyen, we have seen the state of the art to be two, 
generally parallel methods from which to proceed.  The first 
we saw was to view games as objects, either texts or art-like 
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objects, and the second is to view games as activities.  These 
methods prioritise differently where they see the value of 
games: ‘…we might say that aestheticists have given 
valuational accounts about the game itself, or about the 
experience of the game, while philosophers of sports have 
given valuational accounts of performance in games’ 
(Nguyen, 2017, p. 15). 
The games-as-object approaches we have seen, which 
view games specifically as objects for appreciation or study, 
takes in work already established in aesthetics with its 
discussions of representation, narrative, character 
development, socio-political comment, interactivity and 
visual beauty.  The main disadvantage, of course, is that 
rules and overcoming obstacles, which seem essential to 
games, seems only to have a tangential connection with art 
and texts.  Rules and overcoming obstacles (which we might 
broadly see under the rubric of ‘game-play’) is more easily 
encompassed under the games-as-an-activity approach to 
games, the more common method in the philosophy of sport.  
We saw how philosophy of sport accounts often try to 
explain things in normative terms: why we ought to value 
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the playing of games, the purpose of games and the rationale 
for keeping or changing rules. 
Nguyen (2017, p. 16) contends that, contrasting with 
our chosen field of the philosophy of games, that the field of 
‘game studies’ has made real strides with its trans-
disciplinary approach to synthesise perspectives across 
topics.  The philosophy of games on the other hand, at least 
at the time of writing, tends to pick a side and work from 
that perspective, seeing games as either art, text, sport or 
somehow related to the external world (as with magic circle 
approaches).  He urges philosophers of games to think a 
little larger and straddle the divide.  This too will be the 
challenge for this thesis, to see games both as objects that 
can often be beautiful or meaningful but also finding value 
in the playing of them. 
So, what next?  I argue that there is nothing wrong 
with analysing games in relation to what makes them 
artefacts worthy of study, be it for their narratives, their 
production design, music, social or political comment, 
interactivity or anything relating to authorial intent.  
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Neither, I argue, should we stop writing about why we do, or 
ought to, play games or change their rules. 
What I aim to do, however, is to continue talk about 
what is essential to games, as formalism does, but to 
advance an idea that will be related to the ‘interest’ of games 
and their ‘lusory attitude’.  This is clearly not narrative, 
production design, music, social or political comment, or 
authorial intent, seeing that not all games have these 
things.  Looking toward the philosophy of sport, it is the 
‘purpose’ of games and, too, the purpose of having rules, that 
I think should guide us in the coming chapters.   
My aim is to challenge those in the field to take 
seriously ‘fun’ as a lens for games.  This can be seen as an 
answer specifically to Nguyen who asks us to think about 
games as both artefacts and activities.  I will specifically 
argue the purpose of games is to be fun (or perhaps Fun) at 
least in ideal cases.  This can then inform an interpretive 
broad internalist account for how and why we ought to play 
games, and the rationale for changing their rules as well as 
a way of judging them as artefacts to be valued. 
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In order to prosecute this case, I will need to show how 
games are related to fun, seemingly a point neglected by 
current analytic philosophers of games.  Of course, I will not 
be tempted to say games are fun without exception or that 
we are not playing a game unless we are having fun, rather 
that games’ rules depend on something like fun, at least in 
an ideal case.  To do this I will need to get clearer on the 
idea of ‘fun’, which will be the focus of the next chapter.  
More specifically, I will need to propose a technical use of 
‘fun’ as ‘Fun’ (with a capital-F) as an antidote to writers 
before me being unclear as to the precise concept of fun.  
After that we can then re-investigate which of the 
approaches to games can best accommodate talk of ‘fun’. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A Review of the Literature on Fun 
 
Introduction 
Fun and games appear to be strongly related concepts, 
even if this relationship is difficult to articulate.  One 
challenge in precisely stating the link between fun and 
games is the difficulty in theorising about fun.  
Comprehensive theories of fun are lacking and rarely 
attempted in academic literature largely because fun is 
conflated with talk of pleasure, enjoyment, leisure and play 
(see Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004 for a discussion of this) 
when, arguably, it is best seen as a distinct idea.  Whether 
or not there truly is a principle that underlies fun, the 
attempt in this chapter will be to investigate, and clarify, 
the limited literature on fun in readiness for the specific 
claims I will be making later in the dissertation. 
Firstly, I will navigate some of the specific uses of the 
term ‘fun’ in academic scholarship in order to justify the 
claim that fun is undertheorised.  Three standout pieces on 
fun will be singled out for special mention here: Ben 
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Fincham’s recent book The Sociology of Fun (Fincham, 
2016), Martha Wolfenstein and her thoughts on fun and 
morality (Wolfenstein, 1951), and a piece by Mark Blythe 
and Marc Hassenzahl (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004).  After 
introducing Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of ‘flow’ – the state 
often provoked by the balancing of action and skill – we will 
spend some time on Blythe and Hassenzahl’s (2004) work 
which is especially important as it is perhaps the first theory 
of fun itself, as opposed to the use of ‘fun’ as simply a 
fungible term for those discussing play and enjoyment.  It is 
notable that it took until after the rise of personal 
computing for fun to be analysed in this discrete way, as 
part of Blythe and Hassenzahl’s broader work in Human-
Computer Interaction, or HCI. 
My goal in the latter parts of the chapter will be to 
settle the terminological disputes around fun by seeing how 
different theorists are talking to each other, or in some 
cases, talking past each other.  In particular, it is my goal to 
show how the concept of flow compares to folk 
understandings of fun and enjoyment, as well as how, in 
turn, these concepts differ to the technical uses of ‘fun’ and 
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‘pleasure’ as used by Blythe and Hassenzahl.  One 
contribution I will offer as part of this project is to introduce 
a technical use myself, of the word ‘fun’ (or, as I will 
capitalise it, ‘Fun’) for a fun-flow hybrid, which will be useful 
in further discussions of games and play. 
 
Theorising Fun 
Fun is claimed to be a basic need of human life (Monk et 
al., 2002, p. 924).  While this is no doubt true, the subject of 
fun as a distinct topic of research (as opposed to the study of 
things that can be described as fun) is surprisingly 
uncommon.  Instead, analyses of fun are often eschewed in 
favour of other terms like ‘leisure’, ‘play’ or ‘enjoyment’.  We 
see by the 1980s it true to say fun had been largely ignored 
in academia: 
 
Writers, researchers, educators, and philosophers seem to have 
skirted the word "Fun" or avoided its use altogether, while fairly 
commonly using the word "play." (Slaughter, 1983, p. 9)4 
                                               
4 Slaughter has capitalised ‘Fun’ here in a way entirely unrelated to the 




Surprisingly little has changed even now, it striking 
Fincham of there being a ‘lack of literature specifically on 
fun’ (Fincham, 2016, p. 32) when it came time for his 
treatment of the topic.  Those who have fully considered the 
concept of fun acknowledge it as being a pleasure yet 
conceptually distinct to either pleasure or happiness 
(Fincham, 2016, p. 200).  Fun is often seen as being either 
too broad, or too vague a concept to be useful such as Salen 
and Zimmerman who paraphrase LeBlanc: ‘[Fun] is merely 
a stand-in term for a more complex phenomenon that no one 
really understands’ (Salen & Zimmerman, 2003, p. 5, section 
25).   
 We know early conceptions saw fun as subordinate to 
leisure (see de Grazia, 1962; Pieper, 2009; Trafton, 1985) but 
apart from isolated mentions, it seems, for the longest time 
fun was neglected as an object of serious academic interest.  
Johan Huizinga, perhaps the earliest voice on fun in serious 
scholarship, saw the concept as an element of play, along 
with ‘mirth’ and ‘tension’ (Huizinga, 2003[1938]).  He was 
sceptical, however, that there could be a precise 
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understanding of fun, writing: ‘this […] element, the fun of 
playing, resists all analysis, all logical interpretations. As a 
concept it cannot be reduced to any other mental category’ 
(Huizinga, 2003[1938], p. 3, emphasis mine). 
Special mention must be given to the more recent 
writings on fun in the digital realm, specifically the field 
now known as Human-Computer Interaction (or HCI).  
Those interested in HCI have a particular stake in making 
digital experiences enjoyable, be those experiences games, 
apps (including gamified apps), programs, websites or other 
online content.  Works such as the anthology Funology: 
From Usability to Enjoyment (2004) are aimed at this space, 
looking at practicalities of program design, as well as the 
underlying philosophical issues around creating enjoyable 
digital experiences.  I am careful to use the term ‘enjoyable’ 
here because, despite the title of Funology, once again the 
concept of fun (i.e. fun specifically) is almost entirely 
overlooked in this particular work.  The more common 
expression found in this anthology is ‘enjoyment’ which I 
argue is not synonymous with fun.  This is not to say the 
term ‘fun’ doesn’t get a run in Funology, it would be 
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misleading to suggest the term is not used liberally 
throughout the book.  However, most writers appearing in 
the anthology seem to use ‘fun’ with less than laser-like 
precision, its use apparently interchangeable with 
‘enjoyable’ or ‘pleasing’ in the text.  When the term ‘fun’ is 
being used with precision it tends to be as a technical rather 
than descriptive use (see for example Reed, 2004).  As a 
result, very little of HCI generally (and the book Funology in 
particular) is as relevant as it ought to be for constructing 
an overarching theory of fun. 
The obvious exception to this lack of analysis of fun in 
Funology is the standout chapter by Blythe and Hassenzahl 
titled ‘The Semantics of Fun: Differentiating Enjoyable 
Experiences’.  I will return to Blythe and Hassenzahl 
shortly, seeing as their analysis is one of the few in the 
space of semantic difference between the term ‘fun’ and its 
cousins: ‘enjoyment’, ’pleasure’ and ‘play’.  It is also, as 
stated, a landmark for being perhaps the first theory 
specifically on fun as a distinct concept.  First, however, I 
want to point to some important theorising of fun from 
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Martha Wolfenstein, who is crucial in grounding discussions 
of fun and morality. 
 
Fun and Morality  
The dubious morals of fun have been noted across the 
literature, in particular by de Grazia (1962) who tells us 
that fun is amoral and apolitical, perhaps echoing Huizinga 
(Huizinga, 2003[1938]) and his thoughts that game playing 
occurs outside normal life, including moral and political life.  
Podilchak agrees, arguing that fun was regularly seen as a 
morally lesser form of pleasure and that many ‘relegate to 
fun all socially or morally “inferior” forms of free-time 
interactions - whether it be drinking, informal get-togethers, 
“doing nothing” and fooling around, or sexual activity’ 
(Podilchak, 1991, p. 134). 
As Fincham highlights in his treatment of the term, 
there is an almost-paradox when it comes to fun.  Fun is 
seen as idleness and wasting time, thus having strong 
negative connotations, but ‘[at] the same time it is 
something we crave and want to be associated with’ 
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(Fincham, 2016, p. 10).  Fincham tells us that this tension 
can be explained with reference to Martha Wolfenstein’s 
pioneering work on the historic context of fun. 
For Wolfenstein, writing in the 1950s, there was a 
transformation in the way people saw fun in a post-war 
world, especially in the United States.  Play, but also fun, 
were seen in a negative light in pre-war America according 
to Wolfenstein.  The concept of play in particular was seen 
by those before the 1940s, as coming from a place of 
‘unhealthy excitement and nervous debilhitation’ 
(Wolfenstein, 1951, p. 20).  The physicality of play in post-
war America however, mirrored imaginings of soldiers and 
other heroic figures, especially for children.  As Fincham 
writes, Wolfenstein saw play become about, in her words, 
‘muscular development, necessary strength and control’ 
(Wolfenstein, 1951, p. 20). 
Fun and play then transformed from something to be 
avoided to an imperative for children, and by association the 
parents (and especially mothers) as part of a healthy 
upbringing: ‘Instead of feeling guilty for having too much 
fun, one is inclined to feel ashamed if one does not have 
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enough’ (Wolfenstein, 1951, p. 15).  This had further 
implications for the way we see ourselves in relation to fun: 
being a fun person was something to be admired and to 
present to the outside world as part of a well-rounded 
personality.  For Fincham there is a direct line from this 
development to the twenty-first century rise of social media 
and ‘selfie’ culture: 
 
People, particularly young people, tend to post images of 
themselves having fun on holiday, fun in the bar, fun on the 
beach, fun with friends, fun by themselves, fun in the shops, fun 
in the café and fun everywhere. The same pressure, described 
by Wolfenstein in the 1950s, is alive and kicking here in the 
twenty-first century. (Fincham, 2016, p. 11).  
 
Fincham goes on to describe the fact that there are 
real world results of not appearing to be fun.  In particular, 
he cites then ongoing research (Hinton-Smith and Fincham, 
2016, cited in Fincham, 2016, p. 11) about career 
progression being hampered if you are not seen as fun, 
something particularly true of women.  It seems, then, that 
fun is somewhere in between the trivial and the very serious 
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in contemporary society, a development that we can trace 
back to Wolfenstein’s observations about the change after 
the 1940s. 
Although fun itself has limited literature surrounding 
it one could argue that fun has seen a growing prominence 
under a different name: the concept known as ‘flow’.  Flow 
can be seen to be closely related to fun, and later we will see 
where the two terms come apart.  It is now prudent to 
introduce the concept seeing as the literature on fun often 
makes reference to it.   
 
Flow  
Since the 1970s, the term ‘flow’ has been understood as 
a subjective state that occurs during activity finely balanced 
between challenge and skill (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990]).  
The key text in this field is the 1990 book Flow: The 
Psychology of Optimal Experience by Mihaly 
Czikszentmihaly, which introduces the concept for a popular 
audience as well as spelling out insights for specialists in 
the field.  Although Csikszentmihalyi coined the term ‘flow’ 
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for the absorbing feeling of being lost in an activity, he can’t 
be said to have invented the concept.  Groos (2017[1901]) 
and Bühler (2013[1930]), for example, are cited by 
Csikszentmihalyi as describing what came to be known as 
‘Funktionslust’ (literally ‘activity pleasure’) early in the 
twentieth century.  It was, however, Csikszentmihalyi who 
precisely outlined the conditions for flow as part of the 
positive psychology movement that began to gain popularity 
in the last decades of the twentieth century.   
For Csikszentmihalyi, flow has the following 
hallmarks:  
           
• Intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the 
present moment  
• Merging of action and awareness  
• Loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of 
oneself as a social actor)  
• A sense that one can control one’s actions; that is, a sense that 
one can in principle deal with the situation because one knows 
how to respond to whatever happens next  
• Distortion of temporal experience (typically, a sense that time 
has passed faster than normal)  
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• Experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that 
often the end goal is just an excuse for the process 
(source: Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 240) 
  
Although flow was initially studied in terms of what is 
known as ‘autotelic’ activities such as rock climbing, playing 
games and painting (i.e. activities that are seemingly valued 
for their own sake), Csikszentmihalyi tells us that in 
principle one can achieve flow in any activity.  It is rather 
the state of consciousness (‘merging of action and 
awareness’) that determines flow, not a matter of whether 
the action actually achieves an outcome or not.  It is thus, 
for example, possible, and even common, to experience flow 
in a work scenario.  This is one hint that flow is not precisely 
synonymous with fun, seeing as working appears only rarely 
to be fun in the usual sense. 
Csikszentmihalyi studied flow in the first instance with 
what he called the Experience Sampling Method (ESM).  
The method dictates that participants are issued beepers to 
go off at random times and then asked to journal what they 
are experiencing phenomenally at the time alerted.  
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Interestingly, flow conditions were reported quite often and, 
based on this sampling, fairly regularly while at work, while 
relatively rarely during passive leisure time.  Watching 
television, for example, seemed to rarely produce flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], p.30). 
Individual examples of flow producing behaviour, 
however, remain controversial.  We know from 
Csikszentmihalyi’s empirical work that when watching 
television ‘people report some of the lowest levels of 
concentration, use of skills, clarity of thought, and feelings of 
potency’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], p.30) and thus he 
explicitly excludes television viewing from likely flow-
producing activities.  Some have queried this, however, 
especially knowing that other activities featuring low levels 
of bodily movement, such as reading, can reliably provoke 
flow (McQuillan & Conde, 1996).  Those writing about 
television in particular wonder whether it might be useful to 
analyse watching the medium as (occasionally) being 
‘optimal experience’ and by doing so ‘contradict and correct 
[Csikszentmihalyi’s] cultural prejudices in expanding the 
limits of flow’ (Brooker, 2005).  Despite there being some 
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equivocation regarding particular examples of flow, I trust 
we can still meaningfully talk of the phenomenon while still 
being agnostic on fringe cases for the remainder of the 
dissertation. 
Although (as the subtitle of the book dictates) 
Csikszentmihalyi sees flow as ‘optimal’, there is some 
hesitation in describing flow as a type of pleasure.  
Csikszentmihalyi instead claims that flow fits into a 
different category, one that ‘deserves a separate name’ 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 46) which he calls enjoyment.  
This term ‘enjoyment’ appears to be used somewhat 
interchangeably with ‘flow’ in Csikszentmihalyi’s work, 
characterised, he says, by ‘forward movement’ (2008, p. 46) 
or experience that needs and builds skills.  As we will see 
later, this contrasts with others’ use of the term ‘enjoyment’, 
suggesting, perhaps, a technical use.  Despite protestations 
to the contrary, it must be said that Csikszentmihalyi’s 
constant reference to optimal experience when talking of 
flow (and even the use of the word ‘enjoyment’) leads us to a 
natural assumption that flow is, at least in some sense, 
pleasurable.  Indeed, it would be hard to think of why people 
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would pursue flow-producing experiences (such as playing 
games and rock climbing) having, as they do, potentially no 
other ends than pleasurable ones. 
Although there is a danger of being seen as dismissive, I 
will largely ignore Csikszentmihalyi’s view that flow is not a 
type of pleasure.  I think it more intuitive to see pleasure as 
the very broad, superordinate term, and therefore, that 
‘pleasurable’ and ‘enjoyable’ (as terms) encompass both flow 
and fun, and indeed any positive affective experience.  This 
will, as we will see, necessarily contradict Blythe and 
Hassenzahl’s use of ‘pleasure’ but, as we will come to find 
out, this is less problematic since they actively admit their 
use of ‘pleasure’ is a technical one. 
 
Blythe and Hassenzahl 
We will now turn to Mark Blythe and Marc 
Hassenzahl’s (2004) theorising on fun – groundbreaking 
largely because it is specifically about fun.  In the literature 
there has been a tendency to be imprecise when it comes to 
talk of fun, enjoyment, pleasure, play and leisure.  As 
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Fincham writes: ‘… researchers have referred to fun but 
generally they have referred to it in relation to other things, 
and most commonly conflate it with enjoyment or happiness’ 
(Fincham, 2016, p. 28).  Even the highlighted work on the 
morality of fun by Wolfenstein we saw earlier can be seen to 
suffer with a lack of distinction between play and fun.  
Blythe and Hassenzahl are, it can be argued, the first to 
delimit their theorising to fun itself.  It is important then, to 
take a reasonably detailed look at their treatment.  
In the relevant section of Funology, Blythe and 
Hassenzahl all but admit to the lack of precision found in 
the rest of their field of Human-Computer Interaction: 
‘Typical of a relatively new area of investigation [HCI] is the 
lack of an agreed set of terms: enjoyment, pleasure, fun and 
attraction are often used interchangeably. But do they really 
refer to the same experiences?’ (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004, 
p. 91).  What follows is a hugely needed investigation of the 
semantic difference between ‘enjoyment’, ‘fun’ and ‘pleasure’ 
on which I hope to build in my dissertation. 
Blythe and Hassenzahl first raise the interesting 
question of whether the disparity between the terms ‘fun’ 
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and ‘pleasure’ belies value judgments between the two, 
pointing to the term ‘fun’ and its low status origins and 
connotations (as we saw highlighted by Podilchak and 
Wolfenstein).  The main contribution, however, is Blythe 
and Hassenzahl’s own contrasting of ‘pleasure’ and ‘fun’.  
The writers are, it is important to note, careful to not appear 
as endorsing any sort of value judgement of their own: ‘this 
is not to suggest that pleasure is a more worthy pursuit than 
fun’ (2004, p. 100).   
 There is, perhaps, an unfortunate use of terminology in 
Blythe and Hassenzahl’s work here that may obscure their 
engagement with the larger literature.  As hinted, Blythe 
and Hassenzahl see ‘enjoyment’ as the broad term, with 
‘pleasure’ and ‘fun’ as distinct, subordinate, varieties of 
enjoyment.  To be fair Blythe and Hassenzahl flag this as a 
technical use of ‘pleasure’, but this is all the more strange in 
a semantic analysis that is otherwise descriptive rather than 
prescriptive.  I would favour the idea that what is 
pleasurable or is enjoyable is the broad concept, and that 
way we could see fun as also being enjoyable or pleasurable, 
seemingly in line with the way we usually use language.  I 
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suspect, however, that Blythe and Hassenzahl would not 
disagree with this (i.e. that fun is, at least sometimes, 
pleasurable) and are instead trying to hone in on a specific 
concept when they use ‘pleasure’ in this piece. 
 In the coming sections I will attempt to disentangle the 
Blythe and Hassenzahlean fun/pleasure distinction and 
compare it to the more everyday versions as I see them.  For 
now, though, it is appropriate to analyse their distinction as 
it stands, with the understanding that although I think 
their theory is more or less correct, my clarification of 
terminology later in the chapter will help us better see the 
relationship with other thinkers. 
 Blythe and Hassenzahl set up four pairs of terms 
(triviality/relevance, spectacle/aesthetics, 
repetition/progression, and transgression/commitment) as 
ways of understanding the difference between their use of  
‘fun’ (or distraction) on one hand and ‘pleasure’ (or 
absorption) on the other.  Helpfully, Blythe and Hassenzahl 
explicitly cite ‘pleasure’, as being related to the absorption of 
the flow states cited by Csikzsentmihalyi.  Blythe and 
Hassenzahl want to say things that put us in flow, such as 
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painting or playing sports, are ‘pleasures’ rather than fun.  I 
will return to the question of whether this is actually how 
we would use language to describe flow-producing activities 
later, but this is useful to see the lines along which ‘fun’ and 
‘pleasure’ fall for Blythe and Hassenzahl.  It must be said, 
however, that ‘pleasure’ for Blythe and Hassenzahl appears 
broader than simply flow, as we will see presently. 
 Once we look at the pair Blythe and Hassenzahl see as 
triviality on one end and relevance on the other, we can 
indeed begin to see that by ‘pleasure’ Blythe and Hassenzahl 
are discussing something a little different, and perhaps 
broader, than simply flow.  By ‘relevance’ they tell us that 
they mean relevant to opportunities of ‘personal growth’.  
The clear example of flow as personal growth is contrasted 
things such as watching Hollywood science fiction films and 
listening to pop music (which don’t require skill and thus 
rarely provoke the ‘merging of action and awareness’ of flow 
states) as trivial.  These more trivial activities are instead 
associated with ‘fun’, whilst watching opera and ballet are 
considered ‘relevant’ for personal growth by Blythe and 
Hassenzahl (and thus under the category of ‘pleasure’).  Of 
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course we might not want to say that watching opera and 
ballet usually place one in flow, and this is the first clue that 
‘pleasure’ for Blythe and Hassenzahl has a broader meaning 
than being simply about flow. 
 The spectacle/aesthetics pair continues this trend.  
Entertainment such as pop music and throw-away television 
that engage the senses, Blythe and Hassenzahl want to say, 
is fun, whereas art – which is to say something that has 
aesthetic value – such as poetry, ballet and opera are 
pleasures and lumped in with absorption of flow.  Obviously 
the link from ‘aesthetics’ to flow is less clear than the link 
from ‘aesthetics’ to observing art, even though both of these 
are part of what Blythe and Hassenzahl see as ‘pleasures’.  
We can see these terms as more rules of thumb than 
necessary conditions however.  They are intended to simply 
sort the kinds of experiences that are meant by ‘absorption’ 
and those from ‘distraction’ even if each pair of terms doesn’t 
cover all aspects neatly. 
 Transgression/commitment is a little more mysterious.  
By this pair Blythe and Hassenzahl seem to want to explain 
the fun of comedy.  They note that comedy is often based on 
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the fun of subverting, or transgressing, social expectation.  
It may be debated if there is as deep a link between 
‘transgression’ and fun as Blythe and Hassenzahl seem to 
suggest, but we can at least see that Blythe and Hassenzahl 
want to lump comedy into the the ‘fun’ (or distracting) 
category as distinct from ‘pleasure’ (or absorption).  
‘Commitment’, on the other hand, Blythe and Hassenzahl 
cite as important for achieving the concentration needed in 
flow states, which must be correct in some sense, but is it is 
hard to see how this is in opposition to the telling of jokes 
which they cite the other half of this binary pair. 
 The final pair is repetition/progression which serves 
Blythe and Hassenzahl well.  Here ‘progression’, according 
to Blythe and Hassenzahl, takes into account the feeling 
from progressing and building skill, as with flow-producing 
activities, which we know they see as absorbing and a 
‘pleasure’ rather than ‘fun’.  With ‘progression’ Blythe and 
Hassenzahl also take to refer to the progression of 
increasing complexity from art, as opposed to the repetition 
of so-called ‘trivial’ entertainment.  This fits with their 
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previously seen contention that art too is a closer fit to 
‘pleasure’ than ‘fun’. 
 It is interesting to think about what Blythe and 
Hassenzahl are setting out to achieve with their 
fun/pleasure distiction.  As a descriptive analysis it fails for 
looking a lot like a technical use.  I suggest, however, that 
Blythe and Hassenzahl have hit on a very real difference 
with these two terms.  They are seemingly with the term 
‘pleasure’ broadening out ‘flow’ to include non-flow activity 
that leads to ‘personal growth’, which they see as coming 
from such activities as watching opera and other art5.  There 
are some activities such as eating and drinking however, 
that are potential pleasures that appear not ‘absorbing’ or of 
the ‘fun’ variety (either in the autotelic sense that we are 
attributing to folk use or as Blythe and Hassenzahl are 
describing).  We must remain agnostic to where Blythe and 
Hassenzahl would place these type of pleasures in the two 
categories, if anywhere.  As we start to contrast terminology 
                                               
5 Once again, as we have seen, there is debate about which activities provoke 
flow thus one could plausibly argue that watching opera could provoke flow 
under some circumstances. 
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between different theorists this should become clearer, and 
potentially more helpful to the study of fun. 
 
Fincham and Fun 
 The most recent large scale work on fun has been Ben 
Fincham’s book The Sociology of Fun (2016).  It is notable 
for the purposes of this dissertation to be, like Blythe and 
Hassenzahl’s work, specifically about fun.  Indeed Fincham 
takes Blythe and Hassenzahl to be a jumping off point to 
discuss how he sees the specific concept of fun. 
 Fincham describes his preferred theory as a ‘schema of 
fun’.  Fincham’s schema, it seems, is to be seen as a set of 
features of fun, but inconveniently for further study he 
doesn’t appear to endorse any of them as either necessary or 
sufficient (Fincham, 2016, p. 40) thus limiting the theory’s 
utility.  Fincham still makes some notable observations 
about fun as part of the schema however, and thus it is 





Figure 1. Fincham’s Schema of fun (Source: Fincham (2016, p. 40)) 
 
By temporality Fincham tells us that fun appears to have a 
discrete start and end point.  This is intended to be in direct 
contrast to happiness, which also involves a positive affect, 
but which isn’t a phenomenal moment that one can point to, 
but rather something like an underlying mood.  Next, 
Fincham takes the idea of norms and transgression involved 
in fun from Blythe and Hassenzahl and gives it his own 
twist.  Fincham broadens the idea of transgression and tells 
us fun is transgressive by simply being the act of ‘not really 
doing what you are supposed to’ (p. 41) in the sense that 
having fun is in opposition to doing work.  This appears to 
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be a somewhat different point to the one Blythe and 
Hassenzahl make regarding ‘transgression’.  They, for 
instance, exclusively speak about comedy and jokes 
transgressing expectation, as opposed to simply ‘not really 
doing what you are supposed to do’ being transgressive.  The 
next section down on the schema is of the ‘temporary 
alleviation’ variety where, in the ‘relationship to the 
commitment’ sense, Fincham is saying fun is once again 
what we do instead of being committed to tasks.  There is 
also, according to Fincham, temporary alleviation from 
responsibility, a similar idea. 
 Anticipation for Fincham, relates to fun in the way one 
doesn’t actively anticipate anything in particular while 
having fun (think of not knowing the next joke on a comedy 
television show, say) but that fun is anticpated in the sense 
that once something is seen to be fun we can anticipate that 
it will be fun once more.  Fun, as we can see from Fincham, 
is also largely considered a social experience.  I suggest that 
Fincham has been influenced by Podilchak (see Podilchak, 
1991) in his thoughts here, seeing as Fincham elsewhere 
references Podilchak heavily (see for example Fincham, 
 
 110
2016, pp. 31-34) and his ideas of there being, at least in part, 
a social explanation for fun.  As I will touch on a little later, 
I think this may be a misunderstanding based on 
Podilchak’s idiosyncratic data collection. 
 Fun, according to the above schema seems to also have 
relevance for identity according to Fincham.  Recall 
Fincham was the writer who made the connection from 
Wolfenstein’s development in post-war fun, to ‘selfie’ culture 
in the twenty-first century.  Fincham writes in his 
explanation that identity is also important for fun insofar as 
what you portray to others as your idea of fun will be very 
telling.  This is an interesting reading from Fincham seeing 
as it is heavily based on third person reporting of fun rather 
than what we have been discussing elsewhere: fun from a 
first person perspective. 
 Finally, as with Blythe and Hassenzahl, distraction is 
a factor in fun for Fincham.  Fun seems to be a distraction in 
the sense that we are focussing on the thing that is fun to 
the exclusion of all else.  Due to this extreme focus, as per 
the absorption of flow, it then becomes hard to get a sense of 
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the precise phenomenal experience of fun.  As Fincham says 
here: 
 
Whilst we are experiencing fun we are engrossed in it to the 
point that it is almost impossible to then accurately reflect what 
it feels like. If you start thinking about fun whilst you’re having 
it, you start doing something else — thinking about fun rather 
than having fun. (Fincham, 2016, p. 44) 
 
So what can we take from Fincham’s schema of fun?  We are 
really no more enlightened as to the precise conditions of 
fun, seeing as these points are neither necessary nor 
sufficient, but we will return to some later when we will 
stipulate the way we will be using ‘fun’.  Perhaps the most 
interesting thing we can begin to see is some slight 
disagreement with Blythe and Hassenzahl.  As Fincham 
states: ‘The relationship of many things done in leisure time 
– pursuits – to commitment, learning, dedication, 
progression and often frustration – stands in contrast to the 
sorts of key defining features of fun for Blythe and 
Hassenzahl at least.’ (Fincham, 2016, p. 17).  Although 
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Fincham’s ‘schema’ is his attempt at setting the record 
straight I think it is likely that they are, in fact, talking 
about different phenomena with their respective uses of 
‘fun’. 
I think for this reason we need to tease apart precisely 
what each of our theorists are referring to with the word 
‘fun’.  Is Blythe-and-Hassenzahlean fun fun as Fincham sees 
it?  How does this relate to how the folk understanding of 
fun lies? 
Now that we have an overview of how fun is discussed 
in the literature, I feel it would be useful to sort technical 
uses of some of these terms and contrast them with a 
descriptive analysis of folk concepts so that we can clearly 
see how the literature talks to each other.  The first concept 
to clarify is flow and its relationship to its cousins: fun, 
enjoyment and pleasure.  
 
Flow’s Relationship to Fun, Enjoyment and Pleasure 
Firstly, what is the relationship between flow and fun?  
Koster tells us that ‘fun’ and ‘flow’ are not quite synonymous 
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(2005, p. 98) and I think this indeed seems correct.  
Although flow is often described as fun, not all things we 
would call ‘fun’ (in a folk sense) come from being in flow 
(watching television, for example, can be fun although it 
doesn’t usually put one in flow, at least according to 
Csikszentmihalyi (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 30[1990], p. 
30)).  Perhaps, too, not all flow is fun in a folk sense: there 
are a few examples (such as flow states during work) that 
the folk would not usually call ‘fun’.  It must be said that 
Gayle Privette contradicts this view (see Privette, 1983), 
believing that flow is (always) fun, seemingly thinking that 
flow states achieved at work must always result in fun, 
when writing in the early 1980s.  
Perhaps survey data might be needed to confirm the 
intuition, but the flow from being lost in work seems 
perhaps an example of enjoyment without being fun in a folk 
sense, and in particular fun understood by Fincham as being 
an alleviation of responsibility (Fincham, 2016, p. 41).  It is 
perhaps more accurate to say flow is, at least, very often fun.  
Privette’s grand achievement is, instead, to delineate 
between ‘peak experience’, ‘peak performance’ and ‘flow’ (see 
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Figure 2 below).  The upshot is that we can have peak 
experience (i.e. extreme pleasure) without flow, or without 
peak performance (i.e. highly skilful performance relative to 
the actor), as well as peak performance without flow or 
without peak experience. However, when we have flow, we 
necessarily have both peak performance and peak 
experience (as well as, according to Privette, fun.) 
  





Csikszentmihalyi himself is largely silent on the topic of 
fun.  It is notable that his 1990 book (and his work more 
broadly) contains startlingly few references to the term.  The 
2008 edition of Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience 
has, for example, just eight appearances of the word ‘fun’ in 
close to three hundred pages of text.  In those times that it is 
used, the word is dropped without further investigation of 
the term, in an almost casual way to describe examples of 
flow-producing behaviour. 
In some ways the concept of flow will be the clearest of 
all concepts used in this dissertation and, naturally, much 
clearer than that of fun.  This is because Csikszentmihalyi’s 
checklist indicates not only the conditions for flow but also 
what it feels like phenomenally.  Indeed, this is precisely 
why flow is the preferred concept for those in HCI, 
circumventing the term ‘fun’ which, as we saw from both 
Huizinga and Salen and Zimmerman’s critiques, is seen by 
many as too broad to study properly. 
Sorenson and Pasquier (2010) also acknowledge that 
‘the notion of fun is, without a doubt, incredibly broad, and it 
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is debatable whether the search for a comprehensive 
definition could ever prove fruitful’ (Sorenson & Pasquier, 
2010, p. 3).  Instead they turn to flow for answers in the 
construction of digital experiences.  Admitting that flow is 
not quite the same as fun, it seems that, for the purposes of 
game design, that flow can be a useful stand-in.  Sorenson 
and Pasquier cite Koster and his idea that ‘fun is the act of 
mastering a problem mentally’ (Koster, 2005, p. 90) to show 
us that provoking flow can make games fun.   
Salen and Zimmerman also want to say that fun is a 
desired end goal for digital games but that, once again, fun 
is a less useful concept than flow.  About fun they say: 
 
This term does make some sense. Good games are fun. Fun 
games are what players want. A fun game makes for a 
pleasurable experience, which is why people play them. (Salen 
& Zimmerman, 2003, p. 5, section 25) 
 
However, they almost immediately all but give up on 
further analysis of fun, endorsing Hunicke, LeBlanc and 
Zubek’s (2004, p. 2) desire to move away from talk of fun and 
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drill down on precisely what is causing the pleasure.  Like 
Pasquier and Sorenson they make the move, instead, when 
writing on pleasure from video games, of turning to flow. 
When dropping the elusive topic of fun in favour of the 
more pragmatic concept of flow, Salen and Zimmerman 
seem to echo Koster, and Pasquier and Sorenson’s 
contentions that flow is not precisely fun.  They also 
acknowledge that flow is not a game-specific concept but do 
highlight how good games tend to place one in flow.  Sadly 
however, once again, fun itself is given short shrift, seen as 
less useful than the more easily analysed concept of flow. 
When fun is dismissed by theorists as too broad a 
concept to be useful, these theorists, naturally, have a point.  
The concept of fun in its folk understanding covers both 
adjectival use that describes pleasurable things such as 
games, holidays, books, films, activities and even people (e.g. 
‘he’s a fun guy’) as well as a noun use, being a type of 
experience.  The latter use is where we would speak of 
having fun, for example.  It is true that a more general 
understanding of fun here seems, somewhat frustratingly 
for our project, less exact than a concept such as flow, where 
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Csikszentmihalyi spells out the precise conditions.  What 
are the conditions for fun, in contrast?  Why doesn’t eating a 
nice meal seem to be fun but is, instead, enjoyable, while 
watching the television can be said to be both fun and 
enjoyable?  I suspect there is a principle in play that 
distinguishes fun from enjoyment and flow, but I can see 
why the standard tactic is to just see ‘fun’ as a broad, 
nebulous term and to instead favour ‘flow’ due to its 
precision. 
Attempts at finding the principle underscoring the 
differences between fun, flow and enjoyment have a limited 
literature surrounding them.  Podilchak is the foremost 
thinker associated with the distinction between fun and 
enjoyment.  He notably suggests to us that fun, in 
comparison to enjoyment, has a social component, arguing 
that ‘you cannot have fun by yourself’.  Could this be the 
principle that makes fun fun? 
 
You can enjoy yourself by yourself. You could enjoy yourself in a 
group. Sometimes you can have fun in a group. But you cannot 




The reason for this conclusion was qualitative surveys 
given by Podilchak where he asked people about activities 
they enjoyed.  Before the surveys were given, Podilchak 
presumed that enjoyment and fun were essentially 
synonymous.  Then, in what he calls his ‘a-ha’ moment, he 
realised that it was in reports of solitary activities that 
people reported enjoyment, while social activities were more 
likely reported as fun. 
I think that Podilchak has made an important 
contribution with his observation that there are things that 
are enjoyable that are not fun, but that there was perhaps a 
flaw in the methodology of the surveys, and hence the 
conclusion.  My conjecture is that that the word ‘activities’ 
has connotations of multiple people’s actions, whereas 
‘doing’ has connotations of one person’s actions.  For 
example, I suggest you will get different answers to ‘what do 
you enjoy doing?’ compared to ‘what activities do you enjoy?’ 
i.e. more solitary and more social answers respectively.  
Similarly, I think questions of fun could elicit more solitary 
responses (e.g. reading, playing video games alone) if asked 
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‘what do you have the most fun doing?’ rather than ‘what 
activities do you find the most fun?’.  This conjecture could 
be perhaps taken up in the field of experimental philosophy 
to test these intuitions, but this is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  It is an interesting question, however, and if 
Podilchak’s findings held with the updated phrasing, it 
would suggest the need of modifications to the claims I am 
making here. 
We may retain from Podilchak, with certainty, the idea 
that there is overlap with fun and enjoyment.  Podilchak’s 
surveys found that enjoyment was often thought to be a 
necessary feature of fun.  Responses of the sort: ‘you can't 
have fun without enjoyment because fun requires 
enjoyment’ (cited in Podilchak, 1991, p. 142) were found 
reasonably regularly.  This points to a broader conception of 
enjoyment than fun.  Strean and Holt (2001) argue this 
point as well (i.e. the idea that fun is a subset of enjoyment) 
and Fincham (2016, p. 8) tends to agree.  Although not quite 




One intuitive explanation of the variable behind fun as 
everyday speakers understand it is that it may have 
something to do with instrumental versus ‘autotelic’ ends.  
This is anticipated by Fincham and his schema that includes 
alleviation from responsibility and commitment (Fincham, 
2016, p. 41).  (Folk) fun appears to be usually derived from 
activities that are considered ‘autotelic’; in other words 
pursued for their own sake.  Leisure activities for instance 
(e.g. game-playing, sports, going on holiday, listening to 
music and watching entertaining TV) can, often, be 
described as ‘autotelic’ as well as ‘fun’.  Pleasurable states 
from instrumentally valued activities (e.g. eating, drinking 
and being lost in work) seem intuitively to be only 
occasionally described as ‘fun’ and more likely to be 
described as ‘enjoyable’. 
Of course, one may immediately doubt whether being 
lost in work is truly difficult to describe as ‘fun’.  Certainly 
managerial practices from around the turn of the twenty-
first century have spent a lot of time attempting to make 
work more fun, or at least more play-like (Costea, Crump, & 
Holm, 2007).  We hear of work spaces integrated with pool 
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tables and the like, it being difficult to tell where work and 
play begins (Myerson & Ross, 2003).  I suggest, though, that 
we can still afford to be doubtful as to whether work as an 
activity can truly be fun, or at least reliably fun.  I think 
there is a difference between making the work day fun (or 
the work place fun) and work as an activity fun.  For 
instance when Berg writes that ‘building fun, play, and 
humour into the workday is a proven method of unleashing 
creative ideas’ (Berg, 1998, p. 54), this is explicitly about the 
time spent at a workplace rather than work in the stricter 
sense (i.e. as an activity).  Still one must admit that it is 
plausible that one might refer to actual work as ‘fun’.  But 
recall the claim here that this thesis has been regarding a 
more idealistic view of language, and that despite fuzziness 
perhaps there is still something useful in regarding fun as 
an autotelic pursuit, and (typically) excluding work, even if 
not a hard and fast rule. 
Even admitting this, and as helpful as this 
instrumental/autotelic heuristic for ‘fun’ may be, it appears 
the fuzziness may make it unsuitable for our purposes.  
‘Pursued for its own sake’ appears quite vague as a phrase.  
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For instance, can we value the pursuit of knowledge ‘for its 
own sake’ or is this a contradiction in terms?  (We usually 
wouldn’t describe such learning as ‘fun’, for instance.)  Many 
leisure activities can also be pursued for reasons seemingly 
above and beyond ‘for their own sake’ (e.g. winning 
tournaments or earning money) without precluding them 
from also being fun. 
Despite ‘autotelic’ not quite mapping onto ‘fun’ in a one-
to-one fashion it appears there is some link between ‘folk’ 
fun and autotelic activities.  It explains, for instance why the 
same activity can have two modes.  Watching television for 
its own sake (such as when we are watching some reality 
program) seems more likely to be called ‘fun’ than when 
watching a news program with some instrumental ends of 
learning about the world. 
I suspect however that ‘autotelic’ is not the precise 
metric for fun, and that pleasure must be an added variable 
as well.  ‘Doing philosophy’, for example, is arguably 
sometimes done for its own sake, but surely only philosophy 
that brings pleasure that would be described as ‘fun’.  The 
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implicit pleasure that comes from flow may then explain 
why fun and flow often intersect.  
It is still with some annoyance that I think we should 
admit that the precise principle of fun is out of reach for 
now, even if I believe there is a real principle at play (and 
likely to be related to instrumental activity having some 
difficulties being labelled ‘fun’). We may still use the concept 
of fun in the analysis of games, however.  To do this we may 
need to turn to a more precise understanding of fun than we 
have been using, namely a technical use of the word. 
 
Fun with a Capital F 
To review, we have pleasure/pleasurable and 
enjoyment/enjoyable being the broadest (and essentially 
synonymous) concepts.  Fun and flow can be seen as subsets 
of these, seemingly overlapping with each other and nested 
inside enjoyment/pleasure.  This style of nesting concepts is 
reasonably agreed upon, apart from Csikszentmihalyi (and 
his non-standard view that flow is not a pleasure) and 
Blythe and Hassenzahl (who use fun in opposition to their 
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technical use of ‘pleasure’, rather than as a subset).  We will 
perform a thorough exorcism of terminology soon, but first 
we need to continue with looking at the relationship 
between flow and fun.  I do this in order to propose a hybrid 
of the two ideas, a technical use of ‘fun’ or as I shall indicate 
it: Fun. 
Knowing flow and fun closely overlap, but are not 
synonymous, it may be tempting to ignore the confusing 
muddle that is fun and instead concentrate on flow.  There 
seems something useful about fun in the analysis of games 
however.  Not only is there an intuitive link between fun 
and games, but fun seems to highlight the escapist pleasure 
at hand (and Fincham’s ‘alleviation of responsibility’ (2016, 
p. 41)) when playing games that is not always captured with 
talking about flow.  Think to our example of flow from work, 
for instance, which seems to be very far apart from the usual 
feeling of playing a game. 
What is the motivation for positing a technical use of 
‘fun’?  Introducing technical uses of words can very often 
serve to confuse topics rather than simplify them.  I am 
reticent to do it in this case, but, as we have seen, the folk 
 
 126
use of ‘fun’ is somewhat vague and if we wish to preserve 
what is attractive about the use of the term we may need to 
tighten the concept with an ‘explicative’ definition that is 
respectful of current use of the term, but forges new ground 
by stipulating its boundaries.  One reason we would want to 
retain a version of ‘fun’ is that games would seem to be often 
created specifically to be fun.  Also, games are often seen to 
be good examples of games when they are fun, and fun is an 
valued state that is desired in autotelic activities such as 
game-playing.   
If a technical use of ‘fun’ can preserve these facts but 
be precise enough to talk about empirically, this would be 
incredibly useful.  If this technical use was also narrower 
than flow and excluded elements irrelevant to games (such 
as the type of feeling from instrumental activities), then this 
may be even more useful.  This will indeed be my goal when 
specifying the concept of Fun. 
I want to stipulate Fun as the phenomenal experience 
that occurs when an action unambiguously both provokes 
flow and can be considered fun in the folk sense of being 
pursued for its own sake.  In other words, Fun is the 
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intersection of fun and flow.  Fun (with a capital letter) 
therefore differs from fun, because it omits the type of 
feeling from watching television and going on holiday seeing 
as these do not typically spark flow states (the debate over 
flow and television notwithstanding).  These activities can 
be admittedly autotelic and thus perhaps ‘fun’, but ones that 
don’t usually build skill or ‘merge action and awareness’ and 
thus doesn’t place one in flow as Fun must.  Importantly, 
Fun doesn’t admit of the feeling from flow-producing actions 
that are more instrumental in character, such as working or 
reading for ‘a purpose’ seeing as they are not considered 
‘fun’.  However, reading purely for pleasure, such as a page-
turning adventure yarn, would still be unambiguously fun 
and place one in flow, thus being Fun.  Reading, in general, 
may be one of the most reliable flow producing activities 
(McQuillan & Conde, 1996), but I want to say that reading 
an air-safety card, for example, may place one in flow but 
not be Fun, seeing as it is for an instrumental end.  Fun 
(with a capital letter) then always has the phenomenal 
experience of flow.  Indeed, one cannot have Fun without 
being in flow just as one cannot have Fun without having 
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fun (in the sense of being pleasure pursued for ‘its own 
sake’).  
 
A Clearer Picture of Fun 
 
Figure 3. (Proposed diagram of fun/flow relationship) 
 
I have noted that it is generally agreed that fun is a 
subset of what is enjoyable or what is pleasurable.  Knowing 
this, in the above I have sketched a diagram of enjoyment, 
fun and flow, along with helpful descriptions of the kind of 
activities which often provoke these states.  Of course there 
are as many experiences as people that can have them, so it 
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is necessarily difficult to determine typical experiences and 
the terms people use to describe them.  These example are 
certainly not meant as unerrering examples that admit of no 
exceptions, but instead simply usual cases.  In addition, we 
have seen debate over whether some activites, such as 
watching television, reliably provoke flow.  The examples 
should therefore be seen as ‘potential’ cases and should one 
have a preferred theory of flow one might want to substitute 
in a more favoured example.  Further research by way of 
surveys may be able to determine whether my categories do 
align with typical experiences and use of terms.  
With the aid of six diagrams, I will now investigate 
each term in turn, using the Figure 3 as a reference and 
highlighting the relevant portions with a white colouring, as 
opposed to the black.  This is simply done to illustrate when 
certain terms come apart, as well as the use of certain 






Figure 4. (Proposed that flow is the white area of Figure 3.) 
 
Under my preferred model, flow may also cover some of 
what is considered (folk) fun e.g. the feelings typically felt 
from autotelic activities like playing games, painting, 
dancing and reading page-turning novels.  Flow can also be 
provoked by instrumental activities (i.e. activities that are 





Sketching (folk) fun 
 
Figure 5. (Proposed that fun, in an everyday sense, is the white area of Figure 3.) 
 
Under my preferred model, fun is a broad concept – perhaps 
too broad to be useful – and covers only some things that 
also place one in flow.  Playing games, painting, dancing and 
reading page-turning novels, as flow-producing activities, 
might also be considered fun seeing as they could also be 
considered to be done ‘their own sake’.  Some activities that 
don’t place one in flow (or at least don’t place one in flow for 
the entire duration of the activity such as ‘going on holiday’) 
can be also sometimes thought of as ‘fun’ activities due being 
done for ‘their own sake’. 
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Sketching (Capital F) Fun 
 
Figure 6. (Introducing a technical concept called Fun-with-a-capital-F which 
covers the white section of Figure 3.) 
 
Under my preferred model, Fun is a technical concept 
covering only activities that are (folk) fun (i.e. ‘autotelic’, and 
pleasurable, broadly speaking) but that also place one in 
flow, thus being the intersection of fun and flow.  The 
phenomenal feeling of Fun is thus necessarily that of being 
in flow, but things that are generally not thought of as fun, 
such as working and reading ‘for a purpose’ are excluded, 
even though they can place one in flow.6   
 
                                               
6 This understanding may dictate that the same activity could be Fun or not 
depending on if one is in flow (and thus presumably feeling pleasure). 
Olympic sprinters, for example, who are struggling, and not experiencing 
pleasure from flow may not be having Fun whilst those in flow and 
performing well may indeed be having Fun. 
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Sketching Blythe and Hassenzahlean ‘fun’ 
 
Figure 7. (I argue that what Blythe and Hassenzahl call ‘fun’ is the white section 
of Figure 3.) 
 
It seems that what Blythe and Hassenzahl call ‘fun’ would 
cover the ‘trivial’ pursuits of watching comedy television 
shows and listening to pop music but exclude things that 
often place one in flow such as dancing, painting and playing 
games.  The authors seem to signal this themselves, setting 





Sketching Blythe and Hassenzahlean ‘pleasure’  
 
Figure 8. (What Blythe and Hassenzahl call ‘pleasure’ seems to be in opposition 
to their version of ‘fun’, thus the white section of Figure 3.) 
 
Blythe and Hassenzahl admit a technical use of 
‘pleasure’ in opposition to their use of ‘fun’.  One piece of 
evidence for the claim that Blythe and Hassenzahl’s 
‘pleasure’ is as above is that they make specific reference to 
their conception of pleasure as ‘absorbing’ (as opposed to 
‘distracting’), explicitly mirroring the absorbing nature of 
flow (and by extension, Fun).  Secondly, we know that, as 
with flow, activity is part of the pleasure that Blythe and 
Hassenzahl have in mind: ‘the main difference between 
pleasure and fun is its focus on an activity and a deep 
feeling of absorption.’ (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004, p. 95, 
emphasis mine).  Finally, the other connotations that Blythe 
and Hassenzahl give of their specific understanding of 
 
 135 
pleasure (i.e. relevance, progression, aesthetics, 
commitment) are equally at home in conversations about 
flow and Fun.  Indeed, Blythe and Hassenzahl derive their 
entire distinction from Csikszentmihalyi and his work on 
flow in their analysis of pleasure and their idea of 
‘progression’, more specifically skill-based progression.  One 
could argue, though, they are referring not only to things 
that often place one in flow such as dancing, painting, 
playing games, but also things that are not fun in the 
autotelic sense, such as having pleasurable massages 
(having arguably the instrumental ends of loosening 
muscles) and pleasurable eating and drinking (also resulting 
in the instrumental ends of providing energy or hydration), 
activities which are only rarely described as ‘fun’.  This point 
is perhaps contentious however, seeing as Blythe and 
Hassenzahl do not actually cite the instrumental pleasures 
such as eating and drinking as ‘pleasure’, preferring to stick 
to examples such as going to the opera as their non-flow 




Sketching Fincham’s fun 
 
Figure 9. (The white area being what I believe Fincham is describing as fun i.e. 
folk fun from figure 5.) 
 
Fincham’s ideas on fun are perhaps the most elusive 
when it comes to separating out the different uses of ‘fun’.  It 
is clear that Fincham doesn’t intend his study of fun to be a 
technical use of the term, which leads me to believe that fun 
for Fincham is most closely aligned with folk fun (as per 
Figure 5).  His talk of ‘commitment’ and ‘transgression’ tells 
us that his ‘set’ of fun at least includes Blythe-and-
Hassenzahlean fun.  Does it also include Fun too? (And thus 
look like folk fun in Figure 5?)  My evidence comes from his 
talk of playing darts as fun, clearly the type of activity that 
can typically place one in flow, and his mention of ‘attention 
focussed on activity and experience’ which also seems to 
cover that of flow.  This broadens out the Blythe-and-
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Hassenzahlean fun to include some flow-producing 
activities, and thus includes Fun.  It seems, then, that 
Fincham’s idea of fun is equivalent to fun in a folk sense. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter a state of play of the 
literature around fun.  I introduced reference to the origins 
of the term ‘fun’ and its connotations surrounding dubious 
morality, especially pre-war fun in relation to play.  
Importantly it was Wolfenstein, as we saw, who was the 
first to note the change in moral status in post-war America.  
I have also shown there is broad agreement that fun is 
under-theorised in general, but especially as a distinct field 
of study set apart from other concepts such as play and 
enjoyment.  Even books with titles such as Funology conflate 
talk of enjoyment and fun in an unhelpful way, save, of 
course, in that case, for the pioneering work of Blythe and 
Hassenzahl’s section.   
This current chapter can be seen, however, as largely a 
project to clear up the messy semantic disputes in the 
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literature.  In it, I have theorised that fun and flow are 
overlapping, and non-synonymous, concepts that are both 
subsets of what is pleasurable or enjoyable.  The tactic has 
been to investigate the type of activities described by each 
term, for example, eating dinner and having massages being 
potentially pleasurable but not often fun nor flow-producing.  
Contrast this to watching Hollywood action movies and 
going on holiday as potentially being fun but not often 
placing one in flow due to the lack of the merging of action 
and awareness.  Also note that working or purposeful 
reading can place one in flow without usually being 
described as ‘fun’, perhaps due to them having instrumental 
ends.  This leaves such activities such as dancing, painting 
and playing games as being typically both fun and flow-
producing (as well as, of course, pleasurable) which we can 
see, due to this intersection of fun and flow, as being in the 
technical category of Fun.   
Blythe and Hassenzahl’s model, most importantly, lines 
up very nicely with mine, although I claim what they call 
fun is only a subset of what I am calling ‘folk fun’.  It must 
simply be noted that for Blythe and Hassenzahl ‘pleasure’ is 
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simply a category combining flow plus other enjoyable 
experience not usually described as ‘fun’ (although it is 
slightly unclear if they mean to include ‘non-absorbing’ 
pleasures such as eating and drinking as ‘pleasures’).  The 
advantage of my model over Blythe and Hassenzahl’s is that 
we can call some things that place us in flow ‘fun’, 
preserving the folk intuition than flow is often fun, as well 
as calling fun things ‘pleasurable’ which also seems to be an 
intuition we would want to uphold.  Finally, we also have 
the newly minted term ‘Fun’ that may just be narrow 
enough of a concept to hone in on empirical analysis of what 
it is like to play games. 
Next up will be to use our new concept of ‘Fun’ to make 
the central claims in this dissertation.  Most relevant will be 
the claim that we should endorse Bernard Suits’ definition 
but amend his ‘lusory attitude’ condition to where the rules 
are accepted just to make possible an activity that provokes 
Fun.  We will thus, in the next chapter, re-visit Suits and try 
to map where Fun can be accommodated in his theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Fun as a Lens for Games 
 
Introduction 
We have seen a review of the literature in both fun and 
games but in this chapter I hope to tie the topics together in 
a meaningful way.  We started with the conjecture that 
there might be some important link between fun and games 
but so far there has been scant literature attempting to link 
the concepts directly.  Clearly one reason for the lack of such 
an attempt is the ever-elusive nature of fun, a gap which we 
have hoped to avoid with our newly minted concept of ‘Fun’.  
This present chapter will use the concept of ‘Fun’ to assist in 
the synthesis of the literature on fun and games by firstly 
endorsing the style of rule-based formalism seen from 
Bernard Suits, and then adding to it to include our concept 
of Fun. 
If Fun is part of what we can say is ‘constitutive’ of 
games, then this may have ripple effects for other 
approaches to games.  For this reason, in this chapter there 
will also be an analysis of how games, if they were to be 
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essentially Fun, could potentially relate to other games 
methodologies (such as a psychological version of the concept 
coined by Huizinga, the ‘magic circle’, as well as games-as-
activity approaches found in the philosophy of sport).  For 
instance, given that philosophy of sport approaches often 
have something to say on the value of games (either socially, 
culturally, or otherwise), an understanding that sees Fun as 
constitutive of games may be relevant for determining those 
values.  As will be discussed, it may be a short hop to see 
that if games are, as will be argued, essentially Fun, then 
the more Fun provoked by a game the better.  Similarly, we 
might say the more Fun a game is, the more valued it is as a 
game.  Further, if we are to play games in a certain way or 
to change their rules, then perhaps ‘in order to make them 
more Fun’ might be a primary concern if Fun was 
constitutive of games.  Finally, in this chapter we will look 
as the business of games and, in particular, whether games 
that are considered Fun tend to be the more profitable ones, 
which would lend support to the argument that Fun has 




Suits’ Definition Redux 
Let us return for the moment to Bernard Suits’ account  
of games:  
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing 
about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by 
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because 
they make possible such activity. (Suits, 1978, p. 43) 
  
As has been noted, this definition from Suits’ has been called 
the ‘gold standard’ of games definitions (Kretchmar, 2008).  
One might even say that the tradition of defining games 
since The Grasshopper has simply been footnotes to Suits, or 
at least heavily inspired by him.  By way of evidence we can 
see that all major definitions offered since Suits have also 
been formalist ones (see the earlier Chapter 1 for discussion 
of these), insofar as they see a games’ rules as being 
ontologically relevant to the game in some deep sense.   
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 It may be useful to break down the Suits definition 
into four conditions, following Frank McBride’s example.  
We have: 
 
1) to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (the specific 
state of affairs we can call the ‘prelusory goal’)  
2) using only means permitted by the rules (such means we can 
call the ‘lusory means’)  
3) where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means (such rules we can call the ‘constitutive rules’) 
4) where the rules are accepted just because they make possible 
such activity (such an attitude we can call the ‘lusory attitude’).  
(adapted from Suits, 1978 as presented in McBride, 1979) 
 
All these conditions together, according to Suits, 
(attempting to achieve a ‘prelusory goal’ via ‘lusory means’ 
outlined by the ‘constitutive rules’ because of a ‘lusory 
attitude’) result in game-playing.  As Gordon Calleja (2011, 
p. 50) points out, however, this fourth condition, the lusory 
attitude, seems circular: the rules of the activity need to be 
accepted because they make possible that very same 
activity.  It is for this reason that we will focus on the fourth 
 
 144
condition, that of the ‘lusory attitude’, to see if it can be 
strengthened.  In particular, can we make an amendment to 
this fourth condition that preserves its original intention but 
rescues the definition from circularity? 
The reasons for a lusory attitude are largely ignored in 
Suits and Suits-style accounts due to Suits and his admirers 
seeing the lack of a common reason for game-playing as a 
benefit rather than a deficit.  His account means that any 
reason in addition to the lusory attitude (from earning 
money to achieving personal goals) could be cited by game-
players as reasons for playing games.  It is certainly the case 
that one might play a game for status, or for money, or, 
seemingly, or for any number of reasons.  For Suits, 
however, there is only one common reason: the lusory 
attitude (i.e. to make possible the activity) (see Suits, 1978, 
pp. 142-153). 
Nonetheless some common candidates for a further 
reason, and narrowing, of a lusory attitude can be found in 
the literature, and thus reasons over and above simply 
making possible the activity.  Kretchmar (2012, p. 102) cites 
‘excellence’ as such a candidate: that one engages in a lusory 
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attitude for the reason that one can excel (see for further 
discussion McNamee, 2008; Simon, Torres, & Hager, 2014).  
Also suggested is that lusory attitudes might be undertaken 
for knowledge of how a body moves spatiotemporally 
(Fraleigh, 1984, p. 97), as well as how the game might lead 
to self-improvement (see Arnold, 1997; McFee, 2004).   
Perhaps the best existing candidate for reasons of a 
lusory attitude is Csikszentmihalyi himself, who suggests 
that it is for reasons of flow that games, (along with other 
autotelic activities) exist: 
 
What makes these [games and other autotelic activities] 
conducive to flow is that they were designed to make optimal 
experience easier to achieve. They have rules that require the 
learning of skills, they set up goals, they provide feedback, they 
make control possible. (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], p. 72) 
   
Why could we not, then, just agree with 
Csikszentmihalyi and use flow when talking of Bernard 
Suits and lusory attitudes?  In some sense the attempt here 
will, indeed, be to do just that.  By this I mean that just as I 
will have endorsed Suits, I wish to also endorse 
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Csikszentmihalyi’s view that flow is a reason behind the 
lusory attitude of games.  They are both correct, in my 
opinion, as far as it goes. 
It is clear, however, that both Csikszentmihalyi and 
Suits omit explicit talk of fun in their views on games, even 
when the link between fun and games appears strong.  My 
claim that the lusory attitude of games (i.e. the reason a 
games’ rules are accepted) has something to do with the 
concept of fun has apparently no literature surrounding it.  
This is, of course, largely because ‘fun’, as we have seen, is 
underused in philosophy.  It is interesting that even 
references to lusory attitudes being due to reasons of flow, 
although they do exist (see for example McNamee, 2008),  
tend to be passing references rather than substantially 
adding to, or otherwise altering Csikszentmihalyi’s 
(2008[1990]) original claims regarding games.  Also, 
apparently lacking are attempts to build in reasons for 
lusory attitudes into Bernard Suits’ account explicitly, as 
opposed to more general analysis of the goals of games.  
Combining fun with flow and then using it in conjunction 
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with Bernard Suits will thus be the contribution of this 
dissertation to the existing literature on games. 
  So why fun?  Doesn’t flow do the job?  As hinted at 
before, because of the fact that flow and (folk) fun overlap, it 
is true that one could seemingly choose either flow or fun as 
the reason that a lusory attitude is accepted, and thus the 
reason that games exist.  But this is precisely the point; it is 
because both fun and flow are possible reasons for games to 
exist that our concept of capital-F Fun is nominated as the 
more precise purpose of games.   
I must stress that using ‘Fun’ as a version of the 
concept of flow should not be seen as a needless broadening 
of the reason that games are played, but, rather, an 
important narrowing.  Recall that ‘Fun’ is not just any 
casual use of the word ‘fun’, nor, in some sense, is it a casual 
use of the word ‘flow’.  It is a more specific use of both – the 
intersection of fun and flow.  The claim is that games do not 
exist for reasons of any old flow, only autotelic (i.e. fun-in-a-
folk-sense) versions of flow.  Games, too, do not exist for 
reasons of any old fun, only versions of fun that result in a 
merging of action and awareness (i.e. flow). 
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Of course, we need be careful when tinkering with a 
highly respected theory.  The ‘lusory attitude’ condition as it 
stands (as formulated by Suits) is important for implying 
that the rules of games needn’t be accepted for any reason 
beside making possible an activity.  In contrast, an example 
such as the road rules being accepted in order to improve 
safety does not make possible the action of driving.  
Compare this to a game’s rules which, as Suits implies, exist 
to make the game itself possible.  In general, codes and laws 
all work in a way like our road rules example; usually to 
protect or enforce well-being (whether it be the well-being of 
individuals or well-being of collections of individuals) for 
activities that already exist.  Suits highlights that a game’s 
constitutive rules seem unlike these types of rules and 
directives however.  He instead seems to be telling us that 
games spring into existence because of their rules.  For 
Suits, the rules collapse the achieving of a goal, say getting a 
ball in a hole in golf, with the one prescribed way of 
achieving the goal. ‘[If an] episode is treated as an action 
which has one, and only one, end … it can be argued that 
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the action has become, just by virtue of that fact, a game.’ 
(Suits, 1978, p. 25) 
This raises the question though, of why we would want 
games to spring into existence in the first place.  If there 
was an unerring reason for games to be played, then 
presumably we could build such a reason into the lusory 
attitude condition proposed by Suits.  We could then say the 
lusory attitude makes possible games for reason x.  This way 
we could retain the idea that the lusory attitude makes 
possible the activity, without the circularity of suggesting 
that making possible the activity was the ends in itself. 
Of course, there are myriad reasons why game-playing 
might be pursued.  For fitness, to earn a living, for 
entertainment of an audience, surely even because our 
physical education teacher has instructed us to play, all 
count as reasons for playing a game.  None of these appear 
universalisable to a general rule for playing games though; 
board games don’t increase fitness, a Thursday evening 
squash player doesn’t earn a living from squash, playing the 
video game Red Dead Redemption 2 (2018) at home can 
surely be done without an audience and, of course, most 
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games are not played under the watchful eye of a physical 
education teacher. 
I will suggest here however that, possibly without 
exception, one needn’t play games for any reasons other 
than Fun.  Further, I don’t think it an overreach to suggest 
that we might amend condition four of Bernard Suits’ 
definition as follows: (the lusory attitude is) where the rules 
are accepted just to make possible an activity that provokes 
Fun. 
The fact the rules are accepted to make possible a Fun 
activity does not, of course, mean games are played purely 
for Fun, rather that they need not be played for other than 
Fun.  That we might say the rules of squash are accepted to 
make possible an activity that can provoke an autotelic 
version of flow (i.e. Fun) tells us nothing of why an 
individual decides to play squash on a Thursday night.  
Squash can still be played for fitness, or to win tournaments, 
or even because one is forced to at gunpoint, even if we say 
the rules are accepted to make possible an activity that 
provokes Fun, seeing as Fun is the common denominator for 
seemingly all game-playing, at least in an ideal sense.  By 
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‘ideal sense’ I mean from something like the perspective of a 
creator of a game when creating an artefact for the best 
possible outcome.  We wouldn’t want to say that all 
instances of game-playing result in Fun, but from an 
idealising perspective of a game-creator (or rule-modifier) 
the way we relate to players is through their imagining of 
players having Fun. 
Think of a game such as Starcraft 2, a game (at the 
time of writing) played almost exclusively for status or prize 
money.  One might think Starcraft 2 was played for Fun 
originally before tournaments and competitions were 
common, however I think it can be argued that Fun is still 
provoked by Starcraft 2 during certain sections of play, even 
if not at all times and places.  Certainly in an ideal sense 
from the point of view of a game creator, Starcraft 2 is 
intended to provoke Fun. 
Is our amendment to Suits too broad though?  Does the 
ammendement admit Fun activities that are not game-
playing?  It can be argued that the phrase ‘just to make 
possible an activity that provokes Fun’ retains all the 
benefits of the original ‘just to make possible an activity’ 
 
 152
condition in the ruling in and out of activities from being 
games.  With the original Suits definition, for example, the 
acceptance of the rules of a competitive running race can be 
argued to make possible the running race, making the race a 
game.  Although one could argue that races do not tend to be 
referred to as ‘games’ in everyday language, Suits allows for 
this by appealing to running races’ similarity to games 
(rather than them being described as such through folk 
language use).  It seems our amendment doesn’t make any 
distinction here that the Suits definition doesn’t already 
make.7 
What does this mean for the Suits definition?  To 
reiterate it may mean that the Suits definition is correct as 
far as it goes.  It seems there is just a little more to say on 
what games are, specifically about the why of rules.  We can 
be agnostic as to whether we want a reason for our games’ 
rules built into our definition, but it seems to have some 
                                               
7 Note that the addition of Fun, on its own, is not a sufficient 
condition of game-playing.  Painting, reading page-turning novels and 
dancing all provoke Fun without being games.  This addition of Fun to Suits’ 
definition simply spells out an extra necessary condition of game-playing i.e. 
the reason games’ rules are accepted.  Importantly, neither is Fun the pre-




explanatory power.  Further, it has impact on some of the 
other ways we see games.  If we recall the main approaches 
in the philosophy of games (i.e. ‘magic circles’, games-as-
texts, games-as-art and games-as-activities) I suggest that it 
is magic circle approaches to games, as well as games-as-
activities approaches that can be significantly altered, and 
perhaps benefit from, our amendments to Suits’ definition. 
What can we say of the phenomenology of game-
playing given this definition?  Fun, being stipulated here as 
the autotelic subset of flow, is thus provoked in the manner 
of flow, by way of a balance between achievement and skill.  
The way games tend to provoke this state (and are 
specifically designed to do) is to give a prelusory goal to 
achieve and to give (explicit or implicit) instruction on the 
skills needed for the goal to be achieved (via the constitutive 
rules).  As we saw from Csikszentmihalyi: games’ rules 
‘require the learning of skills, they set up goals, they provide 
feedback, they make control possible’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 
2008[1990], p. 72).  The ‘constitutive rules’ are important 
seeing as the achievement of the goal and learning of skill 
need to be dynamic so that one is always striving to achieve 
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it in order that boredom doesn’t creep in (boredom being 
antithetical to flow) (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975; Whiteoak, 2014, p. 743). 
Seeing as though flow is typically provoked through 
balancing of challenge and skill, a dynamic challenge 
through restricting possibility can assist in increasing 
complexity to the original flow-producing optimum (Cowley, 
Charles, Black, & Hickey, 2008, pp. 14-15; Douglas & 
Hargadon, 2000).  Rules, in the case of a game, are then are 
an effective way of ‘providing the paradoxical highly 
structured context and relative freedom of movement’ 
(Douglas & Hargadon, 2000, p. 158) which is seen as vital to 
flow states.  Think of how the rules of chess are restrictions, 
but one that allow one to try their hand at playing stronger 
and stronger chess opponents, in almost infinite ways.  The 
constitutive rules are also important seeing as a hallmark of 
flow is knowing in principle how to deal with the problem at 
hand due to immediate feedback.  The win/loss mechanic 
seen in so many games is perfect for this requirement, 
giving immediate feedback, as it does, as to how one is 
increasing in skill and achievement.  In a similar way, 
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scores and scoring are a method of feedback to determine 
skill and achievement. 
Even if we accept Fun being crucial for games, one 
might wonder about the wisdom of changing the Suits’ 
definition to include an overriding goal of a game.  The clear 
benefit of including a reason behind the rules of games in 
our formalist account however, is that it complements 
several of the other main methods for studying games. 
We must note that the four main lenses for games as 
outlined in this thesis (‘magic circles’, art, text or as an 
activity) are not in direct competition with each other.  First 
of all, it may be true that some games are indeed art, and 
that some games have narratives and characters, in which 
case thinking of them as art or texts may be overwhelmingly 
useful.  So too there seems nothing contradictory between 
seeing games as ‘magic circles’ and investigating the value of 
playing of them (as a philosopher of sport who views them as 
activities may be tempted to do).  Further, seeing games as a 
collection of rules may be more or less useful for all, or none, 
of these methods.  Having said that, our fiddling with 
Bernard Suits’ definition has something direct to say about 
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some of these lenses for games.  We will turn to these next, 
starting with the ‘magic circle’ concept. 
 
Fun as a Magic Circle 
So, do changes to our lusory attitude from Suits (i.e. 
the attitude where the rules are accepted just to make 
possible an activity that provokes Fun) have anything to say 
about the concept of the ‘magic circle’?  To recapitulate, 
magic circles originated with Huizinga, who saw a game’s 
world as importantly distinct from the ‘ordinary’ world: 
 
All play moves and has its being within a play-ground 
marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, 
deliberately or as a matter of course. Just as there is 
no formal difference between play and ritual, so the 
“consecrated spot” cannot be formally distinguished 
from the play-ground. The arena, the card-table, the 
magic circle, the temple, the stage, the screen, the 
tennis court, the court of justice, etc., are all in form 
and function play-grounds, i.e. forbidden spots, 
isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within which special 
rules obtain. All are temporary worlds within ordinary 
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world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart. 
(Huizinga, 2003[1938], p. 10) 
 
The fascination with magic circles in games studies and the 
philosophy of games however comes much later.  Jaakko 
Stenros (2014, p. 149) backs Eric Zimmerman’s (2012) 
account that the modern iteration of magic circles actually 
begins with Zimmerman himself, starting with his work 
with George Lantz in the 1990s and, influentially, with 
Katie Salen and their book Rules of Play (Salen & 
Zimmerman, 2003).  Stenros makes the further point that 
the concept is widely misunderstood.  He cites Zimmerman 
in telling us that that writer and his co-authors were 
speaking from a game design perspective rather than 
attempting to make deep sociological points about the 
playing of games when they brought up modern magic 
circles (Zimmerman, 2012).  The hard-line, strictly formalist 
version of a magic circle perspective, whereupon one would 
claim there to be an absolute distinction between all aspects 
game-playing versus non-game-playing, Zimmerman argues, 
is a caricature held by no-one (or as he sees it, a hypothetical 
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person he dismissively calls a ‘magic circle jerk’.)  The 
binary of game playing, he goes on, may tell you if someone 
is playing a game or not playing a game but it fails to tell 
you anything about the social aspects of a game or indeed 
why anyone would want to play a game (Zimmerman, 2012). 
 Yet magic circle ideas have been persistent since Salen 
and Zimmerman’s work (Stenros, 2014, p. 147).  One reason 
suggested by Zimmerman, is that a ‘straw-man’ of the 
theory makes others’ research much easier.  He claims 
early-career researchers in particular are keen to present 
the literalist magic circle idea that game-playing is 
completely separate from the real world (which, once again, 
Zimmerman attributes to the non-existent ‘magic circle 
jerk’) in order to knock it down (Zimmerman, 2012).   
The binary nature of the magic circle, too, makes it 
easy to project almost any feature on to the game-world/real-
world dichotomy.  Salen and Zimmerman intended the 
magic circle to be about the ‘meaning’ that is created when 
games are played (Zimmerman, 2012), while later, for 
others, the magic circle came to be about other features of 
game-playing, from the psychological state when playing 
 
 159 
games, the social contract entered into when playing games 
or, in a cultural sense, the literal (or conceptual) ‘arena’ in 
which games are played (Stenros, 2014). 
 Stenros (2014) argues that the term ‘magic circle’ 
should be reserved for the ‘social contract’ metaphor, but 
acknowledges that the idea is something of a blank canvas.  
When discussing Fun and its allusions to flow, it is clear 
that it is the psychological metaphor of the magic circle that 
is the most relevant; that one is in some sort of distinct 
mind-set when playing a game.  Stenros, after Apter (1991), 
refers to this mental version of the magic circle as the 
‘psychological bubble’ of playfulness: ‘there is a connection 
between the psychological bubble and the magic circle…’ 
(Stenros, 2014, p. 165). 
If we were to use ‘magic circle’ as a psychological, or 
phenomenological, metaphor (rather than a social or 
cultural one) then surely Fun and its accompanying flow 
state would be squarely inside the circle.  Indeed, Stenros 
specifically mentions Csikszentmihalyi and flow, as well as 
Apter (Apter, 1991) and his talk of paratelic activities, or 
activities (characterized by safety and being voluntary) that 
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have a phenomenology distinct from the everyday (Stenros, 
2014, p. 162).  Importantly Stenros even contrasts the 
‘psychological bubble’ version of being inside the magic circle 
to Suits and his ‘lusory attitude’ (Suits, 1978 cited in 
Stenros, 2014, p. 164), the precise condition of Suits we are 
proposing to alter with talk of Fun.  Stenros calls the lusory 
attitude of Suits (where the rules are accepted just because 
they make possible an activity) not identical to flow but 
‘more like something that can help in achieving that 
phenomenological state [flow]’ (Stenros, 2014, p. 164, 
emphasis mine). This maps precisely onto the updated 
version of the lusory attitude, which we are proposing to 
amend by adding Fun, namely that accepting the rules of a 
game helps achieve a state of Fun (and thus flow). 
 
The Value of Games 
 If we were to build Fun into the definition of a 
formalist account such as that of Suits, then this would 
necessarily alter how we view game-playing as an activity.  
Recall Nguyen: ‘to paint with a broad brush, literary 
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theorists and philosophers of art typically focus on games as 
designed artefacts, while philosophy of sport investigates 
game-playing as an activity’ (Nguyen, 2017, p. 10).  In 
particular, philosophy of sport has much to say on morality 
and value, which should be seen as an advantage of an 
updated formalism account that includes Fun.  We will thus 
take a slight review of broad internalism and the philosophy 
of sport in order to show that our new version of Suits may 
benefit the analysis of the so-called ‘interests’ of the game. 
 Firstly, though, a note on sport as opposed to games.  
In our earlier discussion of broad internalism – the idea that 
the ‘interest’ of the game dictates the games’ value – the 
focus was very much on sport rather than games.  Of course, 
it depends on one’s definition of games as to whether there 
can be sports that are not games.  Meier (1998) claims, for 
instance, that sport is a subset of games, which can be 




            
Figure 10. Meier’s Euler diagram on Game, Sport and Play 
(source: Schneider, 2001, adapting Meier, 1998, p. 11-30) 
 
A similar, but contrasting view is from Suits, recalling that 
for Suits mountain climbing, foot-racing and competitive 
swimming can be games.  Suits’ method shows overlapping 
types of play, dependent on professionalism: 1. Primitive 
play, 2. Sophisticated play, 3. Professional non-athletic 
games, 4. Amateur performances, 5. Amateur sport, 6. 




Figure 11. Suits’ Venn Diagram on Games, Sports and Play 
(source: Schneider, 2001, pp. 1-9, adapting Suits, 1988) 
 
 It must be noted that it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to delve too deeply into definitions of ‘sport’, which 
has its own traditions and, like play and games, is seen 
usually as a broad, if not vague concept.  Suffice it to say 
that even if sport has its own essential qualities, there is 
nothing to suggest that this would necessarily conflict with 
the essential qualities, and the interest, of games being 
‘Fun’.  (For example, physical tests of skill, if essential to 
sport’s lusory goals, can obviously also be Fun.)   
Thus, we return, as par for the course in the 
philosophy of sport, to the value and morality of the game. 
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Recent broad internalism debates (see Dixon, 2016; Morgan, 
2012; Russell, 2007, 2018) do not attempt to settle the 
precise nature of the interest of sport (or game-playing).  It 
could even be said that the literature on the interests of the 
game run secondary to fighting for the very principle of 
broad internalism.  As Russell (2018, p. 5) writes: ‘there is 
no assumption in broad internalism or claim made by its 
defenders that there is general agreement about the point 
and purpose of sport’. (Which we can see, for our purposes, 
as extending to games.) 
Recall Simon’s (2000) characterization of ‘broad 
internalism’ as the idea that a game’s value, and thus any 
changes to the game’s rules, ought to be dictated by what 
Butcher and Schneider (1998) call a game’s ‘interests’.  We 
saw Butcher and Schneider plump for a Kantian-style 
imperative for their notion of ‘interests’, suggesting that: 
‘taking the interests of the game seriously means that we 
ask ourselves whether or not some action we are 
contemplating would be good for the game concerned, if 
everyone did it’ (Butcher & Schneider, 1998, p. 11).  I 
suggest the interests of the game are more in line with our 
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proposed theory that suggests Fun might be in the ‘interest’ 
of the game.  In other words, to paraphrase (and update) 
Butcher and Schneider, taking the interests of the game 
seriously means that we ask ourselves whether or not some 
action we are contemplating would increase Fun.  This kind 
of idea, that the interest (in this case Fun) may be part of 
the essence of the game, is more in keeping to what Simon 
(2000) referred to as an ‘interpretive’ version of broad 
internalism.   
As we have seen, interpretive broad internalism 
dictates that the value, and interests, of the game must exist 
as part of the game’s essence.  As has been noted, this claim 
has its own body of literature around it (see for example 
Dixon, 2016; Morgan, 2012; Russell, 2007, 2018; Simon, 
2000).  For reasons of space we will not directly analyse the 
arguments but simply note that if interpretive broad 
internalism is true then that this is clearly impacted on by 
claims that Fun is to be found in a definition of game-
playing. 
  Once accepting the Suits definition, we can only 
really claim that Fun is part of the essence of games if we 
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were to add to the Suits definition to include Fun, as we 
have proposed.  If we are seriously suggesting that a game’s 
rules are accepted to make possible activities that provoke 
Fun, then this gives Fun a useful measure of value (at least 
according to interpretive broad internalists).  Instantly we 
have an account telling us not only that the lusory attitude 
of a game is part of the game, and that, in turn, that Fun is 
part of the lusory attitude.  We also have an existing account 
that tells us when a game is good: it is good when Fun is 
provoked.   
Similarly, we have an account that dictates if, and 
how, we should alter the rules of a game: we ought to alter a 
game in order to provoke more Fun.  We even have an 
account that dictates normative questions outside the 
playing of the game: we ought to lend another player our 
racquet if we wish to make possible an activity that is Fun, 
to possibly make it more Fun (recall both Butcher and 
Schneider (1998) and Simon’s (2000) for discussion of this, 
and similar, cases).   
Clearly, this line of argumentation is dependent on the 
tradition of broad internalism in general and interpretive 
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broad internalism in particular.  I only include it (in brief) as 
a speculative hint of where the literature may go if the 
account of games and Fun found in this thesis were to be 
taken up more widely.  There are no doubt other traditions 
that would be equally impacted on if they were to take the 
link between fun (or Fun) and games seriously as a way of 
saying what it is games are, or why they are philosophically 
interesting. 
 
Games: The Fun Business 
Does a definition of games that incorporates Fun have 
anything to say on the pragmatics of playing games, or is 
this idea destined to remain somewhat esoteric?  We will 
now take a brief detour into the business of games and think 
about whether there is a strong link with a game being Fun 
and a game being profitable. 
 We already know, if we follow interpretive broad 
internalism and our amendment to Suits, that it could be 
claimed that a game is better as a game if it is more Fun.  
Does this relate to income potential?  Let us look at just one 
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example, the recent best-selling game Red Dead Redemption 
2 (2018), which had the staggering sales figures of US$725 
million on its opening weekend (Tassi, 2018).  This may not 
translate to the game being one of the most Fun-inducing 
games ever released however.  Opinions on this will be 
necessarily subjective but take reviewer Kirk Hamilton: ‘I 
only rarely found Red Dead 2 to be ‘fun’ in the way I find 
many other video games to be fun. The physical act of 
playing is rarely pleasurable on its own. It is often tiring 
and cumbersome, though no less thrilling for it’ (Hamilton, 
2018).  The fun mentioned here is of course lower case (or 
folk) fun, however we know by stipulation that Fun requires 
folk fun. 
 Assuming that these and similar opinions are common, 
it appears Fun doesn’t correlate in a linear way to income 
from games, thus meaning that there are other things that 
are potentially desired from a game apart from Fun.  
Common sense dictates this too, especially in a video game 
context.  It is usual, for example, for video game reviewers to 
incorporate their opinions on aesthetic beauty from 
graphics, well-told narratives, as well as game-play into 
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their reviews in order to assist people in decisions about 
purchasing certain games.  Although obviously the hereto 
unknown term ‘Fun’ is not mentioned in game reviews, (folk) 
fun, an element of Fun, is often cited in the enjoyment of 
games.  Perhaps then Fun is not a sufficient factor in a 
game’s profitability but may remain a necessary one. 
 To illustrate the above point, we need to go no further 
than the current trend in video games: in-game purchases.  
Now, more than ever, there are games that are free to 
download, forgoing income from the sale to instead monetise 
in-game purchases.  This is particularly true of the growing 
mobile games industry, fuelled by the ubiquity of 
smartphones.  Players will pay money for ‘upgrades, 
costumes or weapons for their in-game characters, or … a 
lottery-style “loot box” whose contents are unknown in 
advance, but might prove valuable enough to resell to other 
players’ ("The price of free; Video games," 2018).  
 We know though that purchasing ‘skins’ (an 
alternative appearance for an in-game character), in a game 
such as Fortnite (2017) for example, are often purely 
aesthetic and sometimes hold no advantage in game-play, 
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and instead is more important for how the players want to 
be seen.  While highly lucrative for games developers, it 
seems unlikely ‘skins’ will make a difference to flow states 
(and thus Fun seeing as Fun is contingent on flow states).  
The twist of course is that developers do need to improve 
game-play to keep players in the game so that they would be 
motivated to make cosmetic changes to their characters and 
environments in the first place. 
 It thus seems that a Fun game can be made profitable, 
but not necessarily through making the game more Fun.  As 
suggested, it is Fun that is necessary to profitable games 
rather than being sufficient for them.  I doubt that this is a 
problem for any claims made in this dissertation however.  
Fun games still seem valued more than non-Fun games qua 
games, it is simply the case that the most profitable 
elements that make up the game need not be the Fun 
elements.  In-game purchases may be the most profitable 
part of free mobile games in economic terms, for example, 
but they may not be particularly Fun-provoking.  The free 
market of in-app purchases will come to nought, of course, if 





In this chapter, we have been introduced to a potential 
amendment to Suits’ highly successful, and highly regarded, 
definition of game-playing.  Starting by largely endorsing 
Suits, we noted that ‘accepting rules just to make possible 
an activity’ may lead Suits’ original definition open to 
allegations of circularity.  The proposal in this chapter has 
been to resolve this potential problem by being explicit in 
the definition as to why we would want to make that activity 
possible.  That reason has of course been to provoke Fun, the 
concept stipulated here as the intersection of folk fun and 
flow. 
If we amend Suits’ lusory attitude to that of where the 
rules are accepted just to make possible an activity that 
provokes Fun, it can be argued we have an improved 
definition.  The definition now reads, in its long (and 
amended) form:  
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means 
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permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in 
favour of less efficient means, and where the rules are accepted 
just to make possible an activity that provokes Fun (adapted 
from Suits, 1978). 
 
The overriding benefit of a methodology mixing 
formalism and fun, however, is that it helps us investigate 
existing lenses through which to look at games.  Formalism, 
which in this context is the idea that games are essentially a 
set of rules, is a valid way of analysing games, but we can go 
further and suggest that games’ rules exist, perhaps, in 
order to provoke Fun.  Although games-as-texts and games-
as-art approaches, which we discussed in Chapter 1, might 
be a slightly less optimal way to look at games in this 
context there are real consequences for ‘magic circle’ 
approaches as well philosophy of sport approaches. 
We saw that magic circles, as coined by Huizinga, may 
be a slightly broad concept that has taken a detour in recent 
years, especially after Zimmerman and his collaborators.  It 
can be argued that magic circles are best seen as metaphors 
for the social contracts inherent in game-play, but magic 
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circles can also be seen as metaphors for the psychological 
state of those engaged in game-playing.  If we take such a 
‘psychological bubble’ approach as this, then Fun, with a 
flow state as one of its necessary factors, must be squarely 
inside the magic circle and separate from the rest of the 
world.  Interestingly there will be perhaps another magic 
circle distinction when it comes to Fun: between autotelic 
and instrumental activities, falling along fun and non-fun 
lines, although this is arguably not of the psychological 
bubble variety.  Analysis of ‘Fun’ being part of the magic 
circle for games also neatly lines up with the sort of 
activities that games’ rules make possible; ones that provoke 
flow, or more precisely Fun.  This of course explains why one 
would want to inhabit a magic circle of Fun: because it is 
inherently, and necessarily, pleasurable. 
Finally, we looked back at the value of games, as per 
‘game-as-activity’ approaches.  The activity of game-playing 
– if Fun is indeed an essential part of why games’ rules are 
accepted – gives us a handy account of why we ought to 
value games.  It can be argued, following a certain tradition 
from the philosophy of sport, that playing games is special 
 
 174
because it is Fun, and thereby if we are to change a game we 
ought to make it more Fun.  So too this can be argued to 
dictate our behaviour outside the rules of the game: we 
ought to assist other players if it will go on to produce more 
Fun. 
In the next chapter, we aim to test the current theory 
with difficult cases.  Using different case studies and 
examples of games (including video game and non-video 
game examples) we will see whether the activities made 
possible by a games’ rules necessarily provoke Fun.  I will 
argue that the examples of games that fail to meet the 
proposed definition may be due to a loose manner of 
speaking.  This results in some games being ‘games’ due to a 
misnomer.  The most controversial examples of these I will 
claim are a genre of video games called ‘serious’ games, 
including simulations, educational games, and what are 








 We are now armed with a seemingly powerful 
definition for ‘game-playing’: 
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means 
permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in 
favour of less efficient means, and where the rules are accepted 
just to make possible an activity that provokes Fun (adapted 
from Suits, 1978). 
 
In essence, the proposed definition remains identical to the 
original Bernard Suits definition from The Grasshopper, yet 
with an important addendum: that the rules are accepted 
not just to make possible an activity, but that they are 
accepted just to make possible an activity that provokes 
Fun, (Fun being our flow-fun hybrid).  In this chapter, we 
will test the definition with respect to difficult cases. 
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 Snakes and Ladders, the famous board game, will be 
the first cab off the rank, seeing as it can be argued to fail in 
meeting the definition even though it appears a paradigm 
case of a game.  This is because flow, a necessary condition 
of Fun, seemingly requires ‘building skill’, when Snakes and 
Ladders is apparently a game of chance.  A closer look at 
flow will thus be needed in this chapter to clarify the 
example. 
 The video game Dear Esther – and games like it – may 
also appear a problem for the definition, as the game seems 
to be created for different reasons other than ‘Fun’.  Dear 
Esther meeting the Fun condition of our definition would 
require that flow must be provoked when playing the game, 
and also (seeing as Fun is a variety of fun) that playing the 
game must count as being ‘for its own sake’.  This can be 
doubted on both counts, however, seeing as Dear Esther, 
and games like them (dubbed ‘art games’) appear to provoke 
their pleasure from their story-telling, aesthetic beauty and 




 Art games like Dear Esther can be seen as belonging to 
a broader category known as serious games: ‘any piece of 
software that merges a non-entertaining purpose with a 
video game structure’ (Djaouti, Alvarez, & Jessel, 2011, p. 
2).  These include training simulators often used in the 
military or in the field of medicine.   
It will be important in this chapter to determine 
whether ‘serious games’ are a variety of game, or simply 
game-like.  If serious games are game-like (and not strictly 
games) – and we will argue that they are – then the addition 
of Fun in a definition of games may give a motivation for 
differentiating between games and serious games.  The main 
claim, however, will be that the original Suits definition 
already does a good job between distinguishing games and 
non-games, and that the updated definition just mirrors 
this. 
The final case study in this chapter will be that of 
Microsoft Flight Simulator X (2006) (or FSX) and its 
predecessor Microsoft Flight Simulator 2 (1984).  These are 
difficult cases of games versus serious games, coming down 
to the fact that the former game contains some optional 
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missions to complete, which means there are specific goals 
to be achieved (thus perhaps making it a game) even though 
it remains a very realistic simulation.   
 
Snakes and Ladders 
 The first problem case to be discussed in terms of our 
alteration to Bernard Suits’ definition is the board game 
Snakes and Ladders.  The game is famously one of chance, 
usually played with a single die allowing players to navigate 
a grid of squares in sequential order.  Typically some of the 
squares have pictorial representations of snakes or ladders, 
allowing players to skip ahead when finishing a turn at the 
bottom of a ladder, or going backwards when finishing on a 
snake.   
Snakes and Ladders, in spite of – or perhaps because 
of – being a simple game, appears to be a paradigm case of a 
game.  A definition of a game that went on to exclude 
Snakes and Ladders would then seemingly be a weak 
definition.  Yet our updated Suits-style definition requires a 
games’ rules to be accepted just so that it makes possible an 
activity that is Fun.  As flow is a necessary condition of Fun, 
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then this dictates, if we are correct, that playing Snakes and 
Ladders must be able to place one in flow.  But does playing 
Snakes and Ladders place one in flow?  
We know, certainly, that one may be absorbed in a 
game of Snakes and Ladders in the manner of being ‘in the 
zone’ (as also often reported by those in flow).  A narrow 
reading of Csikszentmihalyi’s flow states, however, tells us 
that ‘building skill’ may need to be part of what is counted 
as being in flow.  Seeing as a typical game of Snakes and 
Ladders relies purely on chance (rather than skill) then this 
leaves the theory in some jeopardy.  It appears something 
must have to give if Snakes and Ladders is to be seen as a 
game under the updated Suits definition. 
One option would be to bite the bullet and attempt to 
claim that Snakes and Ladders is not a game.  What could 
give us cause to think this?  Claiming that games must 
require skill to be games seems to beg the question of what 
games are, rather than looking at what are agreed upon as 
games and then determining what these things have in 
common.  Snakes and Ladders is often introduced to young 
children as one of the first formal games they learn, so it 
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would appear strange if we were to later learn that Snakes 
and Ladders was no game at all.  Biting the bullet in this 
instance then seems pretty unappealing.  
Maybe, then, our understanding of Fun could shift 
slightly?  We know the tension with our theory is that Fun’s 
associated flow states appears to require skill-building when 
Snakes and Ladders does not seem to build skill (except in 
very young children learning, for instance, the concept of 
taking turns).  Is it agreed upon that flow states always 
require skill-building however?  Quinn (2005), for instance, 
shows us that it is unclear if the hallmarks of flow such as 
‘balance of challenge and skill’ are actually necessary 
features of flow, or instead, something else. 
Looking back at Csikzsentmihalyi’s hallmarks of flow 
we have the (1) balance of challenge and skill, (2) clarity of 
goals, (3) clarity of feedback, (4) deep concentration, (5) a 
merger of action and awareness, (6) a sense of control, (7) an 
experience that is valued for its own sake, (8) the loss of self-
consciousness, and (9) the appararent distortion of time 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], pp. 48-67).  Quinn suggests 
that the first four points might be best thought of as pre-
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conditions, giving rise to flow (as described by the fifth point, 
a merger of action and awareness), resulting in the final four 
points which can be seen as consequences of that flow state.  
The further implication is that it is only the fifth point that 
is a necessary condition.  This allows Quinn to propose a 
definition of flow as ‘the experience of merging one’s 
situation awareness with the automatic application of 
activity-relevant knowledge and skills’ (Quinn, 2005, p. 17).  
What would this mean for flow and its relation to the 
building of knowledge and skill?  In short, it leaves the 
‘challenge versus skill-building’ condition as a non-necessary 
one.  Instead, explicit in Quinn’s definition, is the 
phenomenology of ‘awareness versus skill and knowledge’ 
explaining, too, why reading can place one in flow without 
strictly building skill.8  With our Snakes and Ladders game, 
we could plausibly maintain that it is the knowledge of the 
                                               
8 Something like this account I argue must be similar to Csikszentmihalyi’s 
reading of flow.  He cites reading (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008, p. 46) and games 
of chance (p. 61) as likely flow-producing activities despite them only 
building skill in the broadest possible sense.  It should be noted that if ‘the 
merging of action and awareness’ is the single necessary hallmark of flow 
then it seems hard to exclude watching television as flow-producing as 
Csikszentmihalyi wants to (see Brooker, 2005 for argument for this).  I leave 
this as an open debate seeing as we are on firmer ground with game-playing 
(the activity we are most interested in) as flow-producing, Snakes and 
Ladders notwithstanding.  
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outcome (rather than know-how) that is balanced with 
awareness, resulting in flow.  The unknown outcome of 
rolling a dice then could lead to flow under this reading of 
the concept.   
One could argue that Quinn’s definition requires not 
only knowledge (i.e. of outcomes) from the activity for there 
to be a flow state, but skill also.  This may be no problem 
however seeing as although Snakes and Ladders requires 
low skill that this is not to say the game requires no skill.  
For example, one seems to need some level of skill to be able 
to operate a random number generating device at the very 
minimum. 
But perhaps we need not alter our understanding of 
flow too much at all.  Csikszentmihalyi himself seems in no 
doubt that games of chance can provoke flow (which he uses 
interchangably with ‘enjoyable’ and ‘enjoyment’): 
 
One type of activity seems to constitute an exception. Games of 
chance are enjoyable, yet by definition they are based on 
random outcomes presumably not affected by personal skills. 
The spin of a roulette wheel or the turn of a card in blackjack 
cannot be controlled by the player. In this case, at least, the 
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sense of control must be irrelevant to the experience of 
enjoyment. (Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], p.61) 
 
He goes on to suggest that in games of chance that 
protagonists have a state of mind such that they believe 
what they are doing can affect the outcome, which is the 
determining factor rather than the actual truth of the 
situation.  Whether or not we wish to attribute the flow 
state of Snakes and Ladders to the uncertainty of the 
outcome, or the sense of control we (wrongfully) place in 
these situations, it seems that we want to agree with 
Csikszentmihalyi and say that Snakes and Ladders can 
provoke a true flow state.  If true, then our amendment to 
Suits holds up.  
We can further state that it needn’t be the case that 
Snakes and Ladders is particularly good at provoking flow.9 
For our amendment to hold we only need it to be the case 
                                               
9 Party games such as Twister or Cards Against Humanity, or other 
children’s games such as KerPlunk are often thought of as fun (at least for 
children) but not producing flow.  I suggest that although in these cases 
there is limited flow in practice, we must look, once again, at more idealised 
cases.  Certainly if we are to accept Privette’s model of flow from Chapter 2, 
we have the existence of ‘micro-flow’ states which can be argued to occur even 
in these more social games. 
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that Snakes and Ladders provokes flow (and therefore Fun) 
at times, rather than being a terrific way of provoking Fun 
in general.  It may be that one reason Snakes and Ladders is 
considered a better game for children than adults is that it 
is potentially more Fun for children than adults.  It is 
plausible for instance that children might be in more flow 
either from the uncertain outcomes of a dice roll whilst in 
more of a ‘magical thinking’ mindset or from learning skills 
such as dice-rolling or turn-taking.  At any rate, it does 
appear Snakes and Ladders can indeed provoke flow, 
especially in children, and that this fits well with the 




Philosophically important to our variation of Suits for 
a different reason are video games in the mould of Dear 
Esther (2012).  In this particular game the player takes 
control of a character on an island in the Hebrides, plotting 
a course through the foggy landscape while listening to clues 
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about the mysterious Esther.  The story behind Esther’s 
death is then slowly fed to the player at what is described as 
a ‘glacial pace’ (Kelly, 2012).  Much has been made about 
how in Dear Esther the player cannot interact with the 
environment by picking up objects or solving puzzles.  For 
some this places it closer to a story than a traditional game: 
‘all games live somewhere on a spectrum between pure 
gameplay and storytelling, but Dear Esther is so far over to 
the side of narrative that it’s really more of an interactive 
story than a game’ (‘bitmob’, 2012). 
Just as with the previous section where we might 
question whether the game of Snakes and Ladders provokes 
flow, we might, in this case, also question whether Dear 
Esther provokes flow.  Although resolving the mystery of the 
island may be considered a challenge to be overcome 
(challenge being integral to the way many flow-states are 
provoked) there are some important differences which 
suggest that Dear Esther may not actually provoke flow (or 
at least not in typical cases).  We know, for instance, that 
watching television tends not to provoke flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990], p.83).  This is not strictly 
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through a lack of challenge, as presumably there is 
challenge in understanding the plot and motivations of 
characters when viewing certain television programs.  As we 
have seen, it seems it is the ‘merging of action and 
awareness’ that is lacking when it comes to viewing 
television (although this, as we have seen, is contentious).  
Likewise, the awareness of the mysterious storyline in Dear 
Esther might be considered not sufficiently ‘merged’ with 
the actions of wandering around the island when playing, 
seeing as the gameplay might be considered too ‘easy’ a 
pleasure and not requiring the requisite full concentration 
and focus of flow. 
Besides being unclear as to whether Dear Esther 
provokes flow, one could also doubt whether the game 
provokes (folk) fun, the other ingredient in Fun.  Perhaps 
playing Dear Esther is not ‘for its own sake’ (i.e. folk fun) as 
it might appear at first.  One could claim instead, that art 
experiences are not ‘for their own sake’ (i.e. autotelic) or at 
least not in the way that renders them fun in a folk sense.  
The implication then is that experiencing art would be 
 
 187 
instrumental ends (although it is unclear on precisely what 
ends those would be). 
Some reviews of Dear Esther seem to go to this 
question: one reviewer saying ‘Dear Esther doesn’t exactly 
fall under the category of fun’ (Meyer, 2012), implying 
some other reason to play Dear Esther than purely for 
fun.  Reviewer Jamie Fletcher doesn’t hesitate to plump for 
Dear Esther being art: ‘Dear Esther is neither a game nor a 
movie; no – Dear Esther is a piece of art’ (Fletcher, 2012).  
Could art (if one were to contend that art is not considered 
to be for ‘its own sake’) be the reason for playing Dear 
Esther rather than pure pleasure? 
It is far outside the scope of this thesis to provide a 
definition of ‘art’, or even to compare the instrumental 
features of art experiences with that of games.  We must 
leave, then, the question of whether Dear Esther, and games 
like it, actually provokes fun, and indeed Fun.  If one were to 
have a problem with this dissertation’s addition to Suits, 
then it is anticipated that this may be one of the points of 
contention.  I think it can be plausibly claimed, however, 
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that whether art games provoke Fun is an open question, 
and quite possibly best investigated on a case-by-case basis. 
  It must be said, however, that perhaps we don’t want 
things like Dear Esther included in our true conception of 
games at all.  Dear Esther seems to be included in a 
category of things that do not appear to be games of a 
traditional variety.  Such a category can be seemingly neatly 




 Serious games, as a category, can be traced to Clark C. 
Abt, although he was largely writing about ‘pen and paper’ 
games when he introduced the idea, seeing as video game 
technology was in its infancy (see Abt, 1987).  The rise of the 
serious game genre has only become apparent, however, 
since the ubiquity of video games or video-game-like 
artefacts (Djaouti et al., 2011, pp. 1-2).  Defined by Chen and 
Michael as ‘games that do not have entertainment, 
enjoyment or fun as their primary purpose’ (Michael & 
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Chen, 2005) this and similar definitions of ‘serious games’ 
are essentially agreed upon.  As Susi, Johannesson and 
Backlund state: ‘Most agree on a core meaning that serious 
games are (digital) games used for purposes other than mere 
entertainment.’ (Susi, Johannesson, & Backlund, 2007, p. 1).  
An alternative, but similar, definition (that also only admits 
only of electronic games) is ‘any piece of software that 
merges a non-entertaining purpose … with a video game 
structure …’ (Djaouti et al., 2011, p. 2).   
Serious games can thus encompass training games and 
simulations of many varieties, examples including software 
used in training the military through to simulations used for 
training surgeons.  Games that are intended to impart 
information such as versions of advertisements, or games 
with a political message or educational function are included 
in this category, as well as games, like Dear Esther, that 
serve an art function (Djaouti et al., 2011; Flanagan, 2009).  
An increasing sub-category of serious games is one that 
facilitates an exchange of information rather than simply 
facilitates a one-way flow of information.  A famous example 
is Foldit (2008) where players fold proteins, providing new 
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information to scientists in the field via an online connection 
(Djaouti et al., 2011, p. 11). 
‘Edutainment’ and ‘educational games’ are concepts 
that are related to that of serious games.  In fact, 
‘edutainment’ can be seen as a broader concept covering any 
education that is also entertaining, but has particular 
connotations of PC-based games with educational aims that 
were particularly popular in the 1990s.  This genre (in the 
1990s sense) can be seen as a failed one however, seeing as 
the games were often seen as ‘boring’, hampering 
profitability (Susi et al., 2007, p. 2). 
So how, precisely, do serious games differ from 
‘regular’ games?  Serious games, at least very often, are not 
strictly autotelic and in contrast to conventional games often 
have instrumental value.  Susi, Johannesson and Backlund 
hint at this (where ‘rich experiences’ can be read as ‘fun’ in 
the autotelic sense): ‘Hardcore gamers generally want the 
richest possible experience from their games. For serious 
games, however, it is more important that the model or 
simulation can be used to solve a problem, than providing 
“rich experiences” of the kind sought by hardcore gamers.’ 
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(Susi et al., 2007, p. 6).  We have already seen that art 
games may plausibly have some instrumental ends related 
to being an artwork, but training games, educational games, 
advertisements and so on all have ends that would be 
strange to call ‘autotelic’ or for their own sake.  It seems 
then that serious games are unlikely to be considered Fun. 
For the purpose of this dissertation it really matters as 
to whether serious games are a true subset of games, or 
merely game-adjacent and thus not truly games at all.  We 
see, for example, the Michael and Chen definition seemingly 
claim that serious games are a subset of games rather than 
being just game-like, saying they are ‘games that do not 
have entertainment, enjoyment or fun as their primary 
purpose’ (Michael & Chen, 2005, emphasis mine).  On the 
other hand we may see serious games and games as a 
mutually exclusive dichotomy: ‘A problem with the term 
“serious game” itself is that there appears to be a 
contradiction between its constituents; the terms “serious” 
and “game” may seem to be mutually exclusive’ (Susi et al., 
2007, p. 4).  
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We also know that serious games are often not seen as 
games when they are good examples of their type, as with 
the art game Dear Esther (recall: ‘Dear Esther is neither a 
game nor a movie; no – Dear Esther is a piece of art’ 
(Fletcher, 2012)’.  JANUS Research Group, a company 
providing virtual training to the military and intelligence 
communities refer to their products primarily as ‘training’ or 
sometimes ‘immersive training’ rather than ‘games’.  The 
word ‘game’ seems only to be used in promotional material 
when specifically talking about ‘serious games’ ("JANUS 
Reasearch Group, Inc.," 2018).  Although not definitive I 
take this to be some evidence toward the idea that it is 
strange to describe serious games as games simpliciter. 
 Indeed, there seems to be a gap in terminology. If 
serious games were truly a variety of games, what would 
non-serious games be called?  Conventional games don’t 
appear to have their own identity apart from ‘game-proper’ 
or similar.  Even Michael and Chen’s definition seems to 
imply that ‘fun’ is a more usual case of a purpose of a game, 
and that serious games are outliers.  It is the contention of 
this thesis that the two opposing categories are ‘game’ on 
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one hand and ‘serious game’ on the other rather than ‘game’ 
being superordinate term with ‘serious game’ and its 
unnamed cousin (‘non-serious games’?) being subsets of 
these. 
 If we return to the Suits definition however, it is not 
hard to see why serious games are often lumped in with 
games.  Put simply, serious games can be argued to meet the 
original Suits definition.  By this I mean that serious games’ 
rules, one might argue, ‘are accepted just because they make 
possible such activity’ as per Suits.  
 Suits, however, already has provision for instrumental 
ends to games when in The Grasshopper clarifies what he 
means by ‘just’.  He says it is not intended to rule out 
professional game-players who earn money or win 
tournaments from game-playing, but to rule out what he 
calls the ‘quasi-game player’ (Suits, 1978, pp. 142-153), who 
don’t have the correct attitude towards games to be a game-
player.  Players training for surgery are thus, we can argue, 
not playing a game, seeing as they either don’t have a 
prelusory goal at all, or are playing for the ends of training 
to be a surgeon which, given the choice, they would quite 
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like not to require, seeing as it would mean they were a 
trained surgeon.  This arguably defies the ‘consititutive 
rules’ portion of Suits: if the prelusory goal of the serious 
game is to truly learn certain skills, then ‘playing’ the game 
is the most efficient way to learn those skills.   
Either way, those who are playing games to learn from 
them (in the manner of training games and simulators at 
least) are seemingly not playing games under Suits.  We can 
imagine this in an instance where a player, had they already 
been a qualified, experienced and respected surgeon they 
would not have played the serious game seeing as they had 
already learned the skills.  Interestingly, this means under 
the Suits definition (which remember is a definition of game-
playing, rather than ‘game’) one could imagine someone, 
such as a surgeon, playing a training program version of a 
serious game if their ‘lusory attitude’ of accepting the rules 
was to simply engage in the challenge rather than learning 
skills. 
 Our project is slightly different to Suits’ original one, 
in that we are more interested in games as things (to be 
studied, or played) rather than game-playing per se.  As has 
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been stated the general approach has been to take an 
idealised view of games and their creation.  From this 
perspective, it is easy to see that serious games under Suits, 
although could be played as a game, are not generally 
played as games, and thus, I claim, should not be considered 
true games under Suits. 
Whether serious games are simply a variety of games 
because they can be played as such or are not because they 
are not usually played as such is an interesting question and 
one that may have to remain open.  Either way, I will argue 
that this dissertation adds very little to delineating games 
and non-games, seeing as our addendum to Suits is so 
slight.10  For the purposes of investigation in this thesis, 
though, I feel it prudent to pick a side in the argument.  I 
will, then, assume that ‘serious game’ is an (understandable) 
misnomer of a category and that serious games are game-
like rather than being true games.  For supporting evidence, 
we can ask whether training simulators for surgeons or for 
                                               
10 Realistic simulators or semi-realistic games such as Papers Please or Euro Truck 
Simulator 2 that replicate work (e.g. border control or truck driving work) and which 
have trouble being labelled ‘Fun’ I suggest are already omitted from Suits’ definition 
by not having rules outlining less efficient means of achieving goals (i.e. constitutive 
rules) if indeed they have goals at all. 
 
 196
the military are usually referred to as ‘games’ (without the 
preface ‘serious’).  We can also ask similar questions about 
interactive art run on a computer.  Are they usually called 
‘games’?   
As to whether this lines up with folk intuition (recall 
that Suits original definition already diverges from everyday 
use when it comes to seeing foot-races as games) is also an 
open question.  Questions about which things people think of 
as games are empirical and, as such, can be tested in the 
field of experimental philosophy by surveying the public on 
their intuitions about language use.  Such an experiment 
may be a useful area of further research, although also 
outside the scope of this current, non-empirical, project.  For 
a decisive answer the question may need to be phrased as ‘is 
x a) a game or b) a ‘serious game’ or c) both a game and a 
‘serious game’?’.  However even results from these such 
questions should be read with caution.  My claim is that 
serious games are a misnomer, but the fact of the term 
including the word ‘game’ may lead to a bias towards people 
answering that serious games are games, when even their 
own intuitions run counter to that answer.  By this I mean 
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that self-reporting of intuition may actually give misleading 
results in this circumstance.  We may need to compare 
results to other things Suits saw as misnomers, such as the 
Olympic Games, where we may also see a significant 
proportion of answers claiming are games, even though, at 
least for Suits, they fall outside the true concept of what he, 
at least, was interested in. 
 
Microsoft Flight Simulator X 
 We will now look at a particular piece of software, 
Microsoft Flight Simulator X (2006) – also known as FSX.  
The Flight Simulator series is marketed as a game by 
Microsoft, and the last in the official series was FSX 
released in 2006 (Lackey, 2006).  But is it a game in reality?   
FSX attempts to simulate literally the entire globe for 
the purpose of navigation by a range of aeroplanes that the 
player can pilot.  Deemed so realistic that is a ‘great trainer 
for those seeking a real pilot's license’ (Lackey, 2006), the 
series prides itself on detail and ultra-realism, from dynamic 
weather to recreations of real airports.  Interestingly for our 
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purposes is that FSX also includes ‘missions’ such as 
rescuing oil rig workers, or performing stunts as a stunt 
pilot (Lackey, 2006). 
We know there is a little line-blurring between 
simulation games and simulators, the latter often thought of 
as serious games with the former as ‘regular’ games 
(Narayanasamy, Wong, Fung, & Depickere, 2005). 
Narayanasamy, Wong, Fung, & Depickere (2005) attempt to 
arrive at some characterisitics that may distinguish the two 
categories.  Interestingly ‘fun’ is cited as one of the 
distinguishing factors, specifically that simulation games 
are ‘fun to use’ (also ‘exciting’ and ‘interesting’ to use) 
whereas that simulators are ‘seldom fun to use’ 
(Narayanasamy et al., 2005, p. 143).  As might be expected, 
‘fun’ is not explicated at all, thus apparently appealing to 
common use of the word.  We can see though that this 
conception of a game adds support to our updated Bernard 
Suits/Fun definition as offered here, with its specific 




Perhaps the key to delineating between simulations 
(serious games) and simulation games (games-proper) for 
Narayanasamy, Wong, Fung, & Depickere is whether the 
software is ‘goal oriented’ or not (Narayanasamy et al., 2005, 
p. 143).  They cite simulators as ‘never’ being goal oriented 
and simulation games as ‘possibly’ goal oriented. 
(Presumably the goals the authors have in mind are formal 
in-game, autotelic, goals.  Clearly simulations might still 
have the goal of training players or other instrumental 
goals.)  This condition clearly shows that for Narayanasamy, 
Wong, Fung, & Depickere that FSX (with its goal oriented 
missions) must be a simulation game rather than a 
simulator, and thus a true game rather than a serious game. 
We can compare FSX in this regard to its predecessor 
in the series Microsoft Flight Simulator 2 (1984).  The 
earlier game is explicitly judged in the Narayanasamy, 
Wong, Fung, & Depickere article as, in contrast to FSX, to 
be clearly a simulation (Narayanasamy et al., 2005, p. 143) 
and as such a serious game.  An important fact, of course, is 
that that this earlier game in the series did not have 
missions, so is clearly not goal oriented in the sense that 
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they mean, informing their analysis that it is not a game.  
Assuming serious games are not games, we would 
presumably want our Suits definition (and, of course, our 
updated Suits defintion) to predict that adding missions 
turns a non-game into a game. 
To preserve this idea, perhaps one could plausibly 
argue that unlike the mission-led version, Microsoft Flight 
Simulator 2 does not have a prelusory goal. FSX (the 
mission-led version of the series) on the other hand creates 
prelusory goals that one must complete.  It need, then, only 
be true that these prelusory goals go on to provoke Fun in 
order for the amended Suits to hold.  Sure enough, it 




playing of FSX being for its own sake and thus Fun.11   
The fact that our ‘fun-as-autotelic’ condition of Fun 
adds little to Suits’ ‘lusory attitude’ confirms how strong the 
original Suits definition is.  Under both conceptions, all 
realistic simulators (usually) fail to meet the requirements 
of a game due to having instrumental ends.  It seems that 
‘games’ that advertise, teach addition and subtraction, allow 
one to fold proteins, and more, fail to meet the original Suits 
definition (as well as the updated version) seeing as these 
have extrinsic aims taken up by ‘quasi game-players’.  Once 
again one could plausibly call these serious games ‘games’ 
because they can be played as games given the correct 
psychological attitude, or one may consider them non-games 
due to to the way they are usually interacted with.  Either 
way, what the original Suits definition, and our amendment 
to it, say on the status of games does not appear to become 
uncoupled from each other when it comes to these problem 
cases. 
                                               
11 Having said this, ‘game-playing’ may not be universally the case when 
using FSX, and instead, only usual.  One could imagine a player training to 
fly a real plane with FSX, in which case under Suits (and the amended Suits) 
this would not be a case of game-playing.   
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In some sense, although the idea that the updated 
Suits definition delineates between games and non-games 
based on ‘Fun’ may be appealing, I suggest that the finding 
that Suits definition already makes complete and accurate 
distinctions between games and non-games is an important 
contribution.  The claim here will not be that the updated 
Suits definition proposed in this thesis is useful to the 
literature for reasons of determining when games are 
games, but instead for articulating where fun (or more 




 In this chapter we have taken a look at potential 
problems for our updated Suits’ definition.  We saw that it 
seemed the board game Snakes and Ladders may be a 
problem for our theory, seeing as flow – a necessary part of 
Fun – may require the building of skill to be counted as Fun.  
The problem was, of course, that Snakes and Ladders 
appears to need very little skill at all and is better seen as a 
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game of chance.  With an updated definition of flow along 
the lines of Quinn (Quinn, 2005), however, we saw that it 
was ‘awareness’ that was the necessary variable for flow and 
that flow could potentially incorporate ‘awareness versus 
knowledge of outcome’ in addition to ‘awareness versus 
know-how’.  Even if we were sceptical of such a claim, we 
must surely respect Csikszentmihalyi’s understanding of 
games of chance being able to provoke flow through the 
sense of control players have over random events. 
 Also in the chapter was an investigation of serious 
games, a category that includes art games such as Dear 
Esther, as well as training simulators and other games not 
apparently designed for entertainment.  We argued that 
‘serious game’ was a term in opposition to ‘game’ and thus a 
misnomer.  It was claimed in this chapter that serious 
games are usually only referred to as games when it is clear 
in the context that they are outliers as game-like objects.  
Training simulators, for example, rarely market themselves 
as ‘games’ unless prefaced with ‘serious’.  It was claimed 
that experimental philosophy might hold the key to testing 
these intuitions, but that even those results would need to 
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be taken with a grain of salt.  It was argued, for example, 
that the fact ‘game’ appears in the term ‘serious game’ could 
prejudice those asked if serious games were, in fact, games. 
We also investigated Microsoft Flight Simulator X 
(2006) (FSX).  We saw that it appears to fit descriptions of a 
simulation game instead of a simulation, a simulation 
taking it typically to the realm of serious games.  This was 
despite FSX being stunningly realistic.  The reason for 
falling under ‘simulation game’ category is that FSX has 
game elements (unlike earlier versions in the series) and as 
such has a prelusory goal in the form of optional missions to 
be completed.   
Assuming the original Suits definition already excels 
at distinguishing between games and non-games, this leaves 
our updated theory as useful for other reasons.  In 
particular, building Fun into the theory, as we saw in 
Chapter 3 is helpful when it comes to analysing the value of 
game-playing, as well as when and why we would want to 
alter a games’ rules.  Most of all, however, it is satisfying to 
draw a clear line between games and Fun, when our 






The conjecture underlying this entire dissertation is 
that fun may be an overlooked lens through which to look at 
games.  The concept of fun has, as we have seen, had a 
striking lack of literature linking it to games, not least 
because fun itself has been an undertheorised concept.  
When fun is thought about as a standalone subject (as 
opposed to being conflated with play, leisure and enjoyment) 
it is rarely picked up and used outside a sociological context.  
The intent here has seen a more philosophical approach, in 
particular concerned with the ontology of games and the 
values of game-players and games themselves. 
 The aim in this thesis has been to take existing 
approaches in the philosophy of games, most notably 
formalist definitions such as the famous definition of game-
playing from Bernard Suits, and to marry them with the 
concept of fun.  How successfully this has been done may be 
debatable, in part, because fun has proven to be a very 
elusive concept.  The precise principle behind fun – which is 
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to say why we talk of some pleasurable activities being fun 
while it being strange to use ‘fun’ for other activities – has 
not been uncovered in this current project.  One helpful 
heuristic may be to ask ourselves whether the activity is 
performed for any instrumental ends, seeing as autotelic 
experiences are more often described as ‘fun’ in a folk sense.  
We admitted though that even then the vagueness 
associated with the phrases ‘autotelic’ and ‘for its own sake’ 
left the principles of fun frustratingly open-ended.  The true 
principles behind fun would be a worthwhile topic of further 
study, I suggest, seeing as it stands to reason there may be 
an underlying variable rather than the use of ‘fun’ being 
simply a quirk of language. 
 Since ‘fun’ is too imprecise to use without controversy, 
a technical version of ‘fun’ has been used throughout the 
present dissertation.  Introduced fully in Chapter 2, ‘Fun’, 
which we have signalled with a capital-F, is stipulated to be 
the intersection of fun and flow.  We will fully recapitulate 
what is meant by ‘Fun’ in a moment, but for now we can 
argue that it retains much of what we want from the folk 
sense of the word ‘fun’.  There has been a sense that (folk) 
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fun and games are linked in important ways that seem 
inscrutable, but the aim here has been informed by the 
notion that if we can be explicit about the link between the 
technical concept of Fun and games then this may still be 
useful for the overall project. 
 In order to give an argument about how fun is a 
worthwhile way to look at games, a full investigation of 
games and a full investigation of fun has been needed.  
Chapter 1 was that investigation of games.  Unlike fun, 
there has been no shortage of writings on games, so it 
became evident that the review of literature needed to be 
delimited.  It was decided that the ‘philosophy of games’ was 
the best method to approach the questions that this 
dissertation was posing. 
 Recall that the philosophy of games is a growing 
subfield of philosophy mainly concerned with philosophical 
approaches to games in the analytic tradition, or at least 
with some intersection with an Anglo-American style of 
philosophy.  We have seen there is some slight cross-over 
with philosophy of games and ‘games studies’, the latter 
taking many of its cues from cultural and literary theory.  
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However, even when games studies does align with the 
philosophy of games it can be argued that this tends to 
happen when games studies is at its most analytic 
philosophy-like. 
 The review of literature on games in Chapter 1 closely 
tracks the key foundational text from C. Thi Nguyen from 
Philosophy Compass with the additional observation that 
mention of fun is lacking in game literature.  Following 
Nguyen, we can identify four main approaches to the 
philosophy of games; games as magic circles, games as texts, 
games as art, and games as activities.  We began by 
introducing the three foundational thinkers for philosophy of 
games, also as identified by Nguyen: Caillois, Huizinga and 
Suits.  Huizinga is cited as the originator of the ‘magic circle’ 
concept in games, Caillois is, perhaps, best remembered for 
his four categories of games (Agôn, Alea, Mimicry and Ilinx) 
(Caillois, 1961[1958], pp. 11-23) while Suits is known for his 
definition of ‘game-playing’. 
 Important for our thesis, ‘formalism’ (the idea that 
rules are constituted, at least in part, by their rules) is 
exemplified most strongly by Bernard Suits’ definition of 
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game-playing: the orthodox, perhaps even largely accepted, 
definition in the literature.  We saw how the Suits definition 
of game-playing has both a ‘long’ and ‘short’ version, the 
short being: ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary 
obstacles’ (Suits, 1978, p. 43).  We saw, too, some inevitable 
objections to Suits, criticisms that it is both too narrow and 
too broad, most notably from Frank McBride (McBride, 
1979).  The major worry, it seems, is that if there can be 
shown any game without constitutive rules then this seems 
to sink the definition.  Despite this fact, most concerns can 
be countered with a broad enough conception of rules. 
 The main approaches to games were the next to be 
investigated in Chapter 1.  Games-as-art and games-as-text 
methods were deemed to be valuable but limited for an 
essentialist understanding simply because not all games can 
be usefully read as texts or art in a literal sense.  Despite 
this, the field of games studies, for instance, shows the 
utility of games-as-text approaches for many games, 
incorporating all the richness of literary criticism with the 
added complexity of analysis of fluid narratives and 
gameplay.   
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Depending on one’s preferred definition, games are 
sometimes thought to intersect with art as well (see Lopes, 
2009, p. 10), especially as video games increase in their 
complexity and aesthetic beauty as technology improves.  
This leaves aestheticians with something to say about some 
games too.  Both games-as-text and games-as-art 
approaches have less to say about conventional games such 
as football, cricket or Snakes and Ladders however.  Instead 
it is a more complete and inclusive lens for games which this 
thesis has sought to endorse, explaining why both art and 
text methodologies have seen relatively limited analysis in 
the present dissertation. 
 We saw a more promising approach in Chapter 1 
known as the ‘magic circle’, as first proposed by Johan 
Huizinga, although there are several readings of what this 
concept actually entails.  Later in Chapter 3 we read that it 
was Eric Zimmerman and his collaborators who instigated 
the modern iteration of the magic circle; the separation of 
reality and the game-playing world.  Although much 
maligned, later in Chapter 3 we saw how Zimmerman 
claims that critiques of magic circle theory are often 
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‘strawman’ criticisms, in the sense that no-one is literally 
claiming that games create a completely separate space from 
the rest of reality, as is often assumed.  Stenros instead 
suggests that magic circles are best seen as a metaphor for 
the ‘social contract’ entered into when players decide to 
enter games, for example boxers agreeing to forego the usual 
norms of society that prevents fights from breaking out.  The 
binary between play and non-play however, means that 
other differences can be projected onto the canvas of magic 
circles.  One such reading is the psychological state between 
playing and not-playing.  We will fully recapitulate this 
important difference when talking of Chapter 3 in a 
moment, and its relevance to flow, and of course, Fun. 
 Also, in Chapter 1 was a look at philosophy-of-sport 
style approaches to games.  As Nguyen tells us, this is quite 
distinct from seeing games as objects as with the other 
methodologies (Nguyen, 2017, p. 10).  Philosophy of sport 
typically sees games as activities and, as such, seeks to 
analyse their cultural and social importance as well as the 
personal values of their players.  Within this tradition a 
strand known as conventionalism seeks to place games’ 
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values within the conventions of play, for example that we 
should respect the convention of ‘professional fouling’ in 
basketball because it has a long tradition.  Others place 
value with the so-called ‘interest of the game’, such as 
Butcher and Schneider who claim we should value what 
‘honours or esteems’ the game itself (Butcher & Schneider, 
1998, p. 9).  This honouring or esteeming for Butcher and 
Schneider might take the form of embracing actions that 
would be good for the game if everybody did them, in a 
Kantian-style imperative.  Cheating for example, under this 
understanding, would render the game-playing pointless 
and it is thus this reason that one might want to refrain 
from such activities.   
Also important to the claims in this dissertation is the 
position of interpretive broad internalists, who argue that 
the value of games and game-playing can be divined from 
the essential properties of games; from talk of games and 
their place in society, to normative claims of how a game 
should be played and how its rules might be altered.  This is, 
of course, relevant to our purposes seeing as we are indeed 
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proposing to articulate the essence, and thus essential 
properties, of a game.   
 With a review of some of the literature of games under 
our belts we still needed to be clear on the nature of fun in 
order to propose that fun is an appropriate way of analysing 
games.  The slight literature on fun was reviewed in 
Chapter 2, from Wolfenstein’s views on fun as it changed 
after the second world war, to Fincham’s ground-breaking 
The Sociology of Fun (Fincham, 2016) and Blythe and 
Hassenzahl’s landmark work in the field of HCI (Human-
Computer Interaction) (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004).  Blythe 
and Hassenzahl’s contribution, in particular, was relevant to 
our discussion because it was precisely aimed at the 
semantic aspect of ‘fun’. 
 The underlying principle behind the semantics of fun, 
which would have been useful when combining a theory of 
games with a theory of fun, has been shown to be unclear at 
this time.  Some candidates for fun-making include some 
version of a social type of pleasure (Fincham, 2016, p. 200), a 
particular kind of active enjoyment (Dix, 2004) or intensity 
of experience further along a continuum to ‘distraction’ and 
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away from ‘absorption’ (Blythe & Hassenzahl, 2004).  
Perhaps, too, fun may have something to do with intrinsic 
pleasure rather than for instrumental ends, which is the 
assumption taken in this thesis.  There seems little 
agreement however between those seeking to uncover an 
underlying principle for fun and so the variable remains 
uncertain. 
 In Chapter 2 we deemed that the search for the nature 
of fun (at least without the associated vagueness) was out of 
reach for now.  Instead we searched for a more precise term 
that harnesses much of what ‘fun’ captures but with further 
clarity on fun’s phenomenology.  We coined the term ‘Fun’ 
which was stipulated to be the intersection of a folk 
understanding of fun (as seen as a form of pleasure pursued 
for its own sake) and flow.  We saw flow, as understood by 
Mihaly Csikszentmihaly (see Csikszentmihalyi, 2008; 
Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014) as being a term taken 
from the positive psychology movement describing the 
absorbed ‘in the zone’ feeling from a balance been 
achievement and skill.  The idea behind coining ‘Fun’ is that 
it necessarily describes the phenomenological feeling of a 
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subset of things we would usually call ‘fun’, seeing as the 
term is stipulated to precisely capture what is ‘fun’ but 
which has the phenomenology of a flow-state.   
The concept of Fun thus covers, for example, the 
feeling from being lost in the activity of painting, seeing it 
provokes an autotelic version of being in a flow state.  
Capital-F ‘Fun’ typically excludes watching television, 
however, because, although perhaps ‘fun’ due to being done 
for its own sake, doesn’t provoke flow through control, 
building skill or merging action and awareness.  The new 
concept of Fun also excludes reading for instrumental ends 
seeing as, although provoking flow, it is rarely described as 
‘fun’ because it distinctly non-autotelic. 
 Chapter 2 concluded with a series of diagrams to 
clarify different thinkers’ ideas and their specific uses of the 
term ‘fun’, from Fincham’s use of ‘fun’ which was suggested 
to be closely mirroring the folk use, to Blythe and 
Hassenzahl’s ‘fun’ which is similar except that it excludes 




 We then turned, in Chapter 3, to a synthesis of the 
concepts of fun and games, or, more precisely, Fun and 
games.  After endorsing Suits’ formalism as perhaps the 
strongest definition of game, at least in an essentialist 
sense, we came to realise that a condition of ‘accepting rules 
just because they make possible some activity’ may leave 
Suits open to charges of circularity.  It was proposed that we 
could add to Suits a reason behind the acceptance of the 
rules, thereby avoiding circularity and giving us an 
opportunity to sneak ‘Fun’ into the theory. 
 The proposed change to the lusory condition from 
Suits’ definition leaves us with the condition of rules being 
accepted just to make possible an activity that provokes 
Fun.  This, of course, is only a subtle change from the 
original Suits, and as stated, means that Suits may be 
correct as far as it goes.  Indeed, it is important that the 
amendment to the definition retains everything from the 
original, and then merely adds to it.  The addition, in this 
case, adds the reason that the rules would be accepted over 
and above bringing the game into existence.  That reason 
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suggested for bringing games into existence is a form of 
pleasure-seeking: that is to provoke Fun. 
 We have already mentioned magic circles here in this 
conclusion, but it is important to reiterate why a formalist 
account that included Fun would be relevant to the concept.  
We saw in Chapter 3 that magic circles have tended to be a 
bit of a blank canvas on which theorists can project.  If we 
take magic circles to be simply talking of the distinction 
between play and non-play, then one version of that is the 
psychological aspect of playing games, the ‘psychological 
bubble’.  Seeing as game-playing is necessarily Fun and thus 
includes the phenomenological feeling of flow, then clearly 
Fun has a particular phenomenological character.  The 
reason games are played then (i.e. for Fun), potentially 
exists inside the psychological version of the magic circle.  
We saw how this may be useful when thinking why people 
would particularly value games and the state of mind for 
those who play them. 
 Also in Chapter 3 we saw how a theory of games which 
includes fun (or Fun) impacts on philosophy of sport 
approaches to games.  We know it is more common to see 
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games treated as activities to be valued within the 
philosophy of sport tradition.  In particular, philosophy of 
sport gives us a ready-made way of approaching the value of 
games.  We saw how that if we take seriously so-called 
‘interpretive broad internalism’ (and our addition to Suits) 
then Fun gets built in to the lusory goal and becomes a 
reason to value the game or a reason to tinker with its rules. 
 Finally in Chapter 3 we took a look at the pragmatics 
of games in terms of economics.  It was noted that the 
changes to games that directly relate to revenue – such as 
in-game purchases of costumes and ‘skins’ – often have very 
little impact on the Fun of playing the game.  It was 
suggested, however, that the game still need be Fun for the 
game to make money, lest players lose interest in the game 
and the in-game purchases.  This obviously has the result of 
Fun still potentially being a necessary condition to a game 
making money. 
 In Chapter 4 we turned to counter arguments and case 
studies.  We discussed the difficult cases of games that may 
not create a feeling of Fun.  We know a flow state is a 
necessary part of Fun, as stipulated, but we looked at a case 
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where there could be game-playing that doesn’t strictly place 
one in flow.  We saw how that although one may be absorbed 
in a game of Snakes and Ladders that the lack of skill 
involved seems antithetical to a narrow reading of 
Csikszentmihalyi’s flow states.   
Inconveniently for our thesis, it seemed something 
may have had to shift if Snakes and Ladders, the archetypal 
game, was to retain game status under our theory.  We saw, 
however, that Quinn’s proposed definition of flow as ‘the 
experience of merging one’s situation awareness with the 
automatic application of activity-relevant knowledge and 
skills’ (Quinn, 2005, p. 17) may be able to rescue us.  If true, 
this leaves the challenge-versus-skill condition as a non-
necessary one and focusses instead on the phenomenology of 
awareness-versus-skill-and-knowledge.  One could then 
plausibly argue that the knowledge of the outcome is 
balanced with awareness, leading to flow.  Although very 
limited skill is needed to compete, we heard the argument 
that this perhaps does not mean no skill thus apparently 
fitting with Quinn’s proposed definition. 
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Of course, it is broadly understood in the literature 
that games of chance can indeed provoke flow. 
Csikszentmihalyi himself cites games of chance as flow-
producing activities in his foundational work 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2008[1990]).  One idea from 
Csikszentmihalyi is that it may be the misplaced sense of 
control that players have over how much they influence the 
game that can be linked to producing flow states.  
Agreement that games of chance can provoke flow then 
seems to avoid Snakes and Ladders being a true problem 
case. 
The next case study in Chapter 4 was the mysteriously 
plotted video game Dear Esther (2012).  We saw that Dear 
Esther was unusual in that it had very few, if any goals, for 
the player to achieve while trudging around a virtual, foggy 
island.  Instead, narrative was the focus, as the players are 
drip-fed letters read to the unseen Esther.  We saw that it 
was unclear if Dear Esther’s rules, as they are, are 
technically accepted just to make possible an activity that is 
Fun.  The lack of clarity as to whether the game is Fun is for 
different reasons than Snakes and Ladders.  Although one 
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could also argue that Dear Esther doesn’t place one in a flow 
state and is more similar to watching television than 
reading or active play, there are other reasons to doubt the 
status of ‘Fun’.  Dear Esther may not be ‘fun’ to play in the 
folk (i.e. autotelic) sense which would preclude it from being 
a good example of Fun.  We saw reviews such as ‘Dear 
Esther: You’re Not A Real Game At All’ (‘bitmob’, 2012) and 
‘When A Game Is Not a Game’ (Fletcher, 2012) for instance, 
hinting that the game was not ‘fun’ enough to be a game.  It 
was proposed that the ‘ends’ for art games may not be 
strictly autotelic, and instead that art production might not 
be considered ‘for its own sake’ in the manner that we are 
interested in.  
We noted that the existence of a game such as Dear 
Esther left us with two options to rescue our theory.  We 
might either admit that Dear Esther was fun in a limited 
way, or, as endorsed here, that Dear Esther and other 
similar ‘games’ known as ‘serious games’ are games by 
misnomer.  ‘Serious games’ – that is games that ‘train, 
educate and inform’ (Michael & Chen, 2005) – were looked 
at as a category in the remainder of the chapter.  One 
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subcategory of serious games, as we saw, is of art games.  
The ‘art game’ however may be a slightly vague category for 
it can be claimed that mainstream released games, small 
independent releases and art pieces found in galleries can 
all be described with this moniker.   
Other ‘serious’ games include training simulators such 
as flight simulators, and computer simulations for the 
military, as well as educational games that are sometimes 
used in schools.  We saw, as by way of a case study, that 
Microsoft Flight Simulator X (2006) might be a game proper 
and not a serious game because it has missions that give a 
prelusory goal, a feature of a Suitsian game.  We also saw 
that the original Bernard Suits definition may already 
distinguish between games and not-games.  Although a 
serious game that exists to train a surgeon, for instance, 
would seemingly not qualify as (folk) fun seeing as there are 
more instrumental ends to the game, we saw how Suits 
already has provision for so-called ‘quasi game-players’ and 
their instrumental ends with the use of his choice of word: 
‘just’.  It was argued, then, that the updated Suits may not 
distinguish between games and not-games any differently to 
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the original Suits, but that it may still be useful to highlight 
how games are related to Fun.  
The four chapters combined to make a case for the 
concept of fun to not be forgotten when theorising about 
games.  Although fun is a slippery concept, its stand-in 
‘Fun’, as coined in this dissertation, may be useful.  Capital-
F Fun, by definition, gives us a level of precision over the 
phenomenology felt when something is considered (folk) fun, 
seeing as the term is stipulated to be the intersection of 
autotelia and flow states.  Harnessing this idea, we can add 
to the well-respected Bernard Suits definition of game-
playing and suggest that a game’s rules are accepted just to 
make possible an activity that provokes Fun.  Although only 
a slight amendment to ‘just to make possible an activity’ 
condition, in many ways this can be seen one of its great 
benefits, seeing as the Suits definition has actually served 
us very well since its introduction in 1978.  In complete 
form, the updated Fun/Suits definition now reads: 
 
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means 
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permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in 
favour of less efficient means, and where the rules are accepted 
just to make possible an activity that provokes Fun (adapted 
from Suits, 1978). 
 
This, as has been claimed in this dissertation, shows 
us the precise relationship between fun and games (or at 
least Fun and games).  Seeing as the link between fun and 
games is thus very strong, fun as a concept should not be 
ignored when it comes to writing and thinking about games.  
Perhaps we can even make the claim, after interpretive 
broad internalism, that there is a normative claim to be 
made; that games ought to be fun. 
Once we have the concept of Fun built in to our 
definition, as a reason for playing games, this gives us some 
exciting areas of further research, either through formalism 
itself, or in conjunction with magic circle approaches and the 
philosophy of sport.  We have perhaps even made a small 
step in the philosophy of games in straddling both games-as-
activity approaches and games-as-object approaches.  We 
can see this by dint of the fact that the updated Suits 
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definition gives us a new way to value games as artefacts: 
specifically, as we have claimed, that there is merit in 
valuing games qua games that provoke more Fun over the 
ones that provoke less Fun.   
In addition to the treatment of games as artefacts with 
a purpose of Fun, the introduction of ‘Fun’ as a constitutive 
part of games gives the activity of playing games its due.  
The playing (an activity) then is important both in regard to 
its phenomenology as one of an autotelic flow state (i.e. Fun) 
as well opening up discussion as to the social and cultural 
value of games and those who play them based on whether 
the playing is Fun.  If the future of the philosophy of games 
lies in the synthesis of both games-as-objects and games-as-
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